At the time of writing, the two most dominant developments on the Middle East scene were the imminent Israeli pull out from Gaza and the Iranian announcement that it would resume uranium-conversion activities at its Isfahan reactor, which were stopped last year as part of the EU-Iran agreement signed last November.
The good news first.
It was encouraging to learn that not only have the Palestinian Authority and the resistance movement Hamas agreed to form a joint committee to oversee Israel’s Gaza withdrawal, but Israeli and Palestinian security officials have also announced that they would set up a joint operation centre to monitor such a withdrawal.
Hamas might have turned down a request by Abbas that it should forego victory celebrations during the withdrawal, while reiterating that it would not disarm, but at least the positives seem to outweigh the negatives at this particular point in time.
Although to some this might seem a small symbolic step, one has to realise that the 21 Jewish settlements in Gaza that will be evacuated will be ending some 38 years of occupation in the area, along with four small enclaves in the West Bank.
No doubt Fatah and Hamas will continue to battle over who should get credit for such a withdrawal, since Hamas will continue to claim that its repeated attacks on Israeli targets over the past five years have actually forced the Israelis to abandon Gaza.
The PA’s biggest challenge, once the pullout is out of the way, is whether it can win some freedom of movement for the Gazans as well as help in creating new jobs, particularly in the most impoverished areas.
One will also have to see whether jobs in the Government will be open to all Palestinians or whether Fatah members will get first preference.
Abbas deserves praise for having urged Palestinians not to loot abandoned Jewish settlements, while calling on resistance fighters to refrain from excessive cele-brations and lay down their weapons after the pullout.
Many still suspect that the Israelis resorted to the unilateral approach on Gaza to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at a time when they claimed that there was the absence of a Palestinian partner (for which you should read Yasser Arafat) while suspicions will continue to linger that this could enable Israel to escape the inevitable obligations and consequences that would have arisen from bilateral negotiations
One cannot but welcome the statement by Israeli vice premier Ehud Olmert in which he denied Palestinian suspicions that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza was designed as a swap for permanent control over far bigger settlements in the West Bank. He even stated that Israel was prepared to carry on negotiations after the disengagement according to the principles of the road map.
Regretfully, at the same time Sharon continues to argue that blocs of West Bank enclaves with the vast majority of the 240,000 settlers can never be ceded on strategic grounds.
Nevertheless, I would like to congratulate the Gazan people for being so eager to celebrate in a land which so far remains one of poverty, violence and dashed dreams of statehood.
I say so because I once had occasion to meet Arafat in Gaza City and could tell with my own eyes how Gaza looked very much like a “failed state”.
Which brings us to Iran. Although the so-called Iranian “threat” might seem remote from the Council of Europe, this is an issue that we are monitoring very closely at Political Affairs Committee level, to the extent that we even have a rapporteur on the issue. In my modest intervention, I insisted that in order not to send the wrong signals to Teheran, rather than talking of the Iranian “threat” we should refer to it as the Iranian “issue” – even though there is an inherent element of menace in the whole affair. The point at issue is that while the EU3 had asked Iran to relinquish its programme because the technology can easily be adapted for military use, Iranian diplomats rejected these incentives because they do not want to give up what they see as their sovereign right to enrich uranium as part of a peaceful nuclear programme.
As I write, the threat of UN Security Council action looms heavily on the horizon.
One will have to see which option will prevail – whether it will be the carrot or stick approach.
I still suspect that Iran – particularly under its new leadership – could be practicing brinkmanship in order to bargain for better concessions from Europe. Although Europe’s objective is a quasi halt to any enrichment-related activities in Iran, one cannot ignore past calls by Iran for major investments in its economy from Europe, particularly in its oil industry, and specific security guarantees, as well as support for its bid to join the WTO.
If a way can be found by which Iran can continue with its civilian nuclear programme while foregoing the sensitive aspects of this programme, some breakthrough can be made. Although Condoleezza Rice said in February that using military force in Teheran is simply not on the agenda at this point in time, six months have passed since then. For this reason, and for the cause of global peace, I sincerely hope that the option of either a US or Israeli military strike has been ruled out completely.
The threat of a disabling pre-emptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities cannot go away so easily, especially when people like Kissinger said a year ago that although he is not recommending military action against Iran, he is neither recommending not excluding it.
I nevertheless have a strong belief that, in the end, common sense will prevail, even if it is a last minute compromise
solution.
e-mail: [email protected]
Leo Brincat is the main opposition
spokesman on Foreign Affairs and IT.