On Sunday 22 May, TTP terrorists attacked the Mehran navy air base in Karachi. In an 18-hour assault, 10 militants stormed the military facility, destroying two US made surveillance planes and killing 12 soldiers. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack, linking it to Osama Bin Laden’s death. The incident is another example of the TTP’s reach and highlights the alarming inability of the Pakistani armed forces to protect its key military infrastructure
The army has long been the most powerful actor in Pakistan, forming foreign policy and framing domestic decisions. But since the death of Bin Laden on 2 May, there have been 28 attacks across the country, killing over 140 people and injuring hundreds of others. Why is the army failing to prevent these attacks? And how is the tribal based TTP able to strike targets across Pakistan?
The military views India as the country’s existential threat and its resources reflect this stand. Over 80% of the military is deployed along the India-Pakistan border. Its focus on India means it has not allocated sufficient resources to the military campaign against the TTP. A White House report released in April questioned whether Pakistan’s military has a clear plan in place for defeating the Taliban and warned that little progress had been made in recent years. The drawn out campaign has allowed the TTP space to re-group in different areas of the country and many of its supporters now operate with impunity in North Waziristan.
Rather than focusing on defeating terrorism, the armed forces abets and supports certain terrorist groups as part of its regional strategy of strategic depth. The military believes that an unstable Afghanistan fits with its regional objectives and, accordingly, aims to combat India’s growing influence there though the use of state proxies. The military and ISI have provided support to the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and LeT, who have all staged attacks in Afghanistan. The military has repeatedly refused to initiate a military campaign into North Waziristan.
The army’s ability to combat Islamist terrorism also suffers because of its internal divisions. A recent US think tank report highlighted concerns over the growing Islamism within the rank and file of Pakistan’s military. According to a recent article in Foreign Policy, as many as 30% of Pakistan’s military sympathises with the Taliban they are meant to be fighting.
General Kayani’s powerful image has been damaged by his apparent unawareness that Bin Laden lived in Abbottabad. Even a surprisingly large number of Pakistanis believe that Bin Laden received support from the military. Suspicion has fallen on the ISI. Although General Kayani is in charge of the ISI, its S Wing is run separately by retired military and intelligence figures. This section is widely believed to manage all relationships with Islamist militant groups. Analysts have speculated that if Bin Laden did receive protection in Abbottabad, as seems probable, the S Wing was the most likely candidate.
As General Kayani struggles to maintain the army’s unity, terrorist groups across the country with varying ideologies have converged in opposition to the government and military. From 2001-2006 terrorism in Pakistan was broadly split in two distinct zones. In the northwest, the TTP focused on fighting international forces in Afghanistan. In the east, the military supported the Punjab based militants in their operations against Indian forces in Kashmir.
These strands began to converge after the Pakistani military’s operation against the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad in July 2007. A number of Punjabi-based terrorist groups had strong links to the mosque. Subsequently, the ISI and military also distanced themselves from using Kashmiri proxies such as Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Over recent months, rising unemployment, pervasive corruption and a lack of basic amenities has given rise to widespread support for Islamic fundamentalism across Pakistan’s heartlands. Unhappiness over persistent US intervention in Pakistan through drone strikes and discontent over the Raymond Davis shootings has strengthened the appeal of the TTP and its affiliated groups. Terrorist groups of varying stripes have increasingly adopted an alliance of convenience against the government and military.
Our analysis of recent terrorist attacks outside the TTP’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas stronghold suggests that the TTP has used this alliance to expand its reach. It appears the group is increasingly receiving support from others operating in Pakistan’s heartlands such as Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, JeM and LeT. Sunday’s multi-person ground assault against Mehran navy base is strikingly similar to LeT’s ‘fedayeen’ style assaults.
The ability of the TTP to follow up on its threat to avenge Bin Laden’s death has shown its strength and reach. It has warned that in the coming weeks, it intends to strike more Pakistani and American diplomatic and military targets. In the longer term, many are concerned about how safe Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is; the ideological division within Pakistan’s armed forces makes this a real concern. Although the TTP has said that the group would not attack Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, this does not rule out the possibility that they could steal or acquire fissile material in the future.