X and Y married in 1982 and had two sons. In 2001, the plaintiff left the matrimonial home, leaving her husband and children behind. The couple was authorised by decree of the Second Hall, Civil Court (today the Court of Voluntary Jurisdiction) to proceed with a personal separation.

In 2002, X applied to the Civil Court (Family Section) to confirm the separation and liquidate the community of assets and consider issues such as the matrimonial home. She claimed that her husband had made matrimonial life impossible by committing adultery and threatening her and causing the marriage to break down. She stated that she had no option but to leave the home. She alleged that her husband was disrespectful and violent towards her and also incurred a lot of debts which she had to deal with.

The defendant claimed that it was in fact his plaintiff wife who was to blame for the irretrievable breakdown of their marriage. He alleged that his wife had abandoned the house and indulged in homosexual acts, adultery and violence towards him and their children.

The Court examined the evidence and found that the two parties were responsible for the marital breakdown and thereby declared the personal separation between the parties and refused the claim for maintenance for the children since they are today of majority age. The Court also went on to divide the assets between the parties and ordered the sale of the matrimonial home.

The defendant husband felt aggrieved by this decision and filed an appeal application in 2006. He requested the Court, among other things, to declare that the marriage had broken down due to his wife’s general irresponsibility in fulfilling her duties as a mother and wife.

He also declared that the matrimonial home was his paraphernal property and did not form part of the community of acquests and hence, his wife should not benefit from a share in such property. He also requested the Court to, should it not agree that the home was paraphernal property, at least make his wife forfeit her share in his favour as compensation for maintaining the home itself as well as maintaining and seeing to the needs of their children when she abandoned them. The husband explained that due to one of their sons being paralysed, he had structurally adapted the home.

He felt that this home should be given to him to allow his disabled son to continue leading a comfortable life. The appellant husband completely disagreed with the sale of the matrimonial home for these reasons. He requested the Court to allow him and his sons to remain in the house.

The wife disagreed with these grounds of appeal and declared her approval of the Family Section’s decision. She stated that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and done purely to delay the sale of the matrimonial home.

The appellant produced documents to show the extent of his son’s disabilities that were caused by a serious car accident.

He told the Court that the matrimonial home was the only place where his son could live comfortably because the institutions available in Malta were for some reason or other inadequate. Such evidence was questioned by the appellant’s wife and the Court since it was not produced in the Court of First Instance. However, the Court of Appeal did not feel that it should deprive the appellant from producing such evidence and took into consideration the stressful life that the appellant led.

The Court went on to consider the appellant’s grounds of appeal individually:

Was the matrimonial home part of the community of acquests?

The Court referred to article 1320 which lists what precisely falls into the community of acquests. In article 1320(e) it is stated that the Community comprises “any property acquired with moneys or other things which either of the spouses possesses since before the marriage, or which, after the celebration of the marriage, have come to him or her under any donation, succession, or other title, even though such property may have been so acquired in the name of such spouse, saving the right of such spouse to deduct the sum disbursed for the acquisition of such property.”

This article of the law is very effective and applying it to the appellant’s situation meant that once the appellant had, during his marriage, exchanged paraphernal property for the matrimonial home both at a value of Lm7,000, this rendered the matrimonial property part of the community of acquests. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Court of First Instance’s thesis on this issue.

What was to become of the

matrimonial home?

The Court of First Instance had decided to the effect that the home be sold within two years from its decision.

The Court of Appeal considered the evidence brought forward showing the extent of the parties’ son’s disability. The Court of Appeal took into account the appellant’s endeavours to help his son to the extent that the house was transformed to suit his needs such as with the building of a platform lift. The Court noted the underlying principle in family law as being that parents are always to act in the best interest of their children.

The Court hence overturned the findings of the Court of First Instance and declared that it was in the interest of the appellant’s disabled son to reside in the matrimonial home with his father and brother insofar as his conditions did not change substantially in which case, the appellant’s wife could ask the Court to intervene again. The Court rejected the appellant’s request for compensation.