Today, Greece goes to the polls for the second time in less than a month. The outcome of this election in the country that prides itself on being the birthplace of democracy could spell the exit of Greece from the eurozone and the end of the euro. The coming week looks set to be the time when the sickly eurozone’s fever peaks and the ailing EU patient’s prognosis becomes clear.

For Malta, which has itself been wracked by a different sort of political instability for the last few months, what happens in Greece and in Europe more generally over the next week is a matter of great interest, and also of great peril. We are, as always, prey to events largely outside our control, but massively affected by them. We need, therefore, to stop the navel-gazing and backstabbing for a moment and consider how Malta is to come through the next few months with its economic well being intact.

The Greek elections could well produce a government which is determined to renege on, or radically renegotiate, the austerity measures and reforms it had undertaken to fulfil at the time of its second bailout earlier this year. If Alexis Tsipras, the radical leader of the far left Syriza party, who has emerged as the figure-head of a revolt against German-backed austerity measures, wins or is in a position together with other anti-austerity political parties to form the next government, the rest of Europe will have to decide whether to enter new negotiations, or to let Greece exit the euro. For Malta, which in relation to the size of its GDP carries proportionately more of the Greek debt than others in the eurozone and some of whose investment banks may be severely affected, the stakes are high.

If EU leaders cleave to their current line − a line which Germany, backed by Europe’s remaining triple A-rated countries, firmly supports – that Greece must adhere unconditionally to the bailout terms already agreed, the flow of funds to the Greek government will cease. If the lifeline from its creditor nations through the European Financial Stability Facility, the euro’s temporary rescue fund, were cut off, Greece would be unable to pay its debts to honour bonds held by the European Central Bank. And if the ECB made it a matter of principle not to lend to banks of a country in default, then it in turn would cut Greece off.

Without ECB money the entire Greek banking system would collapse. In a series of economic and financial steps too complex to describe, the road to a messy Greek exit from the euro would be inexorably on its way. European governments, including Malta, would bear losses on the loans they have made to Greece in the various bailouts. Most of this would never be repaid. The political and economic consequences would be significant and could place the whole future of the eurozone in doubt.

The alternatives to this bleak scenario are two-fold. The first is that Greek electors or a new Greek government, even one formed strongly of anti-austerity parties, would see sense and adhere to the bailout conditions already negotiated. The message being conveyed to the Greek electorate by EU leaders of the Armageddon that awaits them if they do not do so is designed to put pressure to achieve this objective.

The second option is that the eurozone – essentially Germany egged on by France – softens its present hard line and produces a package for Greece which, no matter how it is dressed up, provides some relief from the current agonising medicine. However, the signals coming from the Bundesbank are implacable. It actually seems to consider, in the face of all opposing evidence to the contrary, that the turmoil from a Greek exit would be “considerable but manageable given prudent crisis management”.

Contemplating the possible disintegration of the eurozone may yet prompt concessions from both Greece and Germany to prevent the worst from happening. The crux, however, is whether the level of fear is sufficient to lead to such a change of heart, while not so powerful as to trigger panic in Greece and elsewhere.

Either way, the political and economic shock waves of the Greek elections will continue to ripple with unpredictable results. Spain, Europe’s fourth largest economy, has fast eclipsed Greece as the focus of the eurozone debt crisis. Bailouts of Spain’s banks, as well as those of Cyprus whose banks are heavily exposed to Greek debt, place a strain on the resources of Europe’s new bailout fund. Despite the recent relief to Spanish banks, contagion across the eurozone affecting Italy, Portugal and others remains a distinct possibility for which Europe’s current firewalls are unprepared and insufficient.

But the political repercussions may in the long term be even more serious. We are already seeing the rise of extremist parties right across Europe. The wreckage of centre-left and centre-right parties litters Europe’s political landscape. From the radical left Syriza and far right Golden Dawn party in Greece, to the National Front in France, the Five Star Movement of comedian Beppe Grillo in Italy, the Pirate Party in Germany, Geert Wilders in The Netherlands and True Finns in Finland, European electors are abandoning the mainstream parties and increasingly seeking refuge in the extreme fringes.

Europe could be facing unpredictable political, economic and social consequences for years ahead as its ineffectual political leaders struggle – as they have done for three years − to overcome the results of a deeply flawed monetary union. As has long been predicted, a common currency can only properly follow political union. It cannot precede it, as we are now painfully discovering. The only realistic solution to this crisis in the long term appears to be the creation of a “United States of Europe”, a single federal state with full fiscal and political union as opposed to today’s union of self-governing nation-states.

Malta will find the inevitable loss of sovereignty and independence, which this would entail, a bitter pill to swallow. It has waited for hundreds of years to run its own affairs. In joining the European Union it knew that there were some areas of policy – for example, foreign affairs, fisheries, the environment and agriculture, which would be common to all. But it never envisaged that its budgets and taxes would be set in Brussels, that its banks would be centrally controlled, or that its hard-won identity as a nation-state would be placed in question.

As our politicians squabble over who did what to whom over the Franco Debono and the RCC affairs, they should perhaps try to raise their sights to the political, social and economic issues that will affect the livelihoods and well being of generations of Maltese to come. These are unfolding in Europe right now and require a mature debate, not the polarising, tit-for-tat response to which we have sadly become used. The issue of the emerging democratic deficit in Europe and Malta’s very future as a sovereign independent country is too serious a matter to become another version of the political football that passes for politics in this country.