Since the end of the Second World War, collective security on the European continent, and with it, peace, has been a priority. The founding fathers of the European Union themselves, aware of the tensions that resulted from the First and Second World Wars, devised and created security structures to prevent future conflicts and strengthen relations between former enemies.
The first structure, although not purely military, obeys this logic: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), essential for the creation and maintenance of industry and armies, was created by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, introducing a concept as widely used today as “energy security." This was arguably the first major step towards the effective integration of European countries.
In the same period in which the ECSC was born, French Prime Minister René Pleven, with the encouragement of Robert Schuman and Jean Monet, wanted to promote the European Defence Community. This ambitious plan aimed to merge the armed forces of the six founding countries (including the Federal Republic of Germany) into a European Armed Forces that would keep the continent together and prevent the possibility of a new conflict between states.
Ambitious as it was, the project failed in 1954 when the deeply nationalist Gaullist deputies of the French National Assembly refused to ratify the agreement. European integration at the military level thus suffered a setback from which it would not begin to recover until the present time, although it will surely continue to face many of the reluctances it once did.
Why did the European Defence Community fail, and what makes the European Armed Forces still a difficult debate today? This is a question that needs to be analysed and understood, for while political and economic integration have advanced with a large consensus, the military problem, which should go hand in hand with the two previous issues, has always been the Achilles' tendon of the common European project.
While there is no EU army and defence remains exclusively a matter for member states, the EU has taken big steps to boost defence cooperation in the past few years.
Since 2016, there has been significant progress in the area of EU security and defence, with several concrete EU initiatives to encourage cooperation and reinforce Europe’s capacity to defend itself.
The vast majority of EU citizens (81%) are in favour of a common defence and security policy, with at least two-thirds backing it in each country, according to 2022 data published by Eurobarometer. Some 93% agree that countries should act together to defend EU territory, while 85% think that defence cooperation should be increased at the EU level.
EU leaders realise that no EU country can tackle the current security threats in isolation. For example, French President Macron called for a joint European military project in 2017, while former German chancellor Merkel said, “We ought to work on the vision of one day establishing a proper European army” in her address to the European Parliament in November 2018. Moving towards a security and defence union has been one of the priorities of the von der Leyen Commission.
A common EU defence policy is provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 42(2) TEU). However, the treaty also clearly states the importance of national defence policy, including NATO membership or neutrality. The European Parliament has consistently supported more cooperation, increased investment and pooling of resources to create synergies at the EU level to better protect Europeans.
Russia’s war against Ukraine underlined the need for the EU to strengthen its defence strategy and speed up weapons production.
Since 1948, NATO has been the principal military alliance of Western countries. The existence of this common, powerful and ambitious project under U.S. leadership largely obscured efforts and intentions to create a common European defence project. For decades, this has been the major argument against further European integration in the field of defence, as protection was secured but delegated.
Even today, with an ongoing and deep political, economic and, at a certain level, judicial integration, military affairs are still often seen as the last bastion of national sovereignty. In Schengen Europe, they remain for many the guarantee of those borders that fell long ago.
Other issues to take into account are the progressive detachment of the population from the armed forces (a Europe that has not seen war on its territory in 70 years, except for the Balkans, has tended to settle into peace, nearly oblivious to wars) and its progressive ageing, with a future with fewer people of military age and who often have an ideological and motivational gap with previous generations concerning the concept and utility of the military.
One of the main problems with future European armed forces is that Europeans are not prepared in any way to be confronted with the reality of a situation of war. What rules of engagement will be used? How do you cope with casualties? And even more, how to create an effective chain of command and control among 27 countries? And what will happen if one does not agree with a particular intervention or action?
How could it be argued that the EU, the world's leading beacon of human rights, democracy and peace, gets engaged in a war? Undoubtedly, these questions have rational and objective answers.
A European-level integration of the armed forces will not be merely beneficial but necessary for Europe. The political and economic framework cannot be completed without the military one.
Dr Mark Said is a lawyer