While on a visit to the US, when Assad Senior ran the show in Syria and Gaddafi still clung to power, a senior US official had compared the two authoritarian leaders saying that Assad acted like a gazelle, while Gaddafi in most cases came across like a baboon.

With Gaddafi and his regime now out of the way and Libya enjoys its first taste of a genuine Arab Spring, all eyes are on Syria.

Particularly on the following issues:

Is the time for patience re Syria over?

Will the House of Assad fall or not in the coming days or weeks?

Will the outside powers intervene directly or covertly by sub-contracting their job to third countries?

Is there room left for diplomacy or will diplomacy be perceived as a way of continuing to shore up the remnants of the Assad regime?

Will the so-called West allow the country to fragment itself and lose its federal structure?

Will the militias make a bad situation worse or not?

Will a dictatorial regime be followed by a new dictatorial regime led by a new strong man?

And most importantly, will the suffering and the bloodshed stop, once and for all?

It would be over simplistic and naïve to attempt to offer instant replies to all these ticklish questions.

What seems to be a given is that Syria is no ‘ordinary’ Libya. Either in terms of size and importance or, and even more so, in geo strategic terms. With so much at stake not only for the big powers but also for neighbouring countries like Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Iraq, developments there cannot be seen or gauged in isolation. So much so that some have even speculated that the battle for Syria is actually a battle for the entire Middle East.

Their line of thinking is that f Assad falls, the area will lose a brutal dictator and Iran a pivotal ally, and this could mark the end of an entire political culture rather than that of a single dictator.

But in politics, contrary to the movies, although one can tell when the final reel might have started rolling, there is no guarantee how the scenario will actually develop and end.

Some claim quite understandably that when beleaguered leaders appear on TV just to prove that they are alive, in most cases this seems to suggest that, in actual fact, the end seems imminent.

I have noticed in recent weeks that apart from the assassination of four members of the Assad ruling clique by a still unknown bomber, which a local newspaper mistakenly dismissed as a suicide killing, the focus seems to have suddenly shifted to the mighty arsenal that Damascus has.

With others pondering on whether this arsenal will be demolished, dismantled or somehow contained, the debate seems to have also shifted to the threat that resorting to such an arsenal could entail for security in the region. When we talk of an arms arsenal one must bear in mind that they are possibly both biological and chemical and can become even more lethal, once unlocked and, as reported, already on the move. The result would go way beyond the suffering and the bloodshed that the Syrians are actually experiencing. Only time will tell whether Syria will merely implode or explode when things come to the crunch.

One cannot either exclude the possibility of having another Lebanon materialize, where proxy wars could be fought on its terrain while sectarian violence continues to erupt.

There are strong indications that the West is already involved – if not directly then through the tacit backing of others who have been selectively shipping arms to the rebel groups with whom they can best identify. No mean task when Syria is reported to have well over a hundred separate militias.

I am still uncertain as to how thin or strong is the demarcation line between a possible direct intervention − which I consider unlikely – to an international peacekeeping force being set up there. Particularly following Assad’s exit or demise.

A Chatham House contact of mine who is a regional authority on the subject recently described Syria as a Stasi state, where everyone is watching everybody else. In such countries, old habits die hard.

Only time will tell whether values and interests will coincide or whether one will prevail over the other.

One cannot help but draw some parallels on the way ‘outside help’ had developed in Libya even if foreign intervention might not be as full blown as it seems to have been in that case.

One thing is certain. Syria is on the brink.

What will follow remains unclear, not because of the unclear situation but also because the extent, nature and divisions within the opposition are still hard to pin down.

As to how successful those hoping for a non-military solution might be is something I will not venture to guess. It could be that the defections, shortages of supplies etc. could make such recourse even less rather than more necessary.

Although some remain sceptical as to whether Assad will really go at all, the biggest dilemma to my mind is what forces will emerge in his place.

A transition process in the wake of such a rapidly disintegrating, brutal regime might not prove to be that easy.

What will be needed for sure is that when all sectors of society are taken on board, none including the Alawites should feel or be marginalized a priori.

As I write this article, reports keep filtering in – even through the US press itself – that stymied at the UN, the US is actually refining its plans to remove Assad. Whether this is true or not, or just psychological warfare will be something that we will learn about possibly only months after Assad will have been gone.

Meanwhile, discussions on a broad range of contingency plans will no doubt continue in the coming days and hours.

Another mystery remains – what role will, could, should or might Israel itself play in this particular end game.

As I see it, the key players will now instead work with a diverse range of partners outside the Security Council while thousands continue to flee across Syria’s borders. And the usual threat continues to rear its head – that of a temporary lack of state structures and aspirant militant Islamists seeking a safe area for training.

If reports on a Syrian army supply crisis are correct, then the meltdown might not be only political or military but also logistical.

Leo Brincat is a member of the Standing House Committee on Foreign & European Affairs

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www.leobrincat.com