Author: Victor Aquilina
Publisher: Kite Group, 2021
Pages: 380pp

Malta has the lives of many thousands of German and Italian soldiers on its conscience', Field Marshal Erwin Rommel wrote in late 1942 when it dawned on him that he had taken the wrong decision in insisting on the cancellation of the planned invasion of Malta in July of that year.

Yet could the decision-makers in London have foreseen that outcome in the dark days of May-June 1940 when France was on its knees and desperately looking for a way out of a dreaded total occupation by Hitler's hordes?

With the prevailing revisionist trend in history where writers seek to question decade-old views and interpretations of long-past and more recent events, substituting their own - all too often dictated by personal prejudice and agendas - it was not surprising that some would jump on the bandwagon to call out the decisions or deliberations of the war cabinet and in particular Churchill's part in these momentous days.

A few Maltese authors also took up the cudgels to argue that the new prime minister was even prepared to sell out Malta and Gibraltar in a desperate effort to reach a peace settlement with Nazi Germany and to prevent Mussolini from joining Hitler and declare war on the democracies.

Victor Aquilina, a seasoned journalist and author, was spurred to look closely at these revisionist interpretations, particularly as they affected the two British outposts of Malta and Gibraltar in the Mediterranean and how a decision of that nature could have a bearing on their very survival.

The issue arose when the French government tried to assuage Mussolini and prevent him from stabbing the country in the back by encouraging Britain to join it in offering certain territorial concessions, including Tunisia, Malta, and Gibraltar. The proposal, made French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, was supported and vigorously pushed forward in the war cabinet by Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, who was himself very much in favour of stemming the flood by stopping the total capitulation of France and reaching a peaceful solution with both Fascist leaders.

Before analyzing the war cabinet's discussions, the author gives a detailed background of the constitutional and political history of the two crown colonies, their economic and social development, demographic composition, and religious inter-relationships with each other. The aspirations and fears of the Maltese and Gibraltarians are also given their due consideration and all this provides a comparative in-depth study of both colonies in the inexorable process that led up to the Second World War.

In the second part of the book Aquilina argues that at no point was Churchill's stance in the war cabinet's talks, spread over three days, tantamount to an acceptance of the French proposal. He gives a detailed account of the talks, based on the minutes, as the protagonists dissected the arguments for and against making an approach to Mussolini in a bid to keep Italy out of the war and mediate for a settlement with Hitler.

With the benefit of hindsight, the way things evolved after the rejection of the French proposal were not very rosy initially and for two-and-a-half years Britain faced a series of tragic military defeats when it decided to plough on alone after the fall of France.

Churchill could be held responsible for a number of questionable decisions which affected Malta very adversely. One was ordering General Archibald Wavell to halt the North African campaign in its tracks in January 1941 to reinforce Greece initially in its defence against the Italians when the Commonwealth forces were in the process of taking over the entire Libyan territory. Another was the endorsement of the RAF's fruitless strategy of squandering great numbers of Spitfires and their pilots in useless sorties over occupied France in 1941 when Malta was begging for Spitfires and not getting any.

Yet, there does not seem to have been a time when Churchill would even consider giving up Malta, the unsinkable aircraft carrier. This is borne out by the efforts made by the Royal Navy - at his insistence - to keep Malta resupplied at the expense of enormous and very costly convoy losses.

When Malta was finally reinforced with Spitfires and torpedocarrying aircraft in the spring of 1942, its aircraft and submarines started taking a grievous toll of the Axis seaborne transport of men, munitions, petrol, and supplies to the Afrika Korps, crippling Rommel's advances towards the Suez Canal.

As the tide of war operations changed Churchill visited Malta twice, in late 1944 and early 1945, and toured the island where he was greeted by cheering Maltese who never doubted his unflinching resolve to defend them from the Axis tyranny.

By then Malta's very important role in the Second World War had been fulfilled. It had not only withstood a three-year-long aerial assault of the first magnitude but also crippled Rommel's chances of reaching the golden prize of the Nile delta and beyond.

The island also served as the Allied headquarters for Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, and subsequently provided logistical support and repair facilities for the Allied navies in the course of the protracted battle for Italy in the last two years of the conflict.

No wonder Rommel rued his great blunder when, on taking Tobruk in June 1942, his over-confidence in trying to make a dash for the Suez Canal led him to argue in favour of cancelling the then imminent invasion of Malta. Was this the result of the ways of fortune or of far-sighted intuition on the part of Winston Churchill?

Available from The Book Festival or www.kitegroup.com.mt