Opposition leader Simon Busuttil has been hauled over some hot coals this week for having had the nerve to question what strings were attached to the Chinese investment in Enemalta. To us, this is a natural question – a gift horse of this breed should always be looked in the mouth.

The agreement has its positives, there is no doubt about that: a significant cash injection into a severely ailing Enemalta, an injection equal to about a quarter of the corporation’s €800 million debt, the building of further economic bridges with an economy the size of China’s, and the prospect of assistance for Malta to meet its ailing renewable energy targets. China, on the other hand, will be securing a strong foothold in the European Union’s energy market and possible create a hub in Malta for servicing its power station products in the Mediterranean region.

But, on the other hand, no such deal comes without any strings attached and the lack of detail provided in the agreement by the government is a little disconcerting.

As the Opposition leader observed this week, there could very well be more than meets the eye to the deal and, as he posited, there could also be the issue of China looking to buy support around the EU’s negotiating table in the equation.

And it is here, perhaps, where Dr Busuttil may have hit the nail on the head.

In both 2009 and in 2011, under a previous Nationalist administration and well before any such Enemalta investment or otherwise had been conceived, reports by European Council on Foreign Relations, an influential pan-European think tank, had already placed Malta in a group of 11 EU members states which it labelled as “accommodating mercantilists”. These countries, according to the 2009 report, shun political confrontation with China in favour of commercial interests and, through their refusal to bring pressure to bear on China on political issues, have “often kept the EU from developing a more assertive stance on issues like Tibet or human rights”.

One might question what political weight Malta, one of the world’s smallest nations, could leverage for China, one of the world’s largest. But when it comes to the EU’s joint political and commercial clout, each member state has an equal vote around the EU table.

The 2009 report – A Power Audit of EU-China Relations – noted that Malta specifically stood in favour of lifting the EU’s arms embargo against China. In terms of Malta’s economic and trade relations with China, the report cited that Malta’s main priority is business development through the identification of market niches in the Chinese economy, and furthering its aim to position itself as a trans-shipment hub in the Mediterranean – an area where Chinese cooperation plays a significant role.

Moreover, the report noted how Malta, which has had close links with China since the 1970s, has been described by interlocutors as a “close ally for China” and that Malta is “keen to see the EU more mindful of China’s sensitivities”.

According to the 2009 report, “The Accommodating Mercantilists’ refusal to bring pressure to bear on Beijing on political issues weakens a key component of the EU’s China policy: these countries have often kept the EU from developing a more assertive stance on issues like Tibet or human rights. At the extremes, some effectively act as proxies for China in the EU.”

In 2011, another ECFR report concluded that China can always depend on some of the European Union’s smaller member states – particularly Malta, Cyprus and Greece – to block any unanimous decision at EU level against its interests.

The report also found that China is “taking over Europe” by stealth bond purchases and strategic investments, and by exploiting internal divisions arising from the financial crisis. 

That 2011 policy brief, entitled The Scramble for Europe, claimed that a lack of European cohesion has invited China to deal bilaterally with individual member states to exploit their divisions.

China, it said, deliberately purchases the bonds of individual member states rather than Eurobonds, because “it knows that dealing bilaterally with European nations leads to a better pay-off than bolstering multi-national initiatives”.  Along these lines, it would be interesting to learn how much Maltese government paper the Chinese government has purchased over recent years.

This, the report said, will pay political dividends in the future. It claimed: “Even after 2014 – when majority decisions at the European Council will require 15 member states with 65 per cent of the population – it will be useful for the Chinese to have a kind of ‘China lobby’ consisting of smaller member states.”

This so-called ‘China lobby’, the report suggested, is comprised of smaller member states, among which Malta, Cyprus and Greece were singled out as being of a particularly placating mindset when it comes to China.

Given this background, the next report of its kind from the ECFR and its take on the new developments between Malta and China will make for interesting reading indeed.

A healthy dose of suspicion, not an overdose, is always beneficial in such circumstances and, as Dr Busuttil said, there could very well be more than meets the eye beneath the surface of the agreement. 

After all, in politics, as well as in big business, there usually is.