The first and only surface seaborne attack on the allied fortress of Malta took place 83 years ago on 27 July 1941, code-named Operazione Malta-2.
A “secret” War Office Weekly Intelligence Review (W.O.W.I.R), No. 27, dated 12 February 1944 intended for the Officer's Mess, gives a detailed account of this raid and the naval vessels used by the Italian navy.
It is noted that the War Office did not necessarily subscribe to the views expressed in their contributions in the review.
The Italians were the first to use human torpedoes in the Second World War in what is considered as one of the riskiest inventions seen during the war. The operations took place at night during the new moon to cut down the risk of being seen.
The two main craft used by the Decima Flottiglia MAS (X-MAS) to attack targets were the S.L.C and the M.T.
The Maiale (pig) or SLC (Siluro Lenta Corsa)
The Maiale was 6.7 metres long with a detachable explosive nose and had a two-man crew who sat astride the torpedo wearing rubber suits and oxygen cylinders and masks. The Maiale torpedo was carried usually by a conventional submarine and launched near the target.
The MT (motoscafo da turismo) or Barchino (small boat) or midget torpedo-boats
The Italians had already used 11 submarines during their attack on Crete on 25 March 1941 using motor assault boats known as Motoscafo da Turismo (MT). Each MT (nicknamed barchino - little boat) carried a 300kg explosive charge in its bow. The MT's were equipped to make their way through obstacles such as steel torpedo nets and create a gap to enter the Grand Harbour. The pilot would steer the assault craft on a collision course at his target and jump from the MT before impact and detonation.
The attack on Malta
The objective for the attack on Malta was to destroy merchant shipping which had recently arrived at the Grand Harbour. The entrance to the Grand Harbour was defended through a Boom Defence system. This consisted of a giant steel anti-submarine net that could be lowered to allow the passage of allied naval vessels and then raised again to stop Axis submarines entering the harbour.
The Italian attack was a complete failure and certainly nothing was further from the truth than the highly coloured reports given out by the Axis broadcasts during the following week. Still, one cannot but admire the courage of those taking part in what was to all intents and purposes a suicidal affair.
The small Italian fleet which set sail from Augusta at 6.15pm on Friday 25 July, sweeping past Cape Passaro at 22 knots consisted of the following naval vessels:
- The cruiser Diana
- 2 M.A.S (Baglietto Velocissimo) fast and light torpedo boats
- 1 MTL (Motoscafo Trasporto Lento), Carrier vessel. These carried two human torpedoes (SLC)
- 10 MT (Motoscafo Turismo) or Barchino Esplosivo were carried aboard the Diana and 2 MAS were in company
- 2 SLC (Siluro Lenta Corsa) (human torpedoes) called Maiale carried aboard the MTL, which in turn was towed by the Diana.
At a position just north of Malta, the Diana stopped, slipped the MTL's then retired to position outside the range of Malta's guns with orders to return to Augusta at 10am the following day if no other orders had been received.
The smaller vessels crept, under cover of darkness, to a point only 3½ miles from the Grand Harbour, all under their own power except the MTL carrying the two human torpedoes, which was this time being towed by one of the large torpedo-boats (MAS).
From this position the MTL proceeded close inshore and lowered the two human torpedoes, each with its crew of two into the water, their instructions being, one to attack the viaduct guarding the harbour and the other to attack the submarines lying in Marsamxetto Creek.
By 11pm motor-boat engines could be heard from the north of the island. At that time, however, there were no suitable ships to be sent out and a striking force of Swordfish was despatched but failed to make contact.
Everything then settled down for some hours until 4.45am, when a track was seen approaching St Elmo viaduct and things began to go amiss for the enemy.
As a distraction, an aerial bombardment had been arranged, and took place at 2.30am and at 4.15am. The viaduct was to be breached a few minutes later at 4.28am by a sub-lieutenant who was to throw himself in his craft at the net defences under the viaduct bridge, after which all the other MT's were to follow through and destroy all possible shipping in the harbour.
In all these arrangements, the enemy was only a few minutes off schedule. At 4.55am, soon after the Raiders Passed had been sounded from the second air raid, the vicinity of Valletta was shaken by a large explosion as the viaduct at St Elmo was blown up. The explosion alerted the defences and the craft were detected by radar.
The firing from the shore defences, which followed, showed that the gun crews were very much on their toes, as were also the searchlight crews illuminating innumerable targets.
The accuracy of the firing was most impressive, particularly as this was the first time these guns had been fired "in anger". The firing continued for about 10 minutes with very few very large explosions mingled with the continuous fire from the shore. The Royal Air Force (RAF) added to the noise by diving down and machine-gunning as though in competition with the shore defences.
The Italians had assumed that the main entrance would be strongly guarded and planned to pass under the viaduct bride which they thought was defended only by a suspended anti-torpedo net. This was destroyed by the first craft, after which the other nine, which were waiting in pitch dark about four cables away, were to pass through into the harbour.
Unfortunately for them, the explosion when the MT struck was so violent that it not only blew the net up, but it also blew the massive iron bridge down. In crashing in its collapse, this filled up the gap.
This completely upset the enemy plan of action and the fleet was at the mercy of the searchlights and guns, much to its discomfort.
The main credit goes to the Maltese gunners. Of the remainder, one SLC ran aground and was later recovered, one MT was sighted by the RAF about 8 miles offshore and was recovered and brought in, as was also one MAS with her crew of nine dead Italians and one live RAF pilot who had bailed out and had swum to it thinking it was a British recovery patrol boat.
Nineteen Italian officers and ratings were captured or swam ashore, the remainer were not so lucky. Malta suffered a damaged bridge and one Maltese gunner, who fell off the bastion in his excitement and broke his neck.
There seems to be little doubt that the failure of the attack on Malta was a great disappointment to the Axis, which had placed so much faith in this novel form of warfare. The subsequent accounts showed only too well that they had not the faintest idea of what had gone wrong with their carefully laid plans.
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