The breakthrough agreement reached last week-end in Geneva by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5 +1) and Iran, marks a significant first step towards ensuring that no new nuclear power will crop up in one of the world's most volatile and unstable regions. The extraordinary efforts and strong determination shown by both sides to achieve this breakthrough illustrate the serious threats that an unresolved stand-off on nuclear issues can pose to international security. The event calls for an evaluation of today's nuclear threat.

For several decades, one of the major man-made threats for the survival of mankind, probably also of our planet, has come from the uncontrollable and insane race for the production and possession of ever more powerful and vicious weapons of mass destruction.

These weapons that are intended to cause widespread destruction of the human habitat and to inflict horrible suffering on survivors, are usually classified, according to their destructive agent, into chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In spite of several transgressions by rogue states in recent history, all state, more or less, agree that chemical and biological weapons should be eliminated.  Diplomacy and collective pressure from the international community helped to gather nearly global support for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, both of which categorically ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of these categories of weapons by all states.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said with regard to nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into force on 5 March 1970, and to which all nations, except for India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan, are parties, has from the outset been the subject of rival interpretations.  Some argue that it is primarily a disarmament agreement which obliges those of the signatory states who possess nuclear weapons to work towards their elimination.  Others, among them the nuclear powers, assert that the NPT, as its name implies, is concerned above all with non-proliferation, and that the primary aim of the Treaty is to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers and the dissemination of  nuclear technology for military use.

The NPT recognises five nuclear powers: the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom.  They have all acceded to the Treaty and in Article 6 have committed themselves to negotiate “in good faith” for an early end to the nuclear arms race. In addition, three non-signatory states, India, Israel and Pakistan, are known to possess nuclear weapons, while North Korea, which withdrew from the Treaty in 2003, is seeking to develop one.

There are several reasons why some states decide to disregard the nuclear non-proliferation regime imposed by the international community and choose to maintain an active nuclear programme.  Among them security and prestige are certainly paramount.

At the basis of the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the belief that deterrence provides the best kind of security. The ability to inflict terrible damage on an opponent, though it may deter him from striking first,  will also encourage him to acquire means to retaliate by inflicting even greater damage. During the cold war the nuclear arms race soon reached the stage where deterrence functioned on the concept of mutually assured destruction, with the appropriate acronym MAD. One can say that this made the world safer than it is today because the red lines were clear and world security was not menaced by non-state actors.

States always take decisions that they believe best serve their security. None of the existing nuclear power states will ever seriously consider giving up all its nuclear weapons unless it has absolute certainty that the other nuclear powers are doing likewise without cheating, and that other state will not acquire nuclear weapons. It is difficult to have this level of trust in the relations between states. Therefore, today's nuclear powers are here to stay.

The NPT recognises the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  It allows signatory states to develop civilian nuclear energy programmes as long as they can demonstrate that their programme is not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the designated watchdog to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear technology. By means of the 1977 Additional Protocol it toughened inspection, verification and control of nuclear material in non-nuclear states.  However, experts see loopholes here because states with  an advanced and established civilian nuclear technology can without much difficulty transfer their know-how to the development  nuclear weapons. 

The crucial issue about today's nuclear threat is whether the safeguards of an international treaty signed by nearly all states together with pressure from the international community are enough to prevent the budding of new nuclear states. The case of Iran, following the agreement just reached in Geneva,  looks encouraging; however, other lurking dangers remain.

A final and comprehensive agreement with Iran, to which both the P5 + 1 and Iran are seriously committed, will greatly diminish but will not remove the threat of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The Middle East is not a nuclear weapons free region. Israel is already a nuclear power, and the nuclear partnership between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan should be a matter of grave concern to the international community.

In addition, one cannot disregard the threat of a nuclear arms race in South Asia should North Korea pursue its nuclear weapons programme.  It may provoke both South Korea and Japan to feel less comfortable under the United States umbrella and to set out to develop their own nuclear weapons.

The spread and organisation of international terrorism has considerably increased the danger of a nuclear devise falling into the hands of terrorists. It is known that from an early stage in his terrorist career Ben Laden tried to acquire nuclear material. His successors and followers are not likely to give up this attempt, and they may succeed should there be a collapse of central authority in Pakistan or North Korea. In the meantime the danger exists that terrorists will produce what is known as a “dirty bomb”, which, though lacking the destructive force of a nuclear bomb, can scatter radioactive material across a wide area.

Today's nuclear threat is also augmented by the current research, especially by the United States,  on the production of smaller nuclear bombs, the so called “bunker busters”, to be used against well defended underground targets.  This development risks blurring the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, and, as new battlefield uses are being devised for such weapons the world moves closer to a nuclear war.

There is no better way to respond to today's nuclear threat than by making the non-proliferation regime foolproof. This can prevent both the terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon as well as regional nuclear arms races. The NPT should be enforced by the international community without double standards, while the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should scrupulously abide by their commitment not to export or transfer materials that can be used to develop nuclear weapons. On their part, the existing nuclear powers should engage more sincerely in nuclear arms reduction negotiations and eliminate operationally inactive stockpiles. Above all, they should collaborate better in a multilateral approach towards guaranteeing and enforcing international security.

Tarcisio Zammit is a former Ambassador to Belgium and Malta’s Representative to the EU’s Political and Security Committee