There is no question about EU leaders’ desire to see the end of the ongoing eurozone debt crisis. The problem, however, is whether they can agree on what needs to be done; and whether whatever compromise is reached will be enough.

The now-traditional talks between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel ahead of European Council meetings are perhaps the most notable example of EU countries aiming to ensure their own interests are looked into. But it would be disingenuous to claim that they are the only two member states doing so.

Even tiny Malta is playing the same game. Economists may debate the merits of the financial transaction tax proposed by the European Commission, but the fact that its most vociferous opponents within the EU – Malta and the UK – rely heavily on their financial services sector betrays their motivation.

Of course, disagreements will be expected among countries, and one cannot expect any government not to express its concerns about a policy which it deems harmful to its necessary interests. But these disagreements may prove catastrophic if they ultimately scupper the EU’s plans to deal with the present crisis decisively.

Examples of how this can happen abound. Earlier this year, US economist Paul Krugman pointed out that Spain’s recent economic bubble sent wages and prices soaring. If the eurozone’s own inflation is allowed to increase, it would be easier for Spain to keep its relative inflation low and restore its competitiveness.

But this is inevitably opposed by Germany, which – as one of the world’s leading exporters – strives to keep eurozone inflation low to maintain its own competitiveness.

German wariness of inflation may explain its opposition to Eurobonds issued jointly by eurozone members. These bonds could ease financing concerns for troubled countries, but Germany has repeatedly rejected them over inflation concerns, and Mr Sarkozy has followed suit.

EU countries may agree that no eurozone country should go bust, as this could cause faith in the single currency to collapse and possibly cause the recent recession to come back with a vengeance. But in their bid to compromise between diverging positions, they risk reaching an agreement which would unduly burden a few countries, possibly leading to that very same undesired outcome.

As economic analysts have repeatedly maintained, EU members may resist specific proposals only to relent as the crisis worsens. But the crisis has already worsened considerably since a newly-elected Greek government discovered, two years ago, that the country’s finances were in a far worse state than believed.

Greece’s request for a bailout was followed by requests by Ireland and Portugal, and Spain and Italy’s finances are deemed to be in a precarious state – if record yields on their bond issues are any indication. The two countries are far too large for a bailout agreement – setting up a bailout fund large enough for smaller countries was enough of a challenge. And as Krugman’s example shows, what may be beneficial to them may be anathema to other countries.

Perhaps this is what Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn had in mind last week when he said that this period was critical to complete and conclude “the crisis response of the EU”.

As he added, there is no single silver bullet to sort the crisis out; in any case there won’t be any each country will find palatable. But if the need comes, will EU members bite the bullet, or will a tragedy of the commons ensue?