Reference is made to the report on the judgement of 8 March of the Criminal Court in the case Republic vs Jurgen Brincat, published in your paper (TMID, 9 March).

In your report it is said, correctly, that Justice Galea Debono wrote in his judgement that “the prosecution was inconsistent by changing its request regarding the punishment” and that “the prosecution requested a punishment of less than 10 years at the last moment”. The report also states that according to the same judgement the prosecution “requested a life sentence four times!”, and that it added that “the prosecution could have easily issued a counter order for the case to be decided in the Magistrates’ Court”.

I always exercise restraint when it comes to considering whether I should comment on any remarks made, in court judgements, in regard to my office, and this out of deference to the courts. Even when the remarks in question are ill-conceived or just simply wrong, legally of factually, as in this case, I tend to keep silent for the same reason, and have done so in the past when similar remarks were passed in other judgements.

I am afraid that my silence has been misconstrued as implying that I will continue to keep silent, no matter how incongruous the remarks. This time round it would be inappropriate of me to allow such remarks to pass unchallenged since while I do not expect deference from the courts in my regard I do expect prudence and correctness especially since the court’s remarks, even emphasised in bold script in the judgement, besides being uncalled for were totally unnecessary for the purpose of the judgement.

The prosecution did not show any inconsistency when it agreed to a sentence of less than 10 years imprisonment. It did not “change its request regarding the punishment”. It did not “request a life sentence four times” (with or without an exclamation mark). What the prosecution always requested, and this never changed, was the punishment of “life imprisonment… or any other punishment applicable according to law to the declaration of guilty of the accused” as required by law. The punishment subsequently agreed upon between the prosecution and the accused was a “punishment applicable according to law to the declaration of guilty of the accused” and therefore was consistent with and in terms of the said request. The same agreement is authorised by law and is within the parameters of what is allowed by law. The court was entirely free to refuse to accept the agreement between the prosecution and the defence. It did not. This means that the punishment agreed upon was appropriate in this case, as otherwise I am sure that the court would have refused, as it has the power to do, to apply the said agreement.

The court complained that the prosecution changed its request “at the last moment”. This is not correct. The agreement was reached when the accused through his legal counsel approached the prosecution seeking such agreement. The agreement was reached when agreement was registered, and therefore at the moment that it became possible. I am not sure whether the court would have preferred that its time and resources be wasted by going to trial notwithstanding agreement on the sentence to be imposed. The issue of a counter order is by law, and therefore by the Constitution, reserved to the attorney general. In this case, the sentence was agreed upon in view of the fact that after the bill of indictment the accused approached the prosecution and declared his readiness to admit the charges. At this stage of the proceedings a counter order would not have made sense.

In its judgement the court passed other remarks on the same vein which are equally unfounded and incorrect but since no reference to these is made in your report I will not offer further comment.

Every authority has, by law, its appropriate competence. I respect the Criminal Court’s competence. I expect it to respect mine.

Silvio Camilleri

Attorney General

Valletta