The Arab Spring has brought dramatic changes right across North Africa and the Middle East; nowhere more so than in Libya, where a civil war has swept away the former regime. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi is now dead, and the Transitional National Council (TNC) will now begin the process of full political transition with a new Cabinet expected to be announced within a month

The mood in Tripoli is one of optimism and victorious jubilation but there are a great many uncertainties about what lies ahead. With its vast hydrocarbon resources, foreign investors are already showing considerable interest in the new Libya and many are assessing the risk landscape as they prepare their re-entry. But, there are many reasons for them to be cautious as Libya moves into the post-conflict phase.

Foremost concerns about what lies ahead are immediate practical questions about the stability and legitimacy of the TNC itself, the demobilisation of the many armed factions, and the restoration of rule of law and security, basic services and day-to-day governance. The TNC has already taken care to show that it favours foreign investment but it will be some time – possibly years in some cases – before the Libyan government is able to provide robust guarantees for security that will help international business play a part in the normalisation and development of the country.

Positive indications

There are many reasons to be optimistic about Libya’s prospects for transition. The first most obvious positive factor is the existence of the TNC. While not all factions recognise or approve of its leadership, it at least provides a viable political framework to oversee political transition, and it enjoys international recognition and support. 

The TNC has set out an ambitious but sensible timetable for political transition. With the conclusion of hostilities, a TNC caretaker government will pave the way for elections within eight months to elect a 200-person national congress and the appointment of a new interim prime minister, at which point the TNC will dissolve. Most estimates suggest that if this plan holds, elections will be held sometime in July. The new congress will draft a constitution, and put it to a referendum after 60 days. And a year later, it will hold multi-party elections for a proper parliament and a full government, assuming of course that this timetable proceeds without significant disruption.

The second positive is that Libya is a wealthy country. It has enormous hydrocarbon reserves with estimated crude oil reserves of 47.1bn barrels. It also has some $170bn in sanctioned assets that foreign governments are now unfreezing and making available to the TNC. The TNC has also signalled its intent to revive and develop the oil sector as soon as possible. With the backlash against the policies of the former regime, the indications are that we are likely to see a more general shift towards economic liberalism, foreign investment and enterprise.

These are all strong and positive indications that the new Libya will have the economic wherewithal to ensure that the workforce – 70% of whom were employed in the public sector – return to work and get the country running again fast as possible, and prevent a slide into rising discontent and unrest. One potential inhibitor to this process is a skills shortfall, given the vast number of African migrant workers that constituted much of the Libyan workforce have fled the country.

Starting from scratch

However, while the economic indications are broadly positive, Libya’s new leadership faces enormous challenges in creating a secure and stable political environment. The most pressing task the TNC faces is cementing its authority and the legitimacy of its leadership to oversee the political transition. This means that it must move quickly to provide security, basic services and a functioning economy. Just as importantly, it requires inclusive political frameworks in which all the different factions and groupings that fought to rid the country of the Gaddafi regime feel they have a stake.

This would be a fraught task in any post-conflict society, but the challenge is even greater given the totality of the transformation in Libya. The revolution swept away what was already a highly dysfunctional old order. This of course gives the new Libyan leadership a chance to create a completely new political system. But for now, it also means that there is a yawning security and political vacuum in which brewing political disputes, factionalism and security problems pose a serious risk of derailing or prolonging transition.

Time is of the essence

The extent and speed at which the TNC is able to provide effective governance and security will be critical in preventing unrest flaring again and various political groupings challenging its legitimacy and competence. The ostensible interim prime minister Mahmoud Jibril in particular has already declared his intention to step down once national liberation is complete, amid clear signs that his lack of popular support risked destabilising the TNC from the outset.

For now, many Libyans seem to be willing to give the TNC a chance, but this goodwill will not last for ever if it fails to deliver. The political stage is also becoming increasingly crowded with technocrats, exiles, tribal figures, and revolutionary military commanders. This is a recipe for a vibrant democracy of course, but no formal means of political participation exists outside of the TNC – or what the different military units and local committees decide to create. There is therefore a clear risk that unless the TNC can make tangible progress, a cycle of instability may take hold as internal disputes erode security gains that in turn inhibit stabilisation and transition. 

The TNC has called on civil servants to return to work and it seems keen to avoid the disastrous de-Baathification type policy that expedited the insurgencies in Iraq. But it is highly unlikely that Gaddafi’s security forces will enjoy any kind of reconciliation or role in the new Libya. This means there is a security gap that new police and security forces will need to fill, which will require recruitment and training and structural organising. This will take time.

Controlling Tripoli

The TNC’s most pressing task after the liberation of Tripoli was to prevent the capital from descending rapidly into lawlessness. In the main, it succeeded. According to Janusian personnel in the city, looting was largely limited to palaces and security sites. Public infrastructure remained relatively untouched, although power, water and fuel supplies remain in short supply. However, this achievement is at risk of unravelling.

The immediate problem the TNC faces is demobilising or assimilating the various revolutionary militias into professional security forces, and preventing political factionalism and unrest over hardship from becoming a security crisis. The security structure across the country is highly fragmented with different towns running their own military affairs, reportedly reluctant to obey the national liberation army. In some neighbourhoods, competing security and administrative committees have sprung up.

In Tripoli, this is a particularly pressing issue, as there are an estimated 70 or so distinct militias from different parts of the country now present. The TNC has urged fighters to return home, and announced a plan to train others as police.

The TNC’s plans to incorporate the various militias into a regular security force remain cloudy. And in the vacuum, there are already indications of some armed groupings vying for control of the capital’s security.

Emerging threats

Another concerning dynamic is that in the absence of a coherent security system, there remains no viable law enforcement. This is particularly concerning given that large numbers of criminal and terrorist convicts freed from Abu Salim prison remain at large, as do remnants of Gaddafi’s security forces, and the proliferation of light and heavy weapons.

Our contacts in Tripoli have expressed serious concern about the sheer amount of weaponry on the streets, and the potential for these weapons to turn civil unrest over hardship or political issues into open conflict. There is also concern about what diplomatic sources have called ‘unknown actors’ that have crossed in to Libya during the war and the potential this has for the growth of terrorist organisations in Libya.

In particular, there have been indications that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has been increasingly active in Libya, primarily in acquiring weapons for its factions in Algeria and Mali. However, the porousness of the border, particularly with Mali, means that weapons may have flowed out of Libya but there is also a risk that militants may have come in.

Outlook

With so many different and potentially destabilising actors emerging, the TNC’s challenge of bringing about security is immense. It must move quickly to establish a fully functional and inclusive government as fast as possible once the war is over. Without a representative system, its task of demobilising or assimilating the revolutionary forces is at risk of failing, and with it its prospects of containing emerging security threats and challenges by different factions to its authority and control.

That is not to stay that such an outcome is by any means a certainty, but the risks are plainly apparent. It will not be until the war is over and the jubilation of victory gives way to what is likely to be a rough phase of transition politics that the picture will become clearer. In the meantime, it will be up to foreign businesses going into Libya to take robust measures to manage the risks, and pressure the TNC to get its house in order. Only when the TNC can provide reliable security guarantees can investment really pour in. In the meantime, the optimistic revolutionary goodwill and camaraderie that seems to be keeping Tripoli placid is likely to have a short shelf life.

Source: Global Experts (www.theglobalexperts.org), a project of the United Nations Alliance of Civilisations

Copyright © 2011 Global Experts/UNAOC