If there is one thing that the outcome of the divorce referendum showed, it is that people are asking for more moral space to take their own ethical decisions. Although I voted ‘no’ in the referendum, particularly because of the damage that divorce will unleash on social cohesiveness in the medium to long term, I respect the people’s decision and I will not be one to stand in the way of their wish. Although fidelity in marriage is an absolute obligation and right a priori for both spouses, I understand that it is possible in some circumstances for there to be an innocent or quasi innocent party in a marriage breakdown, who is looking for space to take his or her own moral decisions in the prevailing circumstances. That in order to accommodate that opportunity, necessitated the introduction of divorce, is another matter, but all that is in the past now.

What is certain now is that the State and the Church both need to address that moral space that has been created by the electorate’s declared wishes. The teaching of the Church on the morality of marriage reflects the moral objectivity both of a priori natural law precepts and of the revealed wishes of Christ. There is no altering that. However, another important aspect of Catholic moral teaching is the distinction between objective and subjective morality. “Christian moral tradition has always maintained the distinction – not the separation much less the contraposition – between objective disorder and subjective guilt. It is perfectly legitimate to give due consideration to the actions of the individual, not only to his intentions and motivations, but also to the various circumstances of his life, and above all to the causes that might impair his conscience and free will. This subjective situation, which can never change into ‘order’ what is intrinsically ‘disorder’ can have some bearing on the responsibility of the individual’s behaviour”. (L’Osservatore Romano, 16 February 1989).

In some cases then, a person’s subjective condition may remove the guilt for an effectively evil action; this is especially true if the person is trying at the same time to satisfy conflicting moral obligations. “Decisions... sometimes arise from difficult or even tragic situations of profound suffering, loneliness, a total lack of economic prospects and depression and anxiety about the future. Such circumstances can mitigate even to a notable degree subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability of those who make these choices which in themselves are evil”. (John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, n.18.)

The recognition of subjective morality is not an escape from the mandate of leading a good moral life, but it does remind us that judging the guilt of someone who does not follow the teaching of the Church is beyond the competence of anyone save the person who performs the act in question. We are historical beings and making progress in understanding truth and choosing the truly good requires time and discernment.

To begin with, the two paragraphs above are not mine although I have always assumed these positions morally; otherwise I would not have been so presumptuous as to reveal them. They are from three of the Church’s more well-known moral theologians (Kevin O’Rourke, OP, JCD, STM; Grezegorz Holub, SDB, PhD; Thomas Davis, JD, LLM, MA). Therefore transferring the people’s mandate into law in Parliament requires a parliamentarian to consider both his/her subjective circumstances and the objective morality of the situation in hand. I have already stated in a previous letter to this newspaper that in the circumstances, since in a democracy the people’s majoritarian wish for a civil right needs to respected (I would not reason the same for a fundamental right), I for one would find it a moral possibility to abstain from voting and would have to explain my vote accordingly. Of course every parliamentarian has to search his own conscience on how to vote and nobody else can decide for him or her.

There is in Aristotelian philosophy the concept of phronesis, which is the characteristic of exercising sound judgment in practical affairs. It is classically considered to be a virtue, one of the intellectual virtues Aristotle describes at great length in his treatise on ethics and which allows the reason to determine what is right or wrong in circumstances which are not clear. Aristotle is also an exponent of the doctrine of the mean, that is, assuming moderate positions in our ethical decision making, which he refers to in both in his personal Nicomachean Ethics and in his social Politics.

Thomas Aquinas incorporated this concept of phronesis into the virtue of prudence, as one of the cardinal virtues of moral philosophy and which is painted on the ceiling of the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee room, if I am not mistaken, together with the other four. It has very little to do with prudence as one understands it today, but with the application of the ‘here and now’ practical reason to issues that are not clear-cut, and where the practical decision making of the conscience has as much moral weight as that in clear-cut epistemological or speculative issues. I hope that I have been of assistance in helping people out of their moral quandaries.

Michael Asciak MD

BIRKIRKARA