There are many considerations for policymakers who want to attract investment in Europe during such turbulent times. The classic approach in the textbook harkens us to strengthen the institutional basis: ensure judicial independence, transparent rule‑making and credible appeals. This is not an easy task. Germany faces trouble on a number of fronts. Its industrial and export-oriented growth model is struggling because of both fierce competition from China, not underestimating America's tariffs. As the top economic country in the EU, Germany may be advised to reform its bureaucracy led by lawyer‑led regulators. This is because, although investors look for clear signals of legal stability and reduced regulatory risk, the decisive factors are institutional quality, independence, and proven conduct.

Investors in Germany, therefore, weigh leaders' backgrounds alongside concrete, observable governance signals. Yet, roughly half of the leading posts in Germany's federal agencies and ministries are traditionally held by lawyers, versus about a quarter in France and under one‑sixth in Britain. This intensification of legal-minded tradition reflects deep differences when compared with other EU countries. This permeates its legal‑administrative tradition, recruitment systems, career paths and political culture. It goes without saying that German public administration is strongly dirigiste. This means that administrative action is tightly framed by statutes and administrative law (Verwaltungsrecht), and many decisions are subject to judicial review by specialised administrative courts and ultimately the Federal Constitutional Court. Further complications arise when federalism and regulatory complexity (many tasks split between federal and Länder levels, plus detailed statutory regulation) result in opening more vacancies for applicants with legal competencies. German legal training comprises two state examinations and a period of practical training (the Referendariat), making it a lengthy and demanding process.

Naturally it opens access to abundant vacancies ranging across a wide set of public careers (ministry posts, judiciary, prosecution, and higher civil service); some without additional professional degrees. A single legal degree thus opens many career paths. Another fly in the ointment is that higher civil service vacancies (höherer Dienst) are historically recruited from law graduates. Many senior careers tracks demand or favour the state law exams as proof of qualification. Consequently, Germany's political and administrative culture leans heavily on a strong Rechtsstaat (rule‑of‑law) culture. This in turn, places a value on technical legal competence at the top of administration.

Let us compare how the French and British administrations are rated. France places less emphasis on legal backgrounds in its administration, and Britain even less so. Starting with France, itself a civil‑law country, yet its elite recruitment is shaped by grandes écoles (ENA historically, plus École Polytechnique, Mines, Ponts). These institutions train "generalist" senior administrators, engineers and economists who then staff ministries and prefectures. Hence, it embraces a larger share of non‑lawyers, like for example, economists, engineers, ENA graduates. Next, Britain traditionally runs a common-law culture. It relies less on formal legal training for its internal administration. Senior civil servants are more often generalists, recruited through the fast stream, with degrees in PPE, history, economics, etc. This results in a balanced mix of decision-making technocrats, who tend to rely more on managerial expertise, policy analysis and political judgment than on specialist legal drafting (though legal advice remains important). Many senior posts are also filled by political appointees or external hires from business and consultancy arenas.

Let us now dwell on the disadvantages of a lawyer-dominated structure. To start with, extensive legal training in Germany, emphasises interpretation and risk‑avoidance; this can translate into conservatism, slow reform, and preference for legal technicalities over innovation or pragmatic policy solutions. One meets with potential gaps in managerial, economic or technical expertise at the top when complex policy issues (digitalisation, economic policy, technical regulation) require interdisciplinary knowledge.

France and Britain pursue distinct approaches: France relies on elite training and recruitment structures, such as the grandes écoles and technocratic corps, while Britain emphasises a generalist fast-stream model with a strong managerial focus. Both produce fewer lawyers at the top. Such legalistic leadership can at times undermine public trust by fostering perceptions of risk aversion and excessive formalism. It can be generalised that a strong preference among legal professionals for risk avoidance and strict procedure may be perceived as bureaucratic obstruction or a lack of responsiveness, lowering trust among investors who prioritise quick, pragmatic problem‑solving. Another negative aspect is the showering of elitism and aloofness. If the majority of senior officials come from one professional background, namely law, investors may view the leadership as an elite clique disconnected from everyday experience. This at its worst, may encourage a policy paralysis or technicalism. Over‑reliance on legal reasoning can delay reforms or produce complex, jargon‑laden decisions that ordinary businessmen find opaque, undermining confidence.

Germany's economy is currently facing a stagnant growth period, so any reforms in its tight governance may help boost trust in the rule‑bound, impartial and legally defensible functioning of the state. The country is ageing quickly at a time when productivity growth in 2025 has stalled.

George M. Mangion is a senior partner at PKF Malta