The Easter Rising was an insurrection, against British rule, mostly in Dublin city, that lasted from 24 April until 30 April 1916. The writer Maurice O'Scanaill gives a brief overview to mark its Centenary
When it came to commemorating the Easter Rising 1916, the Irish had a problem: Easter moves. In 1916, it fell late in the possible time-frame(23rd April) whereas this year, it was near its earliest (27th March). So the celebrations in this, its centenary year, were, in fact, almost a month short of the actual centenary. In true Irish fashion, however, the Irish in Malta found a true Irish solution: celebrate twice - Easter Monday and 24 April.
In 1916, not all leaders of the disparate groups seeking independence from Britain favoured an armed rising; Eoin McNeill, leader of the Irish Volunteers, was convinced it would be a military failure and opposed it. At the other end of the spectrum, Patrick Pearse, romantic ideologue, had little time for such pragmatism; he believed that even in failure, the symbolism of blood sacrifice would arouse the nation to such an extent that independence would soon follow. In between these two extremes, the leaders of the other groups supported the Rising, so they agreed to keep McNeil in the dark.
The justification for an armed insurrection in 1916 could be - and has been - questioned. John Bruton, Irish PM (1994-97), holds that the Rising was wrong; it did not meet the criteria for a just war as its objective - Home Rule for Ireland - had already been passed in Westminster in 1912. But Bruton is in a minority; most view the Easter Rising in light of the tenets of Paine'sThe Rights of Man(1791), which posited that popular political revolution is permissible when a government does not safeguard the natural rights of its people.
The 1916 leaders, mindful of the previous 800 years of lies, duplicity and rapacious exploitation in all of Ireland's dealings with Britain, would have trusted no promises from London. They'd have believed that the only reason the Home Rule Bill had passed was because the Liberal government needed the support of the Irish Party; they knew that the Bill was unpopular in Britain, the first chip off the mighty block of Empire since thirteen American colonies had seceded 140 years previously; Home Rule was anathema to the Unionists in the north of Ireland and, if the Tories (staunch allies of the Unionists) were to regain power in London, Home Rule could be rapidly scrapped.
There were other reasons, too: the Great Famine (1845-50) was still a vivid memory, and hatred of Britain for her aloof indifference to that unimaginable catastrophe was still very much alive. To put it in context, Ireland in 1916 was closer to the Great Famine than we are today to Hitler's Holocaust.
The productive land of Ireland belonged in toto to Protestant families of English and Scottish origin. Some had been 'settled' in various parts of the country in 16th and 17th centuries to supplant persistent, stubborn popery and, throughout the centuries, as various native Irish chiefs rose up (and were duly defeated), their lands were confiscated and given to officers and soldiers of fortune. The Penal Laws (early 18th C) banned Catholics and Dissenters from owning land. The younger sons of these landed families became the professionals, bankers and merchants, and this whole class, who controlled all of the wealth of Ireland, was known as The Ascendancy.
The sole interest of most Ascendancy landowners was in extracting maximum income from their estates in the form of rents from tenants, often rack-rents. Tenants grew two crops: potatoes to feed their families, and corn to sell to pay the rent. When the potato blight struck in 1845 the staple food rotted in the fields. Corn, however, grew normally, but was sacrosanct, earmarked for the landlord's rent.Eating it would lead to eviction for non-payment of rent and death a few months later of deferred starvation and exposure on the open winter roads. The well-remembered callous indifference in London to the suffering of millions of UK citizens was a salutary reminder of how the Irish were viewed in Britain; dumping Home Rule, should it be expedient, would not cost their British masters a second thought. To judge the worldwide impact the Great Famine had in the days of difficult communications, consider that the Ottoman Sultan decided to send £10,000 in aid but Queen Victoria requested that he send just £1,000, because she herself had sent only £2,000. The Sultan complied but also secretly sent 5 ships loaded with food to Drogheda. [http://www.irishcentral.com/roots/history/Little-known-tale-of-generous-Turkish-aid-to-the-Irish-during-the-Great-Hunger.html] Even the Choctaw Nation had a whip around and sent $170. [http://www.irishcentral.com/roots/history/-Irish-town-builds-memorial-to-thank-Native-Americans-who-helped-during-Famine.html]
The Great Famine lasted five years and, by 1850, millions of peasants had died of starvation and disease. There was mass emigration across the Atlantic in often unseaworthy 'Coffin Ships' (so-called because of the high mortality among the diseased, debilitated and overcrowded 'passengers'). By early 20thC, the Famine émigrés had become a political force in America and many had actually prospered; their hatred of Britain knew no bounds, and they encouraged and supported the Rising.
Many rebellions had taken place in previous centuries, all put down quickly and ruthlessly, but despite this record and McNeil's pessimism, 1916's leaders might have had some hope of success: Britain, now engaged in The Great War, might be too stretched to bother about a comparatively minor military challenge in Ireland.
The Home Rule Bill had passed in 1912 but still hadn't come into force: even in peaceful times, these things take time. But, two years later, WWI had wiped it off London's agenda. The Ulster Unionists, in the north of Ireland, were implacably against Home Rule and threatening violent opposition. Carson, their leader, believed that Redmond (leader of the Home Rule Party) would accept nothing less than Home Rule for the whole island of Ireland, so to block this, raised a 100,000-strong volunteer army, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Though a 'private' army, the UVF was tacitly tolerated by London: after all, they were trying to keep the empire together. Authorities turned a blind eye as UVF landed 24,000 rifles and a large stock of ammunition near Belfast in 1914. Carson had been emboldened the previous year when British army officers at HQ outside Dublin declared they'd resign rather than march north against his UVF - the so-called Curragh Mutiny.
Inevitably, Mc Neill found out about the planned Rising and was most displeased. However, when told that a secret shipment of arms was on its way from Germany, he grudgingly went along. But the British had intercepted cables between Germany's ambassador in US and Berlin, and were waiting when the German U-Boat, Aud, surfaced off Kerry. Aboard was Sir Roger Casement, British civil-servant and Irish activist. When McNeill learned of this setback, he withdrew his support and 'cancelled' the Rising. This off-on-off order caused major confusion. His men stood down and went about their business. Many non-Dubliners went to their families in the country for the Easter holidays.
The other leaders - who hadn't been counting on McNeill's support in the first instance - decided to carry on regardless and, in the end, the confusion delayed the Rising by just a single day.
The original plan had been for the Volunteers to march in a sanctioned, innocent-looking parade on Easter Sunday, during which, at a given signal, they would suddenly begin the Rising. Instead, early on Easter Monday, 24 April, groups of men and women occupied several significant buildings in and around Dublin. Pearse read the Proclamation of the Republic from the steps of the General Post Office in Sackville Street - now O'Connell Street - the rebel HQ.
At first, the authorities were taken by surprise; they thought the loss of the Aud had defused the danger. Martial Law was declared but General Lowe was unsure of the rebels' strength, so there was an initial eerie lull. Over the next few days, however, with reinforcements rushed in from around Ireland and from Britain, British troops massively outnumbered the rebels and, with artillery bombardments from land and sea, much of Dublin's centre was reduced to rubble and the Easter Rising was quickly crushed.
Rebel units scattered round the city found it difficult to keep in contact and much of their communications were done by Cumannnam Ban, the women's branch of the Irish Volunteers whose members took an active part in the fighting as well as acting as runners and nursing the wounded. On Saturday 29 April, Pearse surrendered unconditionally and it was all over. Despite its heroic ideals, the Easter Rising turned out, after all, to be just business as usual, rebellion followed swiftly by defeat by superior numbers and arms.
Other minor actions took place around the country but because of McNeill's confusing orders and the slowness of communications in those times, none was significant to the national picture.
There was a heavy death toll on both sides, more on the rebel side. Thousands were injured.
The leaders were arrested, court-martialled, and several were sentenced to death by firing squad.
In the immediate aftermath of the Rising, many Dubliners jeered the rebels as they were marched away: some had sons fighting in the trenches in France; others were unhappy at the disruption to daily life and the destruction of their city. But this attitude changed very quickly as, one after the other, over the next fortnight, fourteen people, including the seven leaders, were shot in Kilmainham Gaol. Two of the leaders were not shot, Countess Markievicz (because she was a woman) and Eamonn DeValera (a US citizen). Sir Roger Casement was hanged for treason in London in August.
As Pearse had predicted, the dead leaders were soon being hailed as martyrs.