All the strictures we currently pronounce or have to endure from others, about the need to enhance competitiveness and productivity, should not be applied only to Drydocks, factory and public sector workers. They must be equally extended to the ways by which we, as a nation, take decisions.

At present, the more one looks closely at what is happening around us, the more one concludes that we are failing badly in the ‘higher’ level tasks of evaluating national challenges and co-ordinating our response to them. As a case in point, one could consider the recent fiasco over the conclusion of a social or national pact among the members of the Malta Council for Economic and Social Development.

I will not go into the processes by which the talks/negotiations or whatever were articulated, since I do not know enough about what actually happened. But there was another instance that occurred at practically the same time, where the opportunity to make concrete if modest breakthroughs in national policy making was botched.

Immigration

The reference is to the national conference on irregular immigration, held early last month. It is instructive to evaluate what went on while it lasted, in order to understand how it is useless to preach about the need to increase productivity at shopfloor level, if our strategic decision-making remains ineffective on a national level.

As it happens, I know something about what the aims of this national conference should have been. At a press conference on Labour’s behalf, along with deputy leaders Charles Mangion and Michael Falzon, and with Labour’s main spokesperson on home affairs, Gavin Gulia, I proposed the holding of a national conference to thrash out the issues that are being raised by the arrival of illegal immigrants in Malta. There is no need to repeat here the problems that this phenomenon is creating, just like it is doing in neighbouring countries. These have been described time and time again.

The problems do not result from factors that can be controlled from the Maltese end. The arising disruptions create human, physical and financial strains which can sometimes become huge. All too often, many people feel like we might be engulfed by the problem, and that the fabric of our economy and society could be seriously weakened, as more and more foreigners arrive at our shores in uncontrolled and uncontrollable numbers.

Yet over the months, the government’s approach to the whole issue seemed wishy-washy at best, thereby helping to generate new waves of popular fear. Often, the security forces – police and army – seemed overwhelmed by what was going on. They were under-resourced and untrained to deal with the demands of the new immigrant communities.

Actually, for much of the time, the focus was on the ideological or moral questions raised by any policy designed to deal with illegal (or irregular) incomers. Should they be allowed to move freely within Maltese territory? Or should they be detained?

To be sure, both main parties represented in Parliament have been in broad agreement on the need for detention, and this in the national interest. Nuances within such a position would frequently arise, not least because of the different ideological stances taken by non-governmental organisations involved in the area. Many NGOs – who have members also active in the political parties – have been pushing for liberal policies (that is non-detention) to be adopted in dealing with immigrants.

If there is a subject on which a national consensus should be sought, it was – still is – this one. So it made sense to get all the political, economic and social ‘forces’ within the nation around one table and try to agree on a number of concrete propositions about future action. Even if this had to only happen among the two main parties represented in Parliament, it would be a distinct advance.

At first, and for quite a while, the Gonzi administration clearly felt that there was some trap in Labour’s proposal for a national conference. Their media and propaganda pundits ridiculed it mercilessly – this is what they do most of the time with whatever Labour proposes.

Then somebody on the government side relented, possibly because it became evident that public opinion had warmed to the idea of a national conference on illegal migration. For, meanwhile, illegal immigrants kept arriving and the Gonzi administration felt itself under increasing pressure.

No ambushes

Still, they apparently wanted reassurance that any national conference would not end up as a political ambush. So the Prime Minister and his deputy declared that before the conference could be held, both main political parties needed to publish their policies on immigration. Then, their differences, if any, could be confronted and dealt with.

Now, this was patently nonsense. If you go to a conference where you would like to achieve formal agreement about how to co-ordinate positions and agree on a way forward, it is hardly wise to cast your policy ideas in concrete just prior to the conference.

Moreover, any step forward needed to be weighed against the material and financial constraints that we as a nation face. For instance, if non-governmental organisations have a certain viewpoint based on praiseworthy moral and ideological criteria, the conference would test their views against the facts of the national situation, such as it is. Given that kind of context it would be possible, hopefully, to devise a framework that respects the national interest, while sticking as close as possible to the high moral ground.

Indeed, there are two ways by which to structure a national conference of the sort that was being proposed. The first, easiest and futile way, is to string together a list of speakers, all expected to delivery ‘plenary’ and inconclusive speeches, whether controversial or not, stack in leisurely coffee breaks plus a lunch or two, and allow everybody to leave with the satisfied feeling that much has been said, even if little done. Unfortunately, most Maltese policy conferences – no matter how well meaning their organisers – adopt this method.

The second way is to design conference work as much as possible around discussion inside working groups, having topics defined to cover clearly specified segments of the matter at hand. ‘Plenary’ speeches would be restricted to the bare minimum. Or else they are tolerated as a boring and irrelevant sideshow, compared to the agenda set for the working groups. Representation on the latter would come from all the relevant ‘forces’ attending the conference. The working groups would be invited to review in closed or open session the facts and material about their topic, and to come out with reactions, proposals, agreements.

As views are aired and contrasted within work groups dealing with illegal immigration, political parties and non-governmental organisations could conceivably converge in their views towards a common statement defining an action programme.

Methodology

Here is how such a method would develop: a chosen expert, acting as co-ordinator on a given subject, would write a report based on discussions and interviews s/he would have had with all interested parties in a given area, plus related research. The report would present his/her conclusions and proposals for discussions in the working group. It would be circulated to members of the working groups within the national conference beforehand, so that all would have time to give considered reactions. When the working groups meet, their discussions would be monitored by a rapporteur who would present an account of proceedings. On the basis of the experts’ reports, and the accounts presented by the rapporteurs, the conference would meet in plenary mode to agree or disagree on conclusions.

This is the model for a national conference on irregular immigration that Labour had in mind. It copies the methods followed by national conferences organised abroad to generate policy directives. And it is what we proposed to government during the informal discussions that led to the summoning of last month’s conference.

Labour had clear ideas about how the working groups could be structured, and I still believe that our ideas were not so bad. In a letter to The Times back in November of last year, I described how guidelines regarding the terms of reference for every working group could be set.

This is what I wrote regarding a working group to deal with security issues: “Are our security services (police and army) acting in a sufficiently co-ordinated manner? Should there be an integrated command structure, focusing on homeland security, incorporating both security forces, to deal with the problems of illegal migration? Should the priorities set for the security forces be reordered? If so, how? Under different scenarios what resources in men and women, funds and equipment would be required? How could they be sourced? What response by way of mobilisation of resources should be planned for, given different levels of ‘emergency’?”

Regarding a working group to deal with social policy issues: “What are the scenarios that would allow the development of open or detention centres? With what levels of migration could they reasonably cope? What would the management structures of the different alternatives be? Who would run them? What would the cost be? What facilities would be available (public, Church-owned, private) to house immigrants? Under what conditions could programmes be contemplated to provide work for immigrants, without disturbing the Maltese labour market?”

Regarding Euro-Med cooperation on migration issues: “How have our international obligations (multi and bilateral) affected our ability to respond to the pressures caused by illegal migration? What leverage can we use to increase this ability?”

Incomprehension

Unfortunately, either we did not get our message through correctly or the other side just did not understand what in our view, it was all meant to be about. At many stages of the decisional loops needed to organise a meaningful conference, there seemed to be huge incomprehension on the government side. At least, this is what with hindsight I am led to conclude.

True, the government side agreed, or appeared to agree, with a repartitioning of discussion topics according to the lines I have just described. But this was not followed on. Some developments stretched from the inexplicable to the farcical.

Take for instance, the time limits set by the government for the conference. To carry out their job of report writing, experts/coordinators needed to be given sufficient time, to meet, interview, analyse, consult foreign researchers, etc. That way, their report and conclusions could provide an exhaustive basis for genuine debate. Certainly, there would have been no point in dragging out the preparation of such reports over long months but a reasonable period should have been set, say two months. However, after having dismissed the idea of holding such a conference at all, the government suddenly decreed it should happen in double quick time. Less than four weeks were scheduled for the preparation and presentation of the papers. This was a drastic mistake.

Then there was the question of who could prepare the reports on the different topics. For the first subject area, security issues, the Labour side suggested Martin Scicluna, who has credibility with both main political parties, having served under both, and who has good experience of public administration related to security and related matters. Eventually, the government agreed with this suggestion.

On the second topic, Labour suggested that academic researchers from the University’s social sciences faculties be commissioned to do the work. Names were mentioned. The government side demurred, and insisted on a person who, while being very valid in a particular area, simply had no experience in the wider areas of social research and policy making that were involved.

A farce developed over the third topic – Euro-Med diplomacy as a tool by which to ensure international cooperation over the immigration issues that are affecting the central Mediterranean region. Here, the Labour side suggested that Dr Stephen Calleya be asked to prepare a paper on what could be done; he has impeccable academic credentials in the area of Euro-Med diplomacy, based on study and research. The government side agreed, but then went on to invite his namesake, the respected editor of this newspaper. The latter clearly has lots of talent and accomplishments, and though knowledgeable about Euro-Med issues, definitely cannot compare with Dr Calleya on the latter’s specialisation. Up to the time of writing, I still do not know how the mix-up happened.

Puzzled and disappointed

As could have been foreseen, discussion papers were not distributed in time to participants, prior to the conference. Only one working group was organised, around a presentation made by Mr Scicluna.

The latter ended up serving as rapporteur for the group on security measures or what have you. It was never very clear whether his final paper (the Scicluna report) was his own, an amalgam of his ideas and issues raised during the discussion on his presentation, or a creation that was finalised outside the conference process. On the social aspect of the whole issue, papers delivered were – to put it mildly – off the point. No real interaction took place about the diplomatic initiatives needed to bolster the internal national effort to manage illegal migration, although in the Scicluna report, some points relevant to this dimension were raised.

Moreover, the conference was studded with ‘plenary’ speeches that will get nobody anywhere. The output should have been contributions that on the basis of the experts’ reports and the rapporteurs’ inputs from the different working groups, would have drawn up position papers that participants could accept as a minimum. Nothing like this happened. Indeed, at the end, the Prime Minister in his speech harked back to the original PN position by which political parties needed to set out their position on the whole issue …

I am unsure whether to be more puzzled than disappointed at the turn of events. It seems like we do not have yet a methodology by which as a nation, we could achieve common positions, even when the good will is there – as I believed there might have been in this case. But if top level coordination of the country’s political and social management can go so offbeam, how can we expect ‘lower’ level activities to gel?

Could it be for instance that the whole fracas over the social pact resulted not from structural disagreements between the parties involved, but from the wrong methodology having been deployed right from the start, to secure agreement and coordination …? Or could it perhaps have been that there was no attempt at all to work according to a viable methodology? Or perhaps, there was little awareness of the need to have such an approach …?

If so, no wonder that our country as a whole is finding it difficult to gear up to the challenges of modernising and enhancing its competitiveness.

All this having been said, let me also clarify that we should still continue to try and coordinate as best we can, a sensible national policy on irregular immigration. Flawed though it might be, the Scicluna report should be used as the basis for further efforts to come up with reasonable approaches on the issue. The latter could remain for long years, an intractable national problem, sometimes bordering on crisis. We have no reasonable alternative but to try, try again and go on trying.

Editorial note

When I was invited to take part in the conference on irregular immigration I was told I had been selected as a media representative, and this after I had written several editorials on the subject of illegal immigration, even writing about the Euro-Mediterannean dimension of the problem.

There was no way I could have known that there had been a mix-up – if there was one – just because I share the same name with Dr Stephen Calleya. If there was a mistake, it was certainly not mine.

Stephen Calleja

Editor TMID