This article has nothing to do with the goings on in Libya. As well as whether or how the whole saga can, might or will be resolved.

It focuses more on the soul searching that has been going on both in the international media itself, among geo strategic analysts as well as in established think tanks, on whether the strategy adopted by a number of EU countries and the US has paid dividends or not. And also whether they were prepared or not for what seems to have been a resultant stalemate so far.

Frustration is so immense at the moment that we even had serious-minded British commentators asking whether this ‘Libyan mess’ would mark the end of Britain as a world power.

Those who think that wars belong to another era must seriously re think it.

The bombing of Iraq and Serbia, the invasions of Sierra Leone, of Afghanistan and Iraq all happened in rather recent years.

Frustration is growing because while some feel that certain countries might have overreached themselves, others feel that they have not gone too far yet.

The very same people, who predicted that it would all be over within days, as was the case of the overthrow of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, are now feeling a new sense of frustration because things are taking too long and costing too much.

Since time immemorial, governments and government agencies have often used the media in times of conflict as part of psy ops (psychological warfare games), but the sense of irritation on the ground seems to be for real this time round.

Plunging from euphoric mode to a depressing muddle will inevitably take its toll on anyone. Governments included.

That a Srebrenica style massacre was avoided remains a feather in their cap.

But from there on many feel that a sense of free fall followed.

Some people argue that the allies and the Contact Group could in effective terms be holding back because they know very little of the TNC’s capacities and intentions.

While some have naively concluded that the Americans took a relatively standoffish approach towards the whole issue by claiming, as historian Michael Burleigh did, that “the Obama administration has since realised that bombing Muslims might not represent the spirit of the Arab Spring”, I believe that the fairest assessment was made by the Centre for European Reform when they claimed that Libya was the first war fought according to Barack Obama’s rules, in the sense that the US is taking a back seat while the Europeans absorb most of the risks and costs.

While some within Europe itself lament the fact that Nato has failed to function as a proper military alliance since many member states have failed to send forces and Europeans added their own bit of self-criticism by arguing that Libya has been a disaster for Europe because EU countries disagreed so much on how to respond to the regime, others have been quick to point out that the alliance has fought every one of its four wars – Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Libya with fewer than the full complement of member states.

What I totally agree with is the argument that one of Obama’s consistent aims has been to convince rising powers and old allies alike to assume greater responsibility for global security. This was made clear in many of his speeches since he assumed the presidency of the United States – far earlier than the Libyan uprising.

Obama has not only made it clear that, plagued as his country may be by an economic crisis on the home front, he will be less keen that his predecessors to intervene abroad. But he once actually told Americans on assuming office, “The nation that I am most interested in building is our own.”

Since 2009 the USA has been making it clear to its allies that it will be requiring Europeans to take the lead for maintaining security in their own region. So much so that he actually said that America will ask for more from its partners.

Some have best defined the US approach as one of leading from behind.

According to the CFER I quoted earlier, the US will not hesitate to lead ‘wars of necessity’ in defence of its European allies, but it will not take the lead in ‘wars of choice’ in or around Europe, such as the one in Libya.

In spite of criticism on the home front, many feel that regardless of certain top Republicans’ talk of the need for a more assertive US global presence, their ability to field military forces abroad will be constrained by fiscal constraints and an increasingly isolationist public. Even if hypothetically there had to be a change in US Presidency. Which at this stage I still consider somewhat unlikely.

This Centre cynically remarked last month that Libya has been a good war for Washington. In the sense that the allies have responded to US calls to assume more responsibility for the security of their neighbourhood while the Americans have the luxury of prosecuting a war from the backseat, while the Europeans absorb most of the costs and risks.

Nato might endure but though Nato is formally in charge, a recent study showed that only eight out of its 28 members – less than one third – have volunteered to drop bombs. But then one cannot ignore the possibility of a well thought out set of distribution of duties either!

Someone cynically told me that never before have so few allies taken part in an ostensibly joint operation.

The best assessment that I came across is that Nato has become a service provider, with different allies turning to it for different services.

As for the Arab Spring itself I am not too sure whether it will ever evolve further or not or even end up against a brick wall.

Some countries have not only reacted to it in a passive manner but others have stopped at merely paying lip service.

It is evident that many big countries are definitely steering clear of a one size fits all policy in response to it.

While others feel that it has created new uncertainties and brought even new economic costs, even though they continue to show enthusiasm about the democratic upsurge that it might have unleashed. At least for a time.

At day’s end, many countries seem to have decided to draw a line in the sand. Particularly since they now have so many lives, budgetary costs and credibility at stake.

The core issue many governments and countries are addressing in their self-analytical soul searching is whether there have been any serious attempts to relate diminished means to expensive ends and to determine whether intervening in a foreign civil war like Libya is best for them or not.

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www.leobrincat.com

Mr Brincat is a member of the Standing House Committee on Foreign & European Affairs