The supposedly final session of the Libyan Reconciliation Dialogue ended in Geneva last Wednesday with a press release saying: “The talks were held in a positive atmosphere, with the different parties emphasising the need to set aside partisan agendas and uphold Libya’s higher national interests. The parties reiterated their…. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya Bernadino Leon explained to the parties how discussions would proceed on the annexes to the Libyan Political Agreement…. The parties expressed optimism that…. The parties underscored their determination to conclude the dialogue process as soon as possible, with a target date within the coming three weeks...”. However, the declaration ignored the most crucial hope of forming a National Unity Government, as originally promised by the UN envoy.

Needless to say, the Libyan crisis may have potentially catastrophic consequences to the Mediterranean Basin, and the EU in particular. Such concerns were behind the initiation of the reconciliation dialogue in the first place.

The talks between various Libyan factions, held in different capitals, have been fraught with boycotts over details, reflecting the participants’ suspicions and lack of trust or simply lack of prerogatives. The resultant state of uncertainty has led observers to call for acquiescing to “Half an Agreement” as being better than none, or even “no agreement” as better than the one being sought by the UN. 

But when you think about it, resolving any conflict requires so many factors – the most crucial of which is the accuracy of diagnosis – on which a remedial scheme may be planned. Personally, as repeatedly articulated in several articles published on the pages of this newspaper, I have been wary of too much optimism regarding the present UN approach. The current civil war must be brought to an end. The Libyan people have endured much unnecessary suffering yet, in their evident patient and passive neutrality, have shown complete rejection of the war.

 

Mirage

Mr Leon has proved to be a juggler and able to muster pressure from distant related parties in order to coerce or lure hesitant groups to the negotiating table. Yet suspicions remain and squabbles continue. False promises keep recurring, including the promise of putting together a “government of national unity”. Such a government – formed not on the basis of real compromise or a real willingness to share power –  will be conditioned by so many ‘ifs’ if it materialises, if it can be installed in the capital Tripoli and if it can govern, etc. Judging from the current slippery undertakings, the ride will be arduous and the results uncertain. The present jostle for nominating a premier is as revealing as it is pathetic, hence the flood of sarcastic comments in the Libyan media.

The confusion, arguments and false hopes that have accompanied the reconciliation talks are indicative of a flawed approach. The political crisis in Libya cannot even be really described in terms of governments or legislative assemblies or even political parties. All these entities are secondary, unreliable and unstable.

Simply put, Libya is in the throes of a vicious and devastating civil war and therefore only leaders of armed groups have any importance on the ground, regardless of their relative political acumen or undeclared aims.

 

The Libyan power divide

In real terms, the power divide in Libya runs between an army and a broad alliance of Islamic-inclined formations (usually referred to as ‘militias’ to their annoyance). The ‘army’ includes the National Army led by General Hafter in the eastern part of the country (Cyrenaica, where its main theatre of war is in Benghazi), the Libyan Army and the Army of the Tribes, west of Tripoli.

The ‘Islamic militias’ include those controlling the Capital (Dawn Alliance), dominating Misrata, fighting in Benghazi (under the banner of the Rebels Shura Council) and now controlling Derna after evicting the extremist IS fighters a few weeks ago. All these formations are the extension of the Libyan Fighting Group, formed in the 1990s against the Gaddafi regime. They also include rebels who rose against Gaddafi in February 2011. The two parliaments and two governments in Tobrug and Tripoli are protected and controlled by either the Army or a militia alliance.

The extensions of IS in Libya are based in Sirte and around Derna, but are not involved in the current quest for reconciliation. The Libyan oil fields are in the hands of the autonomous and quasi-tribal Guards.

Although the Army, as well as the militias, are trying to improve their images, the international community has every right to be nervous of them, since splintering and retributions are a constant threat. There is also fear of a military takeover, while the militias nurture a deep suspicion of the state police and Army.

 

Who should negotiate?

It is clear that talks involving politicians and hand-picked activists cannot be fruitful because civilians have no guarantee of personal safety, and politicians are subservient to the leaders of armed groups. In any case, many politicians are known to be corrupt or have been publicly humiliated and are hardly credible any longer.

All this leads to one conclusion: for the Libyan Dialogue to be rewarding, negotiations must involve the military leaders on both sides of the divide. This may sound like seeking the impossible in view of the depth of reciprocal hatred, suspicion, and feelings of guilt when it comes to talking to those who have killed your comrades.

But continued hostilities also bring with them more victims as well as blame. With suffering and chaos becoming widespread, war engenders a sense of its own futility and sows elements of exhaustion. The word tends then to replace the gun as a negotiating tool. After all, many civil wars did end in peace.

What Libya now needs, first and foremost, is a truce. Negotiations should be sought through a local initiative that makes use of traditional channels and local means of persuasion, pressure, pledges and guarantees. Such mediation requires individuals with credibility, as well as familiarity with the socio-political geography of Libya.

But, the reader may ask, is the time ripe for such a truce? And despite all the continued killings and devastation, I venture to say: ‘Yes!’.