It was truly a masterclass that Roderick Chalmers, Bank of Valletta chairman, gave last Thursday to a full house of very attentive listeners from the top echelons of business at The Malta Business Weekly business breakfast.
In clear and concise terms, Mr Chalmers explained the genesis and development of the world’s worst financial crisis in generations.
Before the perfect storm, Mr Chalmers began, there was the perfect calm. As recent as 16 months ago, nobody had any inkling of what was going to happen.
The first inkling came from HSBC early in 2007 when it issued a profit warning: HSBC had bought some business in the US and found some problems. That was the first time the world heard about the sub-prime trouble.
It soon became evident that the malaise was much deeper than just the sub-prime problem. Sub-prime is another name for adjustable rate mortgages given to low quality borrowers in the US housing market, also called Ninjas – No income, No job people.
As financial institutions passed on the loans to other financial institutions, the link between the borrower and the lender was cut, leading to a high rate of delinquency which became very real after the initial two-year period of favourable rates of the adjustable loan rates came to an end.
Credit rating agencies added to the problem because they gave a credit rating to the sub-prime loans, leading investors to think they were quality credits.
At the other end of the scale, the world was awash with surplus liquidity, fuelled both by Alan Greenspan’s low interest rates and also by the Chinese economy injecting some $700 billion into US banks between 2004 and 2006 to protect its export markets.
House price inflation in the US and the UK and remortgaging fed into the sub-prime sector.
In the financial houses a bonus model was allowed to develop, especially in the US, which was based more on volume than on value, as a result of which failures were rewarded. When the chief of Merrill Lynch was fired for his company’s failure, he took $150 million as a parting gift.
All this surplus of liquidity spurred the development of more and more hedge funds, which added to pressure on the banks to provide them with increased facilities for very low coverage. This led to the growth of an unregulated derivatives market.
Seen like this, it is clear how one thing led to the next. The world’s financial market thrived in a low, light-touch regulation, which was so beloved not just by the financial world but also by politicians – as long as the world was in growth mode.
At a time when the world was seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, the real WMD was being born and bred in the fortress of capitalism.
The light touch regulation mode brought to light what is known as the leverage question, that is, the relation between debt and equity. It is low leverage when for $1 you lend $2 and high leverage when for $1 you lend $30. As long as markets keep growing, a high leverage makes for higher profits, but when markets drop, this leads to a cascade of increasing losses.
When the sub-prime market and its toxic areas started to be uncovered, the financial world went into shock and many were those who got caught. Even then, not all were made aware of the extent of the problem as many traders persuaded their superiors there was no real problem and that the problem was only what they called “warehousing”. Then the music stopped and the warehouses ended up being very full with no buyers around.
Very creditable institutions were thus caught out with a lot of sub-prime debt and no one to sell it to. Everybody stopped selling and the markets crashed.
Finding that they could not sell sub-prime debt to anyone else, the banks then started to sell anything they could sell, including quality assets. This is what is called de-leveraging.
In a state of shock, people all over the world started to ask who else had these toxic loans but not all banks owned up. Investors started to sense too that house prices were about to drop and this too added to the uncertainty as to which banks were solid and which were not. This led to the question of banks’ balance sheet management. For instance, Mr Chalmers here naturally referred to his own bank, BOV’s proportion of loans to deposits is 70 per cent but HBOS and Northern Rock’s were 170 per cent. When this was realized, trust between banks evaporated, they stopped lending to each other and queues developed outside banks.
On the regulatory levels, the previous light touch regulation became heavy handed in over-compensation and the regulators started to demand stricter management of loan portfolios.
Mr Chalmers here started to list the fallen in this world crisis, along with a chronology of events. In mid-March (2008) Bear Stearns was rescued by the Federal Reserve on the principle that no major player should be allowed to go under. Banks too recapitalised as fast as they could to make up for the toxic funds they held.
On 14 September, the Fed allowed Lehman Brothers to go under and thus instigated a chain reaction that from mid-September to mid-October saw a real risk of global collapse.
The list goes on: AIG, the world’s biggest insurer was brought to its knees, risking the employment of its 140,000 employees. It was rescued by the US government, first with $80 billion, later topped up to $120 billion. The Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS were nationalised. Merrill Lynch agreed to be taken over by Bank of America. In Europe, Hypo, Fortis, Brentford and Bingley, and Dexia received government help. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley removed an age-old tradition and within three days accepted to be regulated. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were nationalised.
It is now clear to all that it was the wrong decision to let Lehman Brothers go under for it was precisely this decision that caused the severest consequences on the world markets.
The rest, as they say, is history. How, at two most important meetings held in Washington and in Paris, drawing inspiration from Gordon Brown, the world’s governments accepted the need to put in huge sums of money to get the system moving again.
Is the crisis behind us, Mr Chalmers asked? No, it is not behind us. Only last week Citigroup almost collapsed and was rescued by a $300 billion package. The lesson has been learnt, though it is a costly one: no more Lehmans. The tough stuff is still to come. Until September, the ferocity of the crisis extended to Wall Street only: now it’s moving to Main Street, and also the side streets. Nevertheless, the world’s financial system has been secured.
Something like this has never happened before. In previous recessions, there was one area of the world that was in recession and others were not. This time, the whole world is in recession. The first sign of the tidal wave to come is the unprecedented levels of lay-offs in banks, auto, and hi-tech industries in the US, UK and Europe. The levels of unemployment will rise in these economies to their highest levels since World War II. Even China is suffering, as it sees its order books decline by up to 60 per cent.
Will we in Malta escape this tidal wave? It is highly unlikely that we will escape this wave in its totality. Consumer confidence has already been impacted and spending has slowed down. This is an open economy, usually late in and late out of a recession. The first impact will be in the manufacturing sector, both auto-related and semi-conductors sectors. Malta’s biggest economy sector is tourism and most of our tourists come from Europe and especially the UK, our biggest market, where the Sterling has dropped 30 per cent against the other major currencies.
Yet the Maltese economy is resilient. And fortunately we can draw on the EU for extra capital spending funds, which, if used wisely, can stimulate the economy. We are certainly fortunate to have entered the euro when we did. Banks in Malta are well regulated and well behaved, with conservative loan to deposit ratios, and will continue to feed in to the economy.