“This is Benghazi’s triumph over war”, said my writer friend Fathallah Bzaio, who stuck it for several months, in the city’s most ferocious war zones. “People have suffered so much, but never lost patience or hope”. Those killed on both sides are Libyan boys. It will take years before we can overcome or understand fully the insanity of it all”. Benghazi deserves a Nobel prize for standing fast against strife and extremism”.
Such words reveal the complexity of the Libyan crisis. Four years after the overthrow and death of the Libyan Dictator Gaddafi, Libya, a virtually failed state, is torn between three governments and dozens of militias. Fighting and terror are prevalent, for political, ideological or tribal reasons or for criminal purposes. Law enforcement is almost non-existent and people don’t feel safe because police stations are not operational and the courts are closed. Officers, judges and lawyers have been targeted by assassins. Crime, insecurity and inflation are all on the increase. In addition, there are shortages of food, medicine and electricity. But what has sustained such fratricide?
Disentangling the Libyan yarn
Sought by most Libyans, Gaddafi’s fall was catalyzed by the availability of arms, but it was NATO air power that destroyed Gaddafi’s arsenal.
Everything seemed smooth after Gaddafi’s demise. A Transitional Council was formed, and an Executive Bureau was set up. Elections were held and power transferred to a General Congress. At the time, Benghazi – the hub of the February Revolution – seemed so noble and safe, as one American journalist remarked at the time. Cameron, Sarkozy and other statesmen visited the town to receive popular cheers, duly televised back home.
The Gaddafi army and administration were left in shambles. Some now say that NATO should have “finished” the job, but the Western Powers had no plan to rehabilitate post-Gaddafi Libya. Was the chaos that ensued like a flash-flood the result of commission rather than omission?
Perhaps Libya’s current crisis is not really the fault of others. The blame for the mess rests largely on the shoulders of the Libyan political elite, nourished by a culture of nepotism that puts personal gain before public good.
Men in suits
Paradoxically, most of Jibril’s cabinet were drawn from the team of “Libya of Tomorrow”, the reform programme launched by Gaddafi’s son, Saif. It was not a conspiracy: they simply knew and trusted one another, and had access to world diplomacy. With the Revolution lacking leadership, power was there for the taking. But the new ‘leaders’ had no idea how to manage a volatile post-revolutionary situation. Being mandarins, men in suits’, as the writer Daniel Williams calls them, are clones of the late Iraqi banker-politico Ahmed Chalabi, who started Iraq on its disastrous course. They made a mess of the political power that fell into their laps; they simply did not know how to deal with the new powers that have replaced Gaddafi, namely the armed militias.
Politics of the Gun
With Gaddafi’s army and administration in ruins, those early days of confusion spawned a series of inept and corrupt governments. Militias of all colours proliferated. Those with fundamentalist leanings soon became entrenched especially in Derna, Benghazi, Misurata and Tripoli. Islamist politicians, although a minority, managed through their militias to manipulate the decisions of the first elected Parliament, the NGC, using sheer force and the storming of the Chamber and Ministerial buildings.
In the absence of proper government, the plundering of public funds became rife. One of the prime ministers felt no shame in saying that some 62 billion of public funds “had simply evaporated”!
The second elections brought a defeat for the Islamist camp, which they refused to acknowledge, hence the two parliaments of Tobruk and Tripoli. Clashes flared in Tripoli, with the burning of its airport. The Anti-Gaddafi Revolutionaries, led by Muqatila, gained ascendency.
Unsurprisingly, factional rivalries led to a power vacuum. In the meantime, many militias experienced a form of radicalisation which, in turn, led to the appearance of IS militias who took root in Derna, Sabratha and Sirte, with sleeping cells probably in every town, village and oasis.
Libyans, traditionally espousing moderate Maliki Sunni Islam, could not be attracted to extremist interpretations and brutal practices. For several months, Benghazi witnessed a spate of daily assassinations of retired army and police officers, as well as young activists. It was a nightmare of death and fear.
In mid-2014, the ex-army General Hefter launched the anti-terrorist military “Dignity” operation in Benghazi. The operation became protracted and soon reached a stalemate, with the militias controlling the city’s coastal suburbs, especially the port and financial centre. The confrontation continued unabated, with a depressing daily toll of deaths and rising numbers of casualties, much devastation and the displacement of some 70 thousand families. It is now clear that, in those depressing months, Haftar was amassing weapons and recruiting men for the final successful push.
Invisible Developments
Much has happened during the last 18 months or so. The UN has sponsored political dialogue between various political factions. The process has been tortuous, with much manoeuvring and delaying tactics. The end result has been a political accord that has yet to bear fruit. However, the process slowly attracted certain groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood Party and the Misurata Alliance, both relinquishing their previously belligerent stance as a result.
Another unpublicised development – but one that is equally important in the long run – is the rift between the local fundamentalist revolutionaries (Muqatila) in Derna and IS. The latter have been evicted from the town and a quasi-civic administration restored. The new rulers of Derna avoid interference with the daily life of its citizens and are possibly amenable to political dialogue. The Derna paradigm may well be repeated in other towns. Some analysts speculate that such a pattern will be acceptable to the USA, the Muqatila being more effective in fighting IS.
A Nomadic Government
Shimmering in the distance like a mirage, the Government of National Accord (GNA) remains a puzzling issue in current Libyan politics, even though a ‘stabilisation force’ has been formed by European governments to protect the new government in Tripoli. Western countries, however, remain hesitant about military intervention.
The coalition government is, however, almost fictional so far. Its members are without power, budgets or even offices in which to sit. The same political groups that have approved the Political Accord fail to agree on the numbers and names of the Cabinet Ministers. Worse, the PM-designate, Fayez Sarraaj, a Tripolitanian engineer, has failed to make political use of the credibility imparted upon him by the UN Security Council, the highest world authority. Reticent, he has instead been shuttling between world capitals, but has failed to visit war-free towns inside Libya or win the support of the many local dependable leaders. In short, Sarraaj has not built a political base for himself.
The only hope that this government will gain efficacy is that it will be guided by the acumen of the UN Commissioner who, being a German, may bring in some of the lessons of his country’s path to resuscitation following WWII.
The capital, Tripoli, which is to be the seat of the UNSMIL-backed Unity Government, is quiescent but, for all practical purposes, in the grip of the Muqatila Militia of Hakim Belhaj, whose real attitude towards the government remains a matter of guesswork.
But the Libyan political stage is never without surprises. On 3 March Haitham Tajoury, a militia commander with a chequered career, gave a vague ultimatum to “non-Tripolitanian” – ie Islamic militias – to quit the capital. He also presented himself as the defender of the rule of law and security in the capital, thus offering his militia as the guards of the National Unity Government. Almost simultaneously Colonel Idris Maady, a subordinate of Gen. Hefter in Tripoli, has revealed preparations to ‘conquer’ the capital. Why should more blood be shed? Benghazi is now the logical seat of the Unity Government.
Beyond ‘Dignity’ Operation
Following the eviction of the militias, the Benghazines are joyfully returning to their devastated homes. But delayed attention on the part of the municipal council may lead to overt resentment.
Gen. Hefter’s future role is undecided. He has declared his intention to liberate the rest of the country from all extremists. However, he is vehemently opposed by Tripolitanean and Misurati militias and politicians and his advancing age is another negative factor.
In liberating Benghazi, the military operation has also sown the seeds of potential revenge and retribution. Hopefully, such sectarian sentiments will be dispelled by the traditionally tolerant and reconciliatory Benghazine spirit. As a pre-emptive move, police security committees have been formed to protect against acts of retribution.
And the future?
The Libyan political process remains very fragile, as the UN Secretary-General recently warned. Many bridges have to be crossed before a Unity Government is established in Tripoli. Besides, the Presidential Council is so far really dysfunctional, since its decisions are by unanimity and not majority vote. Libya is also on the verge of bankruptcy.
Although Western countries feel that sending in combat troops will be politically costly, their aircrafts have already started targeting IS camps in Libya, without waiting for a request from the legitimate government.
Now that Benghazi is regaining peace without embroiling the Great Powers, it should be recognised as the one city that has retrieved civic life from the grip of chaos. The trauma has been costly, and the rebuilding of the city should be the responsibility of the world, as was Germany’s. It certainly should not be left to an inept and corrupt Libyan administration.
Basic Truths
“So what’s wrong with Libya? What’s the ‘underlying pathology’, as you doctors say?”, my daughter once asked me. I think the crux of the matter is two-fold. Firstly, the lack of trust all round: between politicians, between rival militias, between the two arch-rival regions of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and, finally, the deep mistrust in any government based in Tripoli. Secondly, most of those selected by the UN team for political dialogue, lack leadership qualities. Effective politicians with roots at the local levels have been excluded from the political process so far! The polarised political atmosphere in today’s Libya, moulded by gunfire, prohibits the natural selection of such leaders.
Analysts have tended to concentrate on IS establishing itself in Libya, with hesitant calls for a military intervention which may have dire unforeseen consequences of further chaos. Meanwhile, the UN commissioner Herr Martin Kobler and his Libyan mediators seem to be incarcerated in a maze of meetings with no end in sight.
As long as World Powers and the UN remain blind to these aspects, the situation will continue to deteriorate. A completely new approach is the only way out!
M. Mufti
Commentator on Libyan affairs
St Paul’s Bay