This case was an action for the annulment of the marriage between the parties contracted in November 1999. This case was interesting due to the Court’s comments on the contract of marriage and the possibility of annulment in the event that certain circumstances arose rendering the same marriage null. The main legislation referred to in issues of this nature is the Marriage Act (Chapter 255 – Laws of Malta), which regulates marriages and related matters.
In this case, the couple had a child, C, in 2001 and later legally separated in December 2004.
The plaintiff claimed that
• the consent of the parties was vitiated by:
• a serious defect of discretion of judgment on the matrimonial life, or on its essential rights and duties; the positive exclusion of marriage itself, or of any one or more of the essential elements of matrimonial life.
Therefore, the marriage was null and without effect in accordance with Article 19 of the Marriage Act.
The Court was therefore requested to declare the marriage contracted in November 1999 as null and without effect. The plaintiff claimed nullity of marriage on the basis of Article 19(1)(d) and (f) of the Marriage Act. The defendant also agreed with his claims. The Court however made an important observation in relation to marriage and annulments. Quoting from a 1991 Court of Appeal judgement, it stated that marriage, being an institute of public order, cannot be nullified by one spouse merely selecting a legal established ground for annulment and the other spouse agreeing.
The court actually stated that marriage cases are not like other cases. Marriage is far more serious and delicate and hence, should not be treated like any other contract. Furthermore, the court stressed that courts should most certainly not allow persons who, capriciously, after a few years of marriage decide that there was a serious defect of discretion of judgment on the matrimonial life, only to suddenly gain this discretion and maturity upon meeting someone else. The court held that the grounds of annulment should basically not be abused and resorted to in an attempt to accommodate all failed marriages. Therefore, the court emphasised the importance of proving the grounds of annulment claimed.
The plaintiff requested an annulment on the following grounds found in Article 19 of the Marriage Act.
The subarticles raised hold that in addition to the cases in which a marriage is void in accordance with any other provision of the Marriage Act, a marriage shall be void if:
Article 19(1)(d) – if the consent of either of the parties is vitiated by a serious defect of discretion of judgment on the matrimonial life, or on its essential rights and duties or by a serious psychological anomaly which makes it impossible for that party to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage;
Article 19 (1)(f) – if the consent of either of the parties is vitiated by the positive exclusion of marriage itself, or of any one or more of the essential elements of matrimonial life, or of the right to the conjugal act.
From the evidence, it was clear that the parties were indeed very young when they contracted marriage. They had started their relationship when they were about 14 years old. Although they married about 6 years after, the Court stated that they were not mature enough to fully comprehend the implications of marriage.
The Court referred to another judgement in 2006 wherein it was held that the validity of marriage must always be presumed. Therefore, it is the absolute obligation of the party or parties to the marriage alleging nullity, to prove otherwise.
Furthermore, the court stressed that Article 19(1((d) talks of a serious psychological anomaly which makes it impossible, and not merely difficult, for that party to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. Article 19(1)(f) on the other hand talks of simulation.
With reference to a 1995 case, the court held that a serious defect of discretion of judgment on the matrimonial life does not include every state of immaturity. Should the legislator have intended perfect and full maturity upon giving marital consent, the court held that very few marriages would be valid.
The court recognised that despite the parties to this case having been together for a long time prior to their marriage, such time had not properly prepared them for marriage – they were still like strangers to each other. The length of their marriage (four years) and the fact that they are now in settled, stable relationships with other persons further proved that their consent was indeed vitiated.
On this basis, the Court declared the marriage between A and B as null.