After a thorough review, President Obama has determined that the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops is necessary to break the stalemate in Afghanistan. Despite the costs, he is clear that this is a war of necessity because the mountainous border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is “the epicentre of the violent extremism practiced by Al Qaeda”.
No-one, least of all President Obama, would deny that the challenges we face in Afghanistan are enormous. Decades of conflict have torn it apart and left it stricken by poverty. And the Taliban’s resort to asymmetric warfare – with improvised explosive devices and roadside bombs – is extracting a heavy price in terms of innocent Afghan lives and on the international forces.
However the resources that will come on stream in 2010 offer a genuine opportunity to break the back of the insurgency. The extra US troops will start to arrive early in the New Year. The additional UK military commitment to Afghanistan represents an extra 1,500 soldiers in just over a year. Italy has said it will send about 1,000 more soldiers to take the total number of its personnel committed to nearly 3,500. We hope it will encourage others to step up their efforts. And then there is the Afghan National Army, which is set to go from 94,000 today to 134,000 by the end of next year.
To turn short-term military momentum into long term success, we need to unite behind a clear political strategy. Central to that strategy must be the recognition that success in Afghanistan involves isolating the minority of hard-core ideologically driven, full time, Taliban fighters, from the majority of insurgents who lend support to the Taliban in order to stay safe, earn money, or gain power and status. If the insurgency can be winnowed down, then the Afghan state can be made strong enough to keep out the hard-core of Taliban fighters who, in turn, are linked to and would provide shelter and support for Al Qaeda.
To that end, the additional troops need to be used to protect the population and isolate the hard-core of Taliban fighters in three ways.
First, we must help the Afghan government to win the trust of its people. The vast majority of Afghans say they do not want the Taliban back. But in the villages and valleys of rural Afghanistan, the government offers so little in terms of protection or basic services, and the risk of Taliban retribution is so great, that few are prepared actively to resist the insurgents.
To turn this round we need to convince ordinary Afghans that we – the international community – will stay until the legitimate Afghan authorities can provide security, justice and development. That was why the President’s focus on building the capacity of the security forces and government was significant. Getting effective provincial and district governors in place will be as pivotal to success in this war as extra troops. Because with the Taliban appointing shadow governors, and establishing courts that deliver quick – if very brutal – justice, the danger is not just that Karzai’s administration is out-fought, but that it is out-governed.
Second, we need to help the Afghan government reintegrate those militants prepared to pursue their goals peacefully and live within the constitutional framework. Increased military pressure is an important foundation for this. By stepping up our presence, and using targeted military operations, we increase the cost of sticking with the Taliban, and encourage insurgents to switch sides. We also need to support the Afghan Government in offering militants a route back into normal Afghan society. Any reintegration programme must be Afghan led, but the international community can and must provide the funding.
Third, Afghanistan needs a new relationship with others in the region. For too long the country has been a geo-political chessboard upon which the struggles of others have been played out. The increased military presence is a clear sign that the international community’s commitment to establish effective governance, and secure Afghanistan’s future not as a client of any, but as a secure and independent country in its own right.
President Obama’s decisions on the US troop contribution provide the platform and impetus for a much greater effort in each of these three areas. The London Conference which Gordon Brown has announced for 28 January will map out the route for international support for Afghanistan over the next 12-18 months and mobilise international support. It will focus on strengthening the Afghan security forces; building governance and reducing corruption. Improving regional relations will also be a key theme. We will work to establish an Afghan-led reintegration programme, supported by an international resettlement fund, and to focus attention on economic and social development. And the conference will also be an opportunity to enhance the international civilian architecture.
The challenges in Afghanistan are complex and will take time to resolve. But at stake is not just the credibility of NATO or the stability of South Asia, but the security of our own citizens here in Europe or America. The US commitment and determination is clear. It is now incumbent on the rest of us to consider our own strengths and resources, and ask what more we can do. After all, it is not just more troops that are needed but police, judges, administrators, development assistance, reintegration funding or agricultural expertise.
David Milliband is
British Foreign Secretary