I noticed with interest that the government has published a Bill to amend the Malta Communications Authority Act. The most notable feature of this Bill is the part which deals with the removal of the chairman and members of the Board, namely Article 20 of the Bill amending Article 3 of the MCA Act including sub-article 6 which reads:

"(6) A member of the Board may only be removed from office by the Minister for any one or more of the following reasons:

(a) if the member due to infirmity of mind or of body or of any other cause is effectively unable to continue to discharge his duties as a member;

(b) if the behaviour or performance of the member brings into question his suitability or ability to continue as a member, in particular for behaviour that affects or may affect his reputation, independence or autonomy, or the reputation, independence or autonomy of the Authority;

(c) if the member has been convicted of a criminal offence affecting public trust, or of theft or fraud, or of knowingly receiving property obtained by theft or fraud or of bribery or of money laundering, provided that the Minister may suspend the member if he is being investigated for a criminal offence; or

(d) if the member fails to perform his duties for a prolonged period without any valid justification:

Provided that notwithstanding the above, it shall be a cause for the removal of a member if that member for any reason fails to perform his duties, including attending for Board meetings, for a continuous period exceeding six months.";

This is indeed a step in the right direction as it means that no new government can now change the chairman or Board members of the MCA for anything other than one of the above reasons. This is in line with the EU Telecommunications Directive of 2009. I would go further and suggest that those appointed to such posts should also be scrutinised by some Parliamentary Committee prior to their formal appointment as is done in many democratic countries around the globe. This scrutiny should deal primarily with:

1) The integrity of the chairman and Board members. 

2) Any conflict/potential conflict of interest.

3) The track record in other sectors and in this particular sector.

4) Conversance with the subject matter.

5) Vision regarding to where he/she/they want to take the Authority.

6) Ability to deal with and not succumb to political pressure.

The scrutiny of a Parliamentary Committee would tend to avoid all the emotional comments surrounding such appointments and should be extended to all entities where the EU demands independence from government.

Philip Micallef

ATTARD