The taxpaying electorate would be forgiven if it loses count of the number of authorities, boards and other quangos in these islands. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the setting up of these quangos is creating a greater distance between the citizen and those responsible for executive power.

This raises the core issue of accountability. Ultimate accountability is to the people, and it is Parliament that represents the interests of the electorate. Parliament has the power of supply (it approves votes of expenditure) and while ministers execute policies, they are subject to parliamentary oversight.

A viable democratic process would require such oversight to be effective, and it is to be presumed that Parliament would approve to the hilt the rights and duties of ministers (the executive) to perform in such a way as to be accountable to the people.

While the exigencies of modern times expect governments to shoulder more responsibilities, particularly in the administrative and social fields, democratic governments set up executive agencies of all kinds to take charge, and act on their behalf, often with quasi-autonomous powers.

These agencies take the form of authorities, commissions, boards and foundations with a structure of their own. They have been described by Professor Hayek as “the political machinery of para-government” and are usually manned by members other than civil servants.

In English-speaking countries, they have come to be known as quangos, an acronym invented in America in the late 1960s. The term describes corporations which are nominally non-governmental but are sustained by public funds and operated at the initiative of the government and with its authority. In the UK, the same term stands for “quasi-autonomous national government organisations”. It is remarkable but true that there does not exist a comprehensive list to show how many of them exist in Malta. Some take the form of commercial organisations like the Malta Enterprise Board. Others are full-blooded public corporations like Enemalta. Others are semi-autonomous agencies like the Malta Financial Services Centre. Others are in place with open-ended assignments and are assigned roles subsidiary to legislation already on the statute book, e.g. employment and training, consumer protection.

In some cases, the declared raison d’être is to protect certain activities from direct political interference. Others still are meant to tap administrative talent outside the civil service.

The fact remains that, as a result of the proliferation of quangos, there is a danger of the governed not knowing their governors.

These quangos have become a permanent feature. They are, to all intents and purposes, immortal. The fact that some of them exercise quasi-judicial functions needs stressing. Most of these agencies are not self-financing. They spend a great deal of taxpayers’ money. Some operate with powers of monopoly to set prices and standards.

It is vitally important that these agencies operate within the framework of ministerial direction and parliamentary supervision. It is only in this way that accountability is not eroded and that the taxpayer could see what he or she is getting for his or her money.

It is equally important that, in cases where control is necessary, Parliament must have the power and the facility to take the necessary measures before the horse has bolted. Most important of all, these agencies and foundations must be accountable to Parliament, via the Minister who is expected to give all explanations to Parliament.

In Malta, this problem is becoming an increasingly sensitive issue, calling for appropriate reform. The Public Service Reform Committee focused, if fleetingly, on this sensitive area as long ago as 1989. It referred to a sizable number of people “who, though not public officers in the constitutional meaning of the term, receive remuneration out of public funds, and function in an official capacity.”

These are the chairmen and members of so many boards and committees running parastatal and state-controlled enterprises and other quangos. These officials have legal responsibilities of their own. They operate mainly on public funds. They are accountable to the government, sometimes in the guise of ‘principal shareholder’. Their autonomy, therefore, has its limits. They are not expected to run their fief like an autonomous state within an autonomous state.

The least one could expect is to have a set of clear guidelines that would prevent the odd, erring chairman behaving like a prima donna, and that all chairmen have to bear in mind the social aspects (besides commercial considerations) of the decisions they have to make.

In such cases, it is up to the elected government to practise the art of the possible, often in terms of its popular mandate. Such a set of guidelines ought to be in the public domain and should be easily available to the taxpaying electorate.

Such guidelines ought to make sure that the growing responsibilities of the state should not be exercised at the expense of the citizen and out of the ultimate control of Parliament. There is, moreover. a case for the separation of personal business interests from full-time paid appointments.

There is also a case for advertising calls for the filling of this category of posts, in the light of required professional or special qualifications, ruling out the possibility of favouritism and considerations of blatant political partisanship.

The objective is to bring government closer to the people and to ensure that, while power is devolved and diffused, public accountability is not sacrificed.

In Malta, there are no such guidelines and the democratic objective referred to above has yet to be reached.