The intense and constructive discussions that took place in Geneva on 7 – 10 November 2013, between the so called E3/EU + 3 or the P5 + 1 (meaning the EU represented by its High Representative, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, plus the United States, Russia and China) with Iran, brought hope of a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, together with signs that at long last the deep hostility between the Islamic Republic and the United States may begin to tone down.

Iran's non-compliance with its obligations under the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations Security Council, provides the legal basis for a series of seven UNSC resolutions, all demanding that Iran suspends its uranium enrichment activities and imposing ever stricter sanctions on this stubborn non-compliant state.

Iran's reaction has been consistent, though defiant and unhelpful. It asserts its right under Article IV of the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and denies it has a programme to develop nuclear weapons. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei even issued a public and categorical condemnation, fatwa, of the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, in 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had not declared sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities, and since then, in its six-monthly reports, the IAEA has regularly reported a continued expansion in Iranian uranium enrichment capability, exceeding the levels needed for civilian nuclear use.

However, it is clear that the Iranian nuclear issue goes beyond international concerns about an already porous nuclear non-proliferation regime. After all, India, Pakistan and Israel have developed nuclear weapons without much ado, and at least one of them, Pakistan, is not all that careful about disseminating its acquired nuclear technology.

Iran is different. Its virulent anti-Americanism that goes back to “Operation Ajax”, a coup launched by the CIA against the popular elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in 1953, and the subsequent return of Shah Reza Pahlavi, with his brutal security police, Savak, radicalised Iran, and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, it came close to becoming a pariah state. American and European support for Iraq during its eight-year war with Iran, 1980 – 1988, strengthened Iranian militants and its fundamentalist regime. Iran’s support for Syria and Hezbollah together with the West’s suspicions that it was supporting terrorism made the divide even worse. The advent of a moderate President, Mohammed Khatami, in 1997 to 2005, was a missed opportunity both for Iran and the West. He was followed by the radical hard-liner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose diatribes against Israel and the United States made meaningful negotiations with Iran impossible.  National grievances take time to heal.  One can only hope that the recent election of President Hassan Rouhani in June 2013, with strong reformist support will begin this healing process.

Iran’s nuclear issue has preoccupying regional dimensions. Iran is in a region where every conflict is connected, and a new nuclear power there will immediately trigger an uncontrollable regional nuclear arms race.  A nuclear Iran will encourage Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others to develop or purchase their own nuclear weapons. A Shiite nuclear state will soon lead to a Sunni nuclear power. It is far too dangerous for international security to allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

The Iranian nuclear issue is further complicated because Iran is the only power in the Middle East that can pose a threat to the United States' s closest allies in the region – Israel and Saudi Arabia.  Both have immediately expressed condemnation of any deal with Iran.  Saudi Arabia's foreign policy spokesman stated that an Iran – US deal would spell a “major shift” in the Kingdom's friendship with the Unites States. Israel's condemnation was even more explicit.  Prime Minister Netanyahu is reported saying that a deal, “would be a mistake of historic proportions”.

A further twist to this already complicated issue arises from the strategic military relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and their unacknowledged nuclear partnership. It is rumoured that Saudi Arabia has secretly funded Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and that it is seeking to purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan to counter nuclear threats from Israel and Iran. Pakistan has already agreed to provide the Saudis with a nuclear deterrent at short notice should the need arise.

These complicated and real threats to international security call with urgency for an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue which would ensure not only that Iran would not develop nuclear weapons, but which would also provide security guarantees to all countries in the region. All security issues in the Middle East are interlinked, as are all conflicts that threaten the stability of the region. These security guarantees should be strong enough to make every country in the region feel highly confident that it does not need a nuclear deterrent to defend its security interests and territorial integrity. For such regional security guarantees to be credible there has to be a solution to the other major issues in the Middle East, particularly that between Israel and Palestine.

This month’s discussions in Geneva were the first high level meeting of the P5 + 1 with Iran following the election of President Rouhani.   Considered to be a moderate and a pragmatist, President Rouhani seems to have the ability to bridge the divide between reformists and conservatives in his own country, while maintaining the backing of Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. This position gave him sufficient political confidence to launch a limited charm offensive during his visit to New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly last September, indicating a clear departure form the austere and isolationist foreign policy of his predecessor.

Having been Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council for sixteen years, from 1989 to 2005, President Rouhani has personal direct knowledge of the nuclear dossier. In New York he indicated that Iran was prepared to soften its position and that with some reciprocal softening by the P5 + 1 it would be possible to solve the issue within six to twelve months.

Few details were leaked following the Geneva negotiations.  However, there are relatively high expectations that a deal can be agreed based on a suspension by Iran of its uranium enrichment programme in return for a suspension of the sanctions regime. Indeed, recently there have been indications that Iran would be prepared to be flexible on its nuclear programme and on its openness to inspection by the IAEA if this would help lift sanctions, particularly on oil sales and on the financial sector.  President Rouhani is probably hoping to consolidate and increase his popularity by achieving some foreign policy successes which will have a positive impact on the Iranian economy.  This may embolden him to make further concessions during the upcoming continuation of negotiations in Geneva on 20 November.

A deal with Iran will bring about an important change in the Middle East political scenario. Iran can become an important ally in stabilizing Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.

However, it is only under a credible regional security umbrella that one can expect Iran to agree to give up indefinitely its ambitions to become a nuclear power state. An agreement involving Iran's suspension of its uranium enrichment programme in return for the lifting of sanctions, the likely outcome of the Geneva talks, will be only one small building block in the construction of a stable, peaceful and nuclear free Middle East.

Tarcisio Zammit is a former Ambassador to Belgium and Malta’s Representative to the EU’s Political and Security Committee.