All speculation about who will succeed Jose' Manuel Barroso as President of the European Commission ended on Friday 27 June, when the European Council adopted the decision to propose Jean-Claude Juncker as candidate for this position. The next step, a favourable vote by the European Parliament on 16 July, is a foregone conclusion, considering that the major political groups have publicly declared their support.
While reflecting on the political manoeuvrings in Europe since the European elections of 25 May, one is bound to ask how Jean-Claude Juncker, towards whom most of the members of the European Council, that is the Heads of Government of the member states, were initially lukewarm, if not hostile, managed to win the approval of all except two member states. Indeed, there are many who still do not consider him the best man for the job.
Mr Juncker has been Luxembourg's Prime Minister for eighteen years and in this capacity he has participated in around a hundred European Council meetings. He was one of the architects of the Euro and was chairman of the Eurogroup from 2005 to 2013. As such he is considered a classic Brussels insider, with an instinctive knowledge of Brussels's rules and ways of doing things. His long experience and personal acquaintances with the Brussels elite made him prefer secret and early-hours deal-makings instead of open persuasion as transparency demands. He is deeply committed to further European integration.
These qualities may have won Jean-Claude Juncker the support of some Heads of Government. However, even though they voted for him, there are many others who find it difficult to explain why he is the best man to lead the European Union in a new direction, able to meet the demands of European citizens increasingly disenchanted by Brussels. Therefore, the reasons why he won nearly unanimous support at the European Council on Friday 27 June must lie elsewhere.
Observers believe that the European Council’s decision to propose Jean-Claude Juncker for the Commission Presidency is more a victory for the European Parliament than for the candidate himself. It is now clear that the European Parliament has outsmarted the Heads of Government and managed to impose its candidate on the European Council by gaining democratic legitimacy to its interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on the selection of the Commission President.
Many commentators agree that the relevant Article in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 17.7) cannot cogently be interpreted to mean that the European party winning the European elections is entitled to nominate the Commission President, and it certainly does not mean that such a nomination should be automatic. However, this is the interpretation that was promoted by the European Parliament both before and during the election campaign. Its slogan was loud and clear: the next Commission President will be chosen directly by the European electorate.
In order to stimulate these elections and seek democratic endorsement of their interpretation of the process for choosing the Commission President, each political group, with the exception of the European Conservatives and Reformist Group (ECR), selected its lead candidate. Throughout the campaign the European electorate was promised that the candidate of the European party winning the most seats would be the next Commission President. The campaign was run on TV with several grand debates among the five lead candidates. This made it harder for the Heads of Government to dump the winning candidate.
Moreover, the lead candidates were chosen by the very same Heads of Government who constitute the European Council, acting in their capacity as national party leaders at their respective party congress. The Heads of Government who participated in the congresses of their political groups and proceeded to nominate candidates for Commission President to run in the European elections can be said to have endorsed the selection procedure promoted by the European Parliament, and to have added legitimacy to it. This argument holds particularly in the case of the European People's Party (EPP), whose congress actually held an election to select its lead candidate, and the winner, Jean-Claude Juncker, proceeded to win the European elections. Many Heads of Government genuinely felt that if they chose an outsider (someone who had not run in the European elections) for the post of Commission President, they would be betraying not only the European electorate but also their own party congresses.
Thus, the Heads of Government, with the exception of David Cameron whose political group in the European Parliament did not present a lead candidate, could not withdraw the support they had given to the lead candidates in the European elections campaign. Prime Minister Joseph Muscat correctly read this prevailing mood when on Monday 16 June, he announced that his government would support Jean-Claude Juncker, even though he came from a different political group, because this was what had been promised to the electorate.
Twenty-five other Heads of Government similarly side-stepped their misgivings about Jean-Claude Juncker concluding that to oppose his candidature would be a denial of democracy. Those on the centre-right, belonging to the EPP, could not deny their own candidate. Those on the centre-left, led by the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who was about to take over the rotating Presidency, decided to bargain, trading their support for concessions. Their priority was winning flexibility over budget rules and targets for reducing their deficits. They wanted the next five years to be about growth and jobs rather than austerity. The connection between the decision in favour of Jean-Claude Juncker and the demands of the centre-left Heads of Government is clear from the very first two sentences of the European Council's conclusions: “The European Council agreed to propose Jean-Claude Juncker to the European Parliament as candidate for President of the European Commission. In this context, (my emphasis) it agreed the strategic agenda of key priorities for the next five years.” France and taly, in particular, believe that the agreed strategic agenda provides for the flexibility they require at home.
Even David Cameron, who did not choose to bargain and forced an unprecedented vote on the nomination of Jean-Claude Juncker, did not come out empty-handed form the European Council meeting. The European Council acknowledged that further integration would not necessarily apply to all member states, and that the concerns of the UK must be addressed.
Similar manoeuvres took place in the European Parliament. The centre-right EPP with 221 seats out of 751, stuck to their candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, while the centre-left S&D group, with 191 seats, bargained to gain support for their candidate, Martin Schultz, to be re-elected Parliament’s President. Moreover, all political groups in the European Parliament, with the exception of the extremist and Eurosceptic groups, have decided to give their support to Jean-Claude Juncker because they see the issue as part of the wider struggle to boost the influence of the European Parliament. The selection of Jean-Claude Juncker to become the next Commission President represents a major power shift from the European Council.
Jean-Claude Juncker made it to the Commission Presidency, thanks primarily to the astute political manoeuvring of the European Parliament. However, the inter-institutional struggle is not over. The Heads of Government made this clear in the conclusions of 27 June 2014: “Once the new Commission is effectively in place, the European Council will consider the process for the appointment of the President of the European Commission for the future, respecting the European Treaties.”
Jean-Claude Juncker may still make a good Commission President after all. As one of the most experienced Brussels insiders, he understands perfectly the political bargaining and manoeuvring that has led to his appointment. This knowledge should make him sensitive to the demands for reforms and flexibility coming form various member states. One good sign for things to come is that he has already given his backing to the strategic agenda for the next five years that foresees less austerity, more flexibility for job creation, and more sensitivity to the specific needs of certain member states, including the UK.