With the coming of 2014, there is a general sense of urgency among the international community, especially among the main regional stakeholders, regarding the situation in Afghanistan. 2014 will bring a presidential election and a change in government, as well as a fundamental shift in the nature of international assistance. The period of transition for re-building Afghanistan that started with the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, following the five-year trauma of the Taliban regime and the United States' invasion in response to 9/11, will come to an end. One should at this stage examine whether the twelve-year US-led military engagement and the billions spent in development assistance have been enough to re-create a viable state in Afghanistan, able to maintain democratic institutions and the rule of law as well as a functioning economy and social development.
A bit of history will help one understand how Afghanistan got into this mess. The modern state of Afghanistan began to take shape in the early eighteenth century when the Hotaki and Durrani dynasties successfully led a series of rebellions against the Persians, and managed to build an emirate uniting the Pathan, Turkomen, Uzbek and Hazak peoples who lived between the deserts of eastern Iran and what was then the north-west frontier of British India, today’s Pakistan.
Throughout most of its history Afghanistan has been a victim of the strategic rivalry of greater powers who sought to control this central territory connecting the Middle East with Central Asia, China and the Indian sub-continent. For most of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth, Afghanistan was caught between the geo-political ambitions of the Russian and British Empires. This led to three anglo-afghan wars, in 1838, 1878 and 1919, intended by the British to curtail Russian influence and affirm the political boundary between Afghanistan and British India, the so called Durand Line established in 1893.
In more modern times Afghanistan was similarly the object of foreign craving. Afghanistan remained neutral and was not a participant in World War II, nor was it aligned to the Soviet Union or the United States during the cold war. However, it maintained close relations with the Soviet Union, and in 1953 it became the first non-Communist recipient of Russian aid. On its part, the United States vied for influence by providing loans and grants. An exchange of state visits (President Eisenhower visited Afghanistan in December 1959, and King Zahir Shah reciprocated in October 1963) convinced the United States that there was little danger of Afghanistan's becoming a Soviet satellite state.
Russian involvement in Afghanistan became more direct and aggressive after the coup of 1973, during which King Zahir Shah was deposed by his relative Daud Khan and the monarchy abolished. Daud was overthrown in 1978 by the Khalq faction of the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which Russia had helped founding in 1965. This led to horrendous lawlessness and revenge killings between the Khalq and the minority Parcham faction of the PDPA, and between supporters of the Khalq rival leaders, Nur Mohamad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. Among the victims were the American Ambassador, Adolph Dubs, abducted and killed, and some fifty Russian advisers.
In the closing days of 1979, Moscow decided to stop this instability on one of its most sensitive frontiers and invaded Afghanistan. This was interpreted by the United States as a calculated move in Russian global strategy, and by most of the international community as a blatant act of aggression. There was not much the United States could do except terminating the Soviet Wheat Deal, calling for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics and supporting diplomatic efforts to obtain Russia's withdrawal. However, what really hurt the Soviet invaders was the support in arms and funds given to the Mujahedeen resistance by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Soviets withdrew after a ten-year campaign during which they had committed some 90,000 troops without being able to gain convincing control of the country.
The fall of the Russian backed government of Najibullah in April 1992, was followed by civil war, which was exacerbated by the support given by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran to the militias and warlords of their choice. This lawlessness weakened the central government, paving the way for the Taliban takeover of Kabul in September 1996, and the subsequent reign of terror as the Taliban sought to consolidate their control through repression and the strict adherence to Sharia Law. They were dislodged by the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom deployed in October 2001, when they refused to give up Ben Laden and disband al-Qaeda basis in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council established The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to keep the Taliban out and provide security to the Afghan people.
The resilience of the Taliban insurgency and the weakness and corruption of the Karsai government have kept ISAF under pressure, and it is not clear to what extent it has managed to stabilise the country. Since 2002, ISAF has deployed and maintained nearly 98,000 troops, two-thirds of them American, without obtaining convincing results in its military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda networks. As it scales down and prepares for withdrawal by the end of 2014, its key task is transforming what is basically a foreign military operation into a peacekeeping operation led by the Afghan government and the United Nations.
Crucial to this transition is the bilateral security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan which was endorsed by the Loya Jirga (grand traditional assembly) on 24 November 2013. With this agreement, which comes into force on 1 January 2015, Afghanistan will gain full control and sovereignty over its territory. However, around 10,000 US troops will remain in Afghanistan for another ten years to train and assist the Afghan military and police, and US Special Forces will be allowed to continue the fight against al-Qaeda networks as part of their counter-terrorism operations.
There is much concern whether the 350,000 strong Afghan Security Forces, which ISAF has trained and equipped, are ready to secure the country and fight the Taliban militants on their own. To meet this concern the United Nations will be revamping and strengthening its Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), while the European Union has extended its police training mission.
The political process, to which both the international community and Afghanistan are fully committed, foresees presidential elections in April 2014 and parliamentary elections in 2015. The conduct and outcome of these elections will determine the strength of the future Afghan government and to what extent it will be able to play a constructive role in the resolution of Afghanistan's problems. There is a growing concern that political reconciliation among Afghanistan's main ethnic groups and regional leaders is not feasible without a profound constitutional and political reform, including a devolution process by which the government relinquishes some of its concentrated powers. It is not clear whether the emerging political leadership will have sufficient support to carry forward these reforms.
Another major challenge for Afghanistan is creating socio-economic sustainability which is achievable once security and governance improve. It is estimated that mineral resources recently discovered in Afghanistan's subsoil may generate some three trillion dollars in the foreseeable future. The question remains whether Afghan citizens will benefit from this wealth or whether these plentiful resources will become a “resource curse” attracting further corruption and foreign interference. New initiatives are needed for a sustainable and non-corrupt exploitation of Afghanistan's natural resources together with strategic measures for the control of opium production.
The future of Afghanistan is still very uncertain. Afghanistan's political calendar for 2014 may present opportunities for a decisive turn towards a better future. It will depend on whether the military and political transitions, including reconciliation with the Taliban insurgents, can be managed successfully.