Chatham House, which is synonymous with The Royal Institute of International Affairs, is no ordinary think tank. It is perhaps the British think tank on foreign affairs that carries most clout. Although when introducing most of its reports and studies it “reminds” us that it is an independent body that promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinions of its own – as the opinions expressed in its publications are the responsibility of the authors – whenever it publishes a study, many commentators tend to pause, take note, reflect and wonder.

Such is the case of its recent Middle East Programme Report on Iran, Its Neighbours And The Regional Crises.

Apart from being a timely report indeed, it has made most noise in diplomatic circles for concluding, somewhat controversially, that Iran has superseded America as the most influential power in Iraq.

Some of its summary conclusions cannot be dismissed lightly or treated with indifference.

Among these is the claim that Iran views Iraq as its own backyard – something that affords it a key role in Iraq’s future. Iran is also a prominent presence in its other war-torn neighbour with close social ties – Afghanistan.

Iran is described as the chief beneficiary of the war on terror in the Middle East, in the sense that the United States, with coalition support, has eliminated two of Iran’s regional rival governments – the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in April 2003 – but has failed to replace either with coherent and stable political structures.

The outbreak of conflict on two fronts in June-July this year between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, and Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon has added to the regional dimensions of this instability.

The authors startlingly remark that Iranian foreign policy, which is often portrayed as mischievous and destabilising is, in fact, remarkably pragmatic on the whole and generally aims to avoid major upheaval or confrontation.

According to them, Iran’s core foreign policy concerns are:

• regional hegemony, particularly economic and cultural, within its sphere of influence;

• an extension of the sphere of influence;

• regional stability;

• to see Iraq unified but unable to pose a military threat;

• an obsession with the US but uncertainty how to deal with it.

This contrasts sharply with the US’s key regional policy concerns, which are:

• the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq as more peaceful, stable and democratic states;

• the defence of the security and regional interests of Israel;

• to contain the violence between Israel and Hezbollah and Israel and the Palestinians;

• global access to energy supplies in the Gulf;

• to contain and defeat the spread of terrorism;

• an obsession with Iran but uncertainty how to deal with it.

What I found most intriguing about this report is that rather than tackling Iran in isolation, its authors have opted for a multi-dimensional approach. The following questions have been examined:

How strong is Iran’s position and how is it shaped?

What factors are motivating the alliances and positioning taking place between Iran and its neighbours in the Middle East and Asia?

How do Iran’s neighbours view its pursuit of nuclear technology?

What reactions can be expected in the region if the US uses military force in attempting to control Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions?

One of the major findings is that the nuclear issue is only one of a series of considerations motivating the policies adopted by Middle Eastern and Asian countries towards Iran.

The authors consider Iran to have been traditionally a master of “soft power”, which contrasts sharply with the fact that the US may have the upper hand in “hard” power projection, but for all its ability to win military battles, the Bush administration has shown a lack of ability in planning for and mastering the subsequent peace.

Regarding the Iranian President, he is undoubtedly the most ideological president to occupy the post since the revolution of 1979.

He is no doubt considered to be a child of the revolution and the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988.

One needs to understand the complexities of Iran’s leadership, particularly since the president’s role is to manage domestic policy and maintain popular support for the nuclear issue through gestures and speeches.

What came as a surprise to me is the conclusion that while the “strategic” alliance with Syria has been strong and constant, this, for the Iranians, is in reality little more than a paper alliance intended to deter the Israelis. The authors even speak of Iran’s fairly disinterested response to the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel this summer.

The greatest Arab fear is of a Shi’a crescent emerging from the ashes of Iraq. This could also happen among those countries with a large Shi’a population, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

When referring to the geopolitical jugular, the authors claim that if the US were to attack Iran, then it would do so knowing that its forces in Iraq would be at an even greater risk than they currently are.

With this in mind, the greatest threat to the US is Iran’s ability to further destabilise the already chaotic public spaces of Iraq.

Living in Iran’s backyard, Iraq could find itself in a situation that could heighten US casualties to the point where a continued presence might not be tenable.

Things have got to the stage where virtually every Iraqi Shi’a party now has strong links with Tehran. The Iranian presence is also keenly felt in Iraq’s Kurdish cities.

You might argue: could the bomb be targeted at Iraq?

This is considered to be most unlikely since there is little apparent danger that any such weapon would be deployed against Iraq, especially as Iraq is now dominated by Shi’a parties and movements.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, links with Iran were not made yesterday. The Lebanese state also had close relations with the Shah’s regime.

Regarding Israel’s nuclear capability, a call for Israel to give up its nuclear weapons has even come from a friendly pro-US Arab leader, King Abdullah of Jordan – not to mention far more critical voices around the world. This is an almost inevitable consequence of the efforts to put an end to the development of nuclear weapons in Iran.

For its part Israel, which has never signed the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty), seems to believe that it can shrug off any attempt to link the two issues. It is more concerned that if Iran is allowed to obtain nuclear weapons, a number of Arab states are likely to seek such weapons as well.

The authors also contend that Turkey may feel obliged to join a nuclear arms race with Iran to maintain power parity with its powerful neighbour on the basis of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction.

Regarding its Asian relations these are multi-layered.

While many feel that China will back Iran all the way because of its energy dependence, the study concludes that China’s trade with the US is many times greater than that with Iran. Beijing thus has many reasons to maintain a good relationship with the US, and can ill afford to be seen as openly endorsing nuclear proliferation for its own narrow national interests.

One particular country which, according to the authors, could perform a brokering role in the ongoing negotiations is Japan – a country whose relationship with Iran is similarly pragmatic.

One might question certain conclusions that lead to Iran being portrayed as a resurgent country but the research capabilities of the study’s authors is of the highest order.

I personally know Nadim Shehadi, their Middle East Programme Associate Fellow with whom I had a most interesting working lunch last year.

e-mail: [email protected]

Leo Brincat is the

Shadow Minister for

Foreign Affairs and IT