Although the people of Malta were familiar with the features of the Westminster model during their long association with Britain, they assumed independent nationhood as recently as 1964. Ever since that date, it has been a learning process.

There have been ups and downs. One major hurdle, successfully negotiated, was the switch by consensus to republican status. The establishment of Parliamentary Standing Committees was another step forward. So was the appointment of the Ombudsman and the Accountant-General as Officers of the House

The issue of electoral reform, with the intent of ensuring parliamentary representation in proportion to national electoral support, has proved to be a hard nut to crack. Malta’s accession to the European Union has opened up new scenarios that subject our parliamentary system to added strains. The learning process is far from exhausted.

Delicate process

Weaving the constitutional fabric is always a delicate process. The question is: who is responsible for doing the weaving? Is this the preserve of politicians, seasoned in parliamentary experience, or should change be, at all times, formally sanctioned by the people?

There are those who take the view that the function of Parliament is not to govern the country, but to control the government. Those who hold this view consider that the accountability of government is ensured by two conventions: the convention that Ministers are collectively responsible to Parliament for the policy of the government as a whole, and the other convention that each Minister is individually responsible to Parliament for the work of his departments. So long as it enjoys majority support, the government rules the roost. The only limit to its power is the impediment against change of certain sensitive parts of the Constitution, unless it has the backing of two-thirds of all Members of the House.

To a major extent, this provision is a safeguard against change without widespread national consent, since it requires the approval of the major parties in the House. Even so, the two major parties could, conceivably, strike a bargain on a specific constitutional issue, and muster a two-thirds majority to change the Constitution without reference to the electorate. It has happened before.

Shouldn’t the electorate be the sole arbiter in all matters involving constitutional change? Shouldn’t civil society come into the equation?

Administrative discretion

Sure enough, our Constitution guarantees a range of basic rights, such as freedom of speech, of association, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and so on. But our system, which draws much of its inspiration from Westminster, is not as sensitive as it is in other democratic countries, when it comes to protecting citizens’ rights against the administration.

In some countries, people can appeal against acts of administrative discretion. Under the French system of administrative justice, cases involving the way public servants exercise their powers are heard in a special administrative court.

This is known as the Conseil d’Etat. It has superimposed the rule of law in the whole field of administrative discretion. This council has the power to require a minister, or his officials, to justify their decisions and has the added power to declare decisions null and void if the attempted justification is satisfactory. It has also the power to award damages.

Likewise, a French citizen has the right to haul the French equivalent of MEPA before the Conseil d’Etat and to appeal against its decisions, and the latter would be required to justify its performance to the satisfaction of the administrative court.

This system facilitates recourse to an effective system of control of administrative actions. Such control is more decisive than that exercised by our Ombudsman.

Our ministers are not likely to relish reform on the above lines. They could not be expected to go out of their way to provide a rod for their own backs.

Government by consent

The idea that a democratic system is one in which the people rule themselves has its origins in ancient Greece. It has been refined into a system of representative government by consent.

The Westminster tradition has always held reservations against this trend. There has been reluctance to give the people direct control over questions of government policy.

The system militates for concentration of political power in the hands of freely-elected Members of Parliament.

The focus of attention turns to the role and organisation of Parliament. The ultimate aim is the establishment of a system in which Parliament, elected by general suffrage, is the centre of political authority. Parliamentary power is limited by specific provisions of the Constitution, by considerations of party discipline within the majority party, and by the very fact that the Parliamentary time-table is set by the government of the day.

Beyond that, Parliament seems to be impotent when a government is convinced of the need for action and ready to use the powers at its command.

Surely Parliament would be a more effective spokesman for citizens’ rights if it could exercise initiative on the lines of the US Congress or the National Assembly in France.

Unwritten rules

Is it “safe” to expect the government of the day to be in sole and complete charge of public affairs? This system works satisfactorily if and when the unwritten rules of free competition between the political parties are observed.

It is taken for granted that civil rights are preserved and that no attempt is made to curtail freedom of speech or association. It is also assumed that no government will take advantage of its temporary majority, in order to change the electoral system for its own benefit. Another rule of the game is that the government should not interfere with the impartiality of the civil service.

And so on and on.

These unwritten “rules” of the game mean that a party in Opposition can rest secure in the knowledge that its chances of shaping public opinion at the next election are not likely to be compromised by government tactics, that no attempt is made to put the clock back by retrospective legislation, The system makes parliamentarians feel cosy.

What guarantee is there that a future government, with power to impose policies it chooses to adopt, will be sensitive to public opinion and the public interest? Under our present system, there is sometimes a tendency for bureaucrats to put their own convenience before the public interest. Ministers may assume that they know it all and may frown on public consultation.

One is left with the vague impression that, in the last resort, it is not the electorate that is master in its own house. The political class holds the pack of cards, but the party in government holds the aces, as well as the joker.

Ours has developed into a system of “winner takes all”, in which the parties take turns to govern the country. The government of the day controls Parliament and has the facility to call a general election if and when circumstances suit it.

Such a system may meet various criteria of good government. But it does not ensure that the sovereign electorate holds the keys to its destiny between one general election and the next. One fine day, an aggressive government may resolve to be aggressive, and, in many vital areas, there is nothing to stop it between one election and another.

In the democratic jig-saw puzzle, the government of the day should be in charge of public affairs. Parliament’s role is to scrutinise the government’s perform-ance.

But, at all stages, the people ought to have the right, as well as the means, to call the shots when it feels aggrieved by government decisions or indecision.