I happen to be writing this article at the same time that a spate of kidnappings has evidently brought the Syrian civil war to Lebanon; at a time when speculation is rife that certain powers are trying to target Iran through Syria and with the just revealed shocking findings of the UN independent investigation into the Syrian Houla massacre firmly in mind.
All three developments will no doubt add sinister twists to the whole Syrian saga.
Unfortunately, since Syria is geographically located farther away from Malta than Libya, the bloodletting developments have not impacted locally the same way that the Libyan uprising did. Mainly out of narrow minded local self interest - that we do not have the same geographic proximity to Syria as to Libya, or the same people-to-people links, trade and investment ties as we had with Libya and which we hope will continue in the near future.
Until recently, the main focus was on whether there would be regime change or not in Syria. But now the biggest preoccupation is apparently that Syria seems to be following the Lebanese path by continuing with what could be a lengthy and protracted conflict over several years – a sort of Middle Eastern ‘Balkanisation’, where the scene is dominated by sectarian strife and antagonism.
The level of hardship that the Syrian people have been experiencing should be uppermost in our minds but it would be naïve to play down or ignore the fact that geo-strategic considerations seem to be the prevailing issue in this conflict-torn country.
While no doubt the big powers – be they the USA, Russia or China – will continue to dominate the centre stage, Turkey’s role will most likely prove to be pivotal. Not only is it being considered as a main conduit for rebel fighters and weapons going into Syria at present, but it has long been identified as the main logistical base for goings-on in the area – regardless of who might actually be calling the shots.
Neither can one lightly dismiss the role of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In the former’s case one can well understand that their main preoccupation is Iran, but nevertheless the question “What is Qatar doing in Syria?” is a ticklish one that continues to be posed by various analysts and commentators.
In spite of the ever-increasing body count, as more information continues to surface, many people have been piecing together the bits of the jigsaw to try and figure out not only who is really helping whom in Syria, but how, to what extent and what the real motivations might be.
It is understandable that all the key players are no doubt seeking to have an influence on the process of events not only in Syria itself but also in the region around it.
Given the way the weapons of mass destruction issue went up in smoke in Iraq, the initial reaction is to tread very cautiously regarding the extent of chemical weapons that Assad might really have in Syria, as well as how strong the possibilities are that he could effectively be tempted to use them.
On the other hand, an over simplistic interpretation of this saga could also prove to be counterproductive and even mistaken.
Apart from the fact that he could actually be tempted to do so out of despair, as the war turns even more vicious than it has been so far, one must also factor in other possibilities, such as whether such weapons could end up in extremist Jihadist groups’ hands in a post Assad-scenario or whether they could eventually be traded internationally, adding more uncertainty in the area and even beyond.
As in the case of Libya, it seems almost certain that external powers are not simply helping the Opposition in generic terms but are picking and choosing who to support while the support for Syria and Iran continues unabated from the usual suspects.
There has also been talk of foreign fighters, although no foreign troops have been identified so far.
On the intelligence gathering level, I have no doubt that covert action has been underway for months – not just days or weeks.
The same goes for external funding which, from what I can tell, has been considerable.
I pity Lebanon too, because it has always been the ideal playground for proxy wars, apart from the fact that its politics and religion have long been linked with those of Syria itself.
Russia’s future role remains somewhat ambivalent. Even though it blocked UN action and is considered to be continuing to look on Syria as the last Russian stronghold in the Middle East – even more so since Russia got pushed out of the region as a result of the Arab Spring – there have been rumours that, in the end, some kind of deal could be worked out by the various big powers. And some have speculated that Russian action on the Syrian issue could even be used as a bargaining chip for promoting its goals in its future negotiations with the West.
The more crisis-ridden the Russian-American dialogue, the more such a possibility gains in credibility. In my opinion, Syria might continue to matter to Russia even in a post-Assad scenario, beyond the whole question of the regime’s survival.
Israel has so far been prudent by standing aside and avoiding action, but what can happen in the coming months remains a big mystery. Even more so since the US election is only some three months away, and one will still need to factor in whether an overly pro-active Israeli role in this crisis will help or hinder the two front runners’ prospects within a purely domestic American scenario.
Obviously what could trigger it into action could be the potential use or misuse of chemical weaponry, particularly if the stock is as big as it is reported to be.
In my opinion, the fact that external help is dividing the opposition further is fuelling even more uncertainty in the region, since it is making the prospect of a more unified opposition under a single command even more remote.
What is puzzling is that while the West is being accused of being too interventionist in the issue, there has meanwhile been contrasting criticism that Madame Clinton has been raging against Assad but doing nothing.
Since July, military strategists have been weighing the pros and cons as well as the risks and challenges of intervention in Syria.
One thing has emerged very clearly since then, something that we had suspected all along: that the assassination of senior officials at the heart of the Assad regime on 18 July gave a decisive new impetus to opposition forces and confirmed that the crisis was finally tipping from an anti government rebellion into a sectarian civil war.
Leo Brincat is a member of the House Standing Committee on Foreign and European Affairs
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