When the PN floated the idea of an offshore fuel hub, what Alex Borg himself described as "a petrol station in the Mediterranean", I thought it best to let the proposal sink in before passing judgement. And sink it did. The more it settled, the more it exposed itself as economically unsound, technically questionable, and detached from reality.

Despite claims that a broad range of technical specialists had been consulted, no established figures publicly endorsed the proposal. That absence of independent professional backing raises legitimate questions about the robustness of the concept from the outset.

Central to the proposal is the claim that the facility could handle hydrogen and ammonia without further investment, but this does not reflect engineering reality. Hydrogen requires either extreme compression or storage at near absolute-zero temperatures, making LNG infrastructure fundamentally incompatible without major redesign. Ammonia is easier to store, but is toxic and requires specialised materials and safety measures to prevent corrosion and other risks. In both cases, the idea of seamless future fuel integration without significant additional investment is more aspirational than technically grounded.

The improvement of security of supply was also presented as a key advantage. While offshore FSRUs are indeed designed to operate in more exposed conditions than nearshore facilities, one must question the value of a €500 million investment if significant operational vulnerabilities would still remain. As was publicly acknowledged, the proposed configuration would still not have remained operational during severe weather events such as Storm Harry, undermining the very resilience it claims to provide. 

Relocating Malta's primary gas infrastructure further offshore also introduces additional exposure to risk. Critical energy assets outside territorial waters are inherently more difficult to secure, as the recent alarming incident involving LNG shipping in nearby waters has shown us.

There is also a less discussed but important issue of system design. Malta's current setup at Delimara, consisting of a floating storage unit supported by dual onshore regasification systems, provides full operational redundancy in case of malfunction of one system. By contrast, FSRUs are constrained by deck space, weight distribution, and safety separation distances, limiting the ability to fully duplicate critical systems onboard. For this reason, standalone FSRUs are typically found in emerging markets or transitional setups rather than as long-term, fully integrated solutions.

This becomes even more evident when one examines the figures presented by the PN itself.  In the main presentation slide, the proposed fuel hub was said to handle 30,000 tonnes of fuel per day, covering both bunkering operations and power generation needs. 

Yet, the current LNG tanker holds less than 60,000 tonnes in total.  By the proposal's own numbers, the offshore facility would therefore require replenishment every other day, simply to keep up with the figures.  Such a system would depend on an almost continuous convoy of supply tankers, an arrangement that is neither practical nor operationally sustainable. It is a basic arithmetic issue that raises serious doubts about the assumptions, planning and technical expertise underpinning the proposal.

Even the rest of the presentation material reflected a lack of technical rigour, with imagery depicting an oil tanker lifted off from a commercial advertisement, instead of an LNG carrier.  Any technical expert would not have missed such a blunder.

The financial case is equally questionable. Comparable offshore energy infrastructure in Livorno exceeded €500 million over a decade ago, and with sustained increases in steel and engineering costs since then, there is little basis to assume lower costs today.

The projection of around €200 million in annual revenue within only three years appears grossly inflated. If such returns were realistic, similar projects would already be widespread across global ports. Marine energy investments are long-term infrastructure assets with modest, regulated returns and payback periods typically in the range of 10 to 15 years, highly dependent on utilisation and long-term contracts.

Adding to this is the significant hidden infrastructure requirement. A 30-kilometre subsea pipeline from Hurd's Bank to Delimara would still be necessary, introducing substantial additional capital cost and engineering complexity.

Against this backdrop, Malta's more coherent energy direction lies in infrastructure that prioritises reliability, integration, and affordability. A 120-kilometre fixed pipeline linking to the European gas grid offers a fundamentally different proposition: direct access to a broader, more liquid market and a more resilient long-term supply structure, for a similar capital cost.

The fuel hub proposal appears less like a coherent energy strategy and more like a concept built on overly optimistic assumptions, lacking the engineering and economic analysis that such a project demands.  The justifications presented are designed to support a pre-determined political conclusion.

Inġ. Jonathan Scerri is a former chairman of Enemalta and currently works as an independent consultant on energy infrastructure.