SAVIOUR RIZZO

The mechanism of social dialogue, in existence in Malta since 1990 and legally institutionalised in 2001 through the MCESD Act, offers a platform where different interests of workers and employers are recognised and collective representation of their interest accepted.

In other words the social dialogue, upon which this social partnership mechanism is based, is meant to bridge the cultural gap between the main actors involved in industrial relations. The integrative and collaborative spirit which is supposed to prevail in this institution is meant to encourage an effective trade-off between their respective different interests and their resistance to any measures that may adversely affect their constituents.

However events since the 1990s have shown that this spirit of compromise and consensus building may not have always prevailed or did not manifest itself as one would have liked to.

The present impasse between the social partners where they tend to engage in open confrontation and accusing each other of irresponsibility is far from being the only case.

Why have there been so many occurrences wherein social partners have engaged in this kind of turf war? Is there something amiss with the institutionalisation of tripartite social dialogue in Malta? It is of course naïve to presume that the setting up of a social partnership mechanism would create a climate of peace and harmony in industrial relations. But social analysts have tried to identify a system which has managed to build a high level of consensus. This model can be found in the Netherlands.

The Dutch system of social partnership has attracted the attention of many experts all over the world because it is perceived as providing the ideal mechanism of social dialogue that appeals to the principles of a social market economy. Indeed, it has been dubbed as a success story by Bill Clinton and Jacques Delors.

The Dutch system of industrial relations is synonymous with the consensus culture, which way back in the 16th and 17th century enabled disparate interest groups to join forces in order to stave off the threat of floods to their low lands. By means of this spirit of cooperation they managed to build ‘polders’ – stretches of land reclaimed from the sea or lake protected by dykes to prevent flooding. Since the same consensual ethic and cooperative spirit tend to prevail among the social partners, the Dutch industrial relation system has earned the name of ‘The Polder Model’.

The main tripartite corporate institution in this polder model is the Social and Economic Council (SER) which is very similar to the Maltese counterpart, MCESD, as regards role and composition. The difference is that the persons appointed by government are not civil servants but people specialising in the field of economics, law, finance and sociology. They are not accountable to government.

This, however, is not the only difference between the Dutch and the Maltese system. The institutional framework of social dialogue in the Netherlands embraces a number of advisory and consultative bodies, each contributing to the national consensus. Three of these bodies, which tend to keep a very high profile in the designation of policy making, are the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Social and Cultural Planning Office and the Advisory Council on Government Policy.

These three institutions are separate from each other but they complement each other in the sense that they provide the social actors involved in industrial relations with the necessary information backed by valid data.

The Bureau for Economic Planning makes independent analysis relevant to economic policy. It has established itself as a widely trusted source of independent economic analysis. In its analysis it tries to make short term (one to two years ahead), medium term (four to five years ahead) and long term (less than 20 years) forecasts. These forecasts can be very useful for the designation of wage policy by the social partners and fixing the budget of social assistance.

The Social and Cultural Council regularly publishes reports on the living situation of the Dutch population. Among the aspects covered are health status, education level, labour market participation rate, housing situation, disposable income and leisure time utilisations of various sections of the population. The opinions of the Dutch population on social, ideological and political topics are monitored through surveys.

Policy-making tends to give rise to a lot of puzzles. Trying to find a solution to these puzzles is the remit of the Advisory Council on Government Policy. This advisory council publishes reports in all policy areas.

Its opinions may deviate from those held by the cabinet. However, the government is bound to respond to the reports of this council.

The professional approach of these institutions has been instrumental in building a high level of mutual trust relationship among the social partners. The data they provide give that much needed legitimacy to the decisions which have to be taken.

Of course, this does mean that the industrial relations system in the Netherlands is free of conflict. During the month of October negotiations between the social partners were deadlocked over issues such as the early retirement schemes, social benefits for the unemployed and disabled people. This deadlock sparked off a number of strikes and demonstrations. It was in the second week of November that an agreement was reached on these issues following recommendations made by the Social and Economic Council.

However much the polder model of industrial relations may have built a system of harmonious relations, envied by many western countries, the Dutch are aware that there is no paradise without snakes. But the mutual trust inbuilt in this system may go a long way in keeping the actors on continuous alert about the presence and danger of these snakes.

They may thus manage to stave off this danger in the same way as by their polder system they succeeded in controlling the floods.