It has become routine to describe meetings of EU leaders – such as the upcoming European Council – as crucial. But a series of ‘crucial’ meetings and ‘decisive’ agreements are yet to suggest a definite way out of the present economic crisis gripping the EU.

Let’s take the last decisive agreement reached: A second bailout package, worth €130 billion, for Greece. That a second bailout was needed itself shows how the issue appears far more difficult to sort out than originally thought: And a number of factors suggest a third bailout wouldn’t be too unlikely.

The agreement seeks to avoid a default on Greek debts. Ironically, however, it effectively is one: As private creditors have been persuaded to agree to a partial write-off of debts. The European Central Bank has refused to take any losses itself: To the annoyance of private lenders who will now be unlikely to provide further loans to Greece any time soon.

Moreover, the bailout operates on the assumption that the country’s economy will register growth in 2014, after years of economic contraction – even though the painful cuts necessary to secure it will help continue that trend. Thousands of enterprises are shutting down every month, and the purchasing power of Greeks is eroding fast: Expecting a sufficient reversal of the present trend in little over a year may be over-optimistic.

The aim is to see Greek debt reduced from 160% of GDP to 120% of GDP by 2020, but even if this target is reached, Greece would be far off from safety. The bailout’s inherent problem is that it focuses on more immediate concerns – avoiding a debt default and the prospect of Greece leaving the euro, and all the consequences this would entail – and not the long-term problem of Greece’s uncompetitive and unsustainable economy.

As a result, very little of the €130 billion involved will directly help to boost the country’s ailing economy.

The situation also betrays a problem that goes beyond Greece, or any other bailout recipient for that matter. The agreements reached over the past few years show that there is little chance of a eurozone country accepting a deal which may be beneficial to the bloc but which would possibly affect its own interests – unless, of course, its back is to the wall.

Germany, which has taken a leading role in negotiations, provides a number of examples. As one of the world’s leading exporters, the country stands to benefit from keeping inflation down within the country and within the eurozone, as it ensures that its exports remain competitive. Allowing its inflation to go up would provide some respite to heavily-indebted countries, making it easier for them to boost their own competitiveness.

But the odds of Germany making this decision are very low, and it is only natural to expect so much. Malta’s own opposition to a financial transaction tax is based on similar principles, for instance.

Germany is also leading opposition to plans to increase the size of the EU’s bailout fund, despite the recommendations of the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the G20, insisting that this would discourage countries from consolidating their finances.

So the situation we’re facing is that of bailout agreements which have to strike a balance between cutting expenditure and leaving an economy strong enough to cover remaining costs, while raising no objections from any of the countries involved. Add to the equation populations which may become restive as “austerity measures” translate to countless tales of personal hardship.

Will the eurozone manage to walk this tightrope? Doing so will be crucial.