Three analysts have cast doubt on the prospect of Malta introducing a dedicated Prime Minister's Question Time in the current legislature, telling The Malta Independent on Sunday it is unlikely that a government with a comfortable majority would open itself up to more scrutiny.
The concept, which has been discussed for years and was recently touched on by Speaker of House Carmelo Abela, would see the Prime Minister face MPs directly and regularly, similar to the Westminster tradition of PMQs.
But asked by this newspaper to assess the prospects and pitfalls of such a reform, Jean Claude Cachia, senior lecturer at the Institute of European Studies, Prof. Mario Thomas Vassallo, associate professor at the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy, and Prof. Roderick Pace, Professor at the Institute for European Studies at the University of Malta, agreed that Malta's majoritarian political culture and two-party polarisation would make a straight import of the British model difficult, and possibly counterproductive.
Pace said everything was possible "but not quickly", arguing that Malta's political culture is shaped not only by majoritarian instincts but by an "almost visceral, adversarial rivalry" in which even minor disagreements escalate into what he described as a symbolic Great Siege, where compromise is treated as a capitulation. In such an environment, he said, institutional reforms, whether PMQs or other mechanisms, cannot function as intended unless the political culture itself is strengthened first.
Vassallo was equally blunt. Malta's political culture, he said, is one in which the winner takes all, given the two-party system, and a government with a strong parliamentary majority such as the one Labour has held since 2013 could limit the effectiveness of PMQs unless the Standing Orders provided robust protections for meaningful questioning. He warned of the risk of "orchestrated 'softball' questions" being planted by government backbenchers to run down the clock.
Cachia, for his part, agreed a government with a comfortable majority could easily neutralise PMQs regardless of the formal rules, arguing that in Malta's majoritarian culture, winning a general election is often treated as a mandate for absolute executive authority. Without strong institutional checks, he said, PMQs risk becoming another neutralised procedural tool, with the government using its parliamentary majority and party-line voting to preserve the status quo.
Before the next election? Not likely
On whether the reform is likely to materialise at all before the next election, none of the three analysts was optimistic. Cachia noted that although the Opposition, the Nationalist Party, had explicitly included parliamentary reform proposals, including PMQs, in its 2022 electoral manifesto, the absence of any serious subsequent debate suggested a broader lack of cross-party political will. A government with a comfortable majority is unlikely to prioritise reforms that strengthen executive scrutiny over it, he said, when other political and economic priorities compete for attention.
Vassallo said he was "not optimistic at all", arguing that experience shows no governing party in Malta's political system will willingly surrender its executive dominance unless compelled by an undeniable cross-party consensus, or directed by a legitimate intergovernmental body such as the Council of Europe.
Pace pointed to a cautionary precedent: when President George Vella attempted to initiate a serious constitutional reform debate, the effort was abruptly and almost dismissively extinguished, revealing how fragile reform momentum can be in Malta. He likened the pattern to the long running saga of Gozo-Malta connectivity, which began in the 1960s as a proposed causeway, was later reimagined as a bridge, then a tunnel, and has since dissolved into a resigned "bah" - big announcements and shifting concepts, but no structural transformation. If PMQs fail to materialise this legislature, Pace said, it would signal that meaningful parliamentary strengthening remains a long-term project rather than an imminent reality.
Malta's Parliament does not currently have a dedicated slot in which the Prime Minister must answer questions from MPs on any matter of government policy, unlike the House of Commons, where the Prime Minister faces half an hour of questions from MPs each sitting week. Instead, Maltese MPs can submit written parliamentary questions (PQs) to ministers, and the Prime Minister answers questions from MPs after delivering ministerial statements, including a briefing that follows each European Council meeting.
Parliamentary reform
Cachia said a dedicated question time for the Prime Minister was never introduced because Malta's Parliament already has a designated time for MPs to question ministers, though whether that mechanism is effective and provides the necessary accountability is a separate question. He pointed to figures revealed weeks ago showing that over 36,054 parliamentary questions were tabled between 2022 and 2026, with more than 1,200 left unanswered. Cachia also said the polarisation in the Parliament had turned various parliamentary questions into another source of confrontation between the government and the Opposition and suggested there was never sufficient political will to introduce a PM Question Time, particularly given that some consider the current system adequate.
Vassallo traced the gap to the slow, decades-long process by which Malta's system of institutional checks and balances on the executive took shape after Independence. From Independence to the end of the 1980s, he said, there was little cross-party appetite to change parliamentary practice, with governments generally comfortable relying on existing accountability mechanisms. Over the past 35 years, the current framework of oversight bodies - including parliamentary committees, the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Audit Office and the Office of the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life - gradually took shape and became embedded within the Maltese State's institutional framework. A Prime Minister's Question Time, Vassallo said, would represent a further step in that direction, and could form part of a broader Standing Orders reform.
Pace noted that only a small number of Commonwealth parliaments actually have a dedicated Prime Minister Question Time, and that the absence of such a slot in Malta did not mean the Prime Minister avoided questioning altogether, given the existing channels of ministerial statements and regular PQs. He attributed the gap partly to the historically slow pace of parliamentary reform in Malta, noting that it took until the mid-1990s for Parliament to introduce permanent standing committees, a feature other legislatures, Commonwealth and otherwise, had adopted decades earlier.
Transplanting the British model
On whether the Westminster model could simply be transplanted to Malta, all three analysts pointed to structural differences that would complicate a direct copy. Cachia said that while Malta's Parliament is based on the Westminster model, a direct transfer of PMQs would likely prove difficult given Malta's small parliamentary size and highly partisan political culture. In. the UK, he said, PMQs function as a regular forum for Opposition scrutiny, and backbench MPs use them to raise constituency concerns and press the executive; in Malta, the smaller chamber and more polarised environment could reduce the value of a highly adversarial format and increase the risk of partisan performance over substantive scrutiny. Cachia suggested a more suitable approach might be an adapted executive scrutiny session held monthly or fortnightly, which could strengthen accountability while better reflecting Malta's institutional scale, though any such reform would need careful design to avoid reinforcing existing polarisation.
Vassallo said they saw no structural impediment to the model working in Malta, but flagged two key differences with Westminster. First, because the majority of Labour backbenchers hold Cabinet or parliamentary secretary roles, the pool of independent backbenchers available to ask critical questions is far smaller than in London. Second, Malta's intense two-party system means PMQs would likely degenerate even faster than at Westminster into strict party-line battles, making backbench defiance or genuinely neutral questioning virtually non-existent.
Pace said the answer depends heavily on how any PMQs session would be structured under a reformed Standing Orders regime - the length and frequency of sessions, the ground rules on how many questions MPs could submit, and whether rules compelling ministers to answer questions on time were strengthened.
Administrative delays and commercial sensitivity
Asked what a formal PM Question Time would add that existing PQs, interpellations or motions do not already provide, the analysts pointed to the shortcomings of the current system. Pace said parliamentary questions in Malta are frequently delayed, deflected or left completely unanswered despite formal deadlines set out in the House Standing Orders, which lack strong enforcement mechanisms or legal penalties for non-compliance.
Ministers, he said, routinely rely on standardised holding replies stating that information will be given at another sitting, or that data is still being collected, leaving questions in procedural limbo indefinitely. Beyond administrative delays, Pace said ministers frequently decline to answer substantive questions on public expenditure and direct orders, citing advisory cost limits or commercial sensitivity - a justification that has featured prominently in disputes over Air Malta's finances, production contracts for Love Island Malta, state sponsorship of VisitMalta, and the transfer of public land and property to private interests. Unless the Standing Orders are meaningfully reformed through cross-party consensus, Pace warned, a Prime Minister's Question Time risks becoming similarly ineffective.
Cachia said existing tools such as parliamentary questions and motions already provide important mechanisms of scrutiny, but argued a formal PM Question Time would add a distinct layer of accountability by shifting attention from individual ministers to the Prime Minister, requiring the head of government to answer directly on overall policy direction, Cabinet coordination and executive responsibility. Unlike written PQs, which are often channelled through delayed formal responses, Cachia said a PM Question Time would create a live, public forum in which the Prime Minister must respond to pressing political issues, strengthening visibility, transparency and accountability at the executive level.
Vassallo noted that Malta already has a mechanism resembling this in the Prime Minister's briefing to Parliament after each European Council meeting, when MPs are allowed to ask questions related to the statement. However, he said, that mechanism differs from a dedicated PM Question Time because it is confined to the European Council agenda and outcomes rather than any matter of government policy, and questioning is limited to the subject of the statement rather than allowing broader scrutiny of the Prime Minister. A formal PM Question Time, he argued, would enhance both spontaneity, by forcing the Prime Minister to demonstrate mastery of government policy without advance notice or scripted answers, and regularity, enabling immediate scrutiny of breaking news, emerging scandals or weekly national issues rather than requiring MPs to wait weeks for written responses.
Accountability and political theatre
On whether the reform would meaningfully improve accountability or mostly generate political theatre, the analysts were split on emphasis but converged on the underlying risk. Cachia said there is a real risk that formal PMQs could generate theatre rather than substantive scrutiny, with sessions potentially dominated by partisan exchanges that reduce space for detailed discussion of legislation and public policy. However, he argued that theatre and accountability are not necessarily incompatible, since public visibility can sustain attention and pressure on the executive, while the anticipation of a session may encourage more serious internal preparation and coordination within government.
Vassallo said that, in the short term, PMQs would overwhelmingly generate political theatre, given Malta's media landscape, in which radio and television stations are owned by the political parties. But they added that theatre is not devoid of value: forcing an executive leader to defend policy live on camera under pressure is itself a mechanism of public accountability, even where the substantive policy analysis remains shallow.
Pace took the broadest view, arguing that the impact on accountability depends far less on the mere existence of a PM Question Time than on the rules of the game - the Standing Orders, their enforcement, and the consistent, impartial application of the law and full respect for the Constitution. He pointed to a deeper structural problem repeatedly highlighted by civil society organisations such as Repubblika and independent commentators: the political culture surrounding the notion of having "paid a political price".
In Malta, Pace said, a minister's resignation following a scandal or ethical breach is often treated as the full extent of accountability, after which the matter is considered closed, with many retaining their parliamentary seats or being quietly appointed to other State roles. In more mature democracies, he argued, resignation marks the end of a political career, whereas in Malta it has evolved into what he called a temporary laundering mechanism, allowing disgraced figures to withdraw from public view until outrage subsides. Against that backdrop, Pace said a PM Question Time would be insufficient on its own, and risks becoming another stage for political theatre rather than genuine scrutiny, without stronger institutional safeguards and a political culture that treats accountability as more than a temporary inconvenience.
All three analysts also raised concerns about the format descending into a soundbite exercise, and about its potential impact on scrutiny time available to other MPs. Cachia and Vassallo both said the risk of a soundbite exercise was real, with Vassallo warning that party-owned media - news portals, radio and television alike - would use soundbites and spin brief quotations out of context to fit their agenda, impacting a genuine legislative and political inquiry. Pace said the outcome depends entirely on the rules established, and that he did not exclude the possibility of it becoming just a soundbite.
Scrutinising ministers
Asked whether a dedicated PM slot could come at the expense of scrutiny time for other ministers, Cachia said this was a very real risk unless parliamentary time was structurally expanded, since sitting time is a finite resource in Malta's part-time legislature. If PMQs were simply inserted into the existing schedule, they said, it would either reduce the time available for standard parliamentary questions, on which backbenchers depend to raise local issues, or shorten the time allocated to debate legislation.
Cachia noted that Speaker Abela has already ruled out reducing MPs' speaking times, arguing that parliamentarians need sufficient time to properly unpack issues rather than being rushed - meaning, in Cachia's assessment, that PMQs cannot realistically be introduced at the expense of existing backbench rights, and that the only viable option would be to extend the parliamentary timetable itself. Vassallo agreed the risk was real, saying the additional procedure would need to be squeezed within the traditional, rigid structure and timetable of parliamentary sittings, and that introducing a dedicated PM slot would need to be complemented by wider changes to how Parliament is organised. Pace said that if the opportunity was taken to reinforce the Standing Orders to ensure PQs are properly answered, other ministries would not be negatively affected by the reform's introduction.
Asked whether a PM Question Time could raise the public profile of parliamentary proceedings, where turnout for watching sittings is low, Cachia said there is a strong argument that it could, though the impact would depend on design and reception. Ordinary sittings often attract limited direct viewership because debates can be lengthy, procedural and inaccessible to non-specialist audiences, with the electorate more often relying on news coverage for insight into parliamentary business. A short, high-profile PMQs session, they said, could make scrutiny more visible, generate greater media coverage, particularly from party-aligned outlets, and produce content easier for the public to follow and share - though there is also a risk that it would simply reinforce disengagement if dominated by adversarial exchanges and performance, increasing visibility and polarisation without improving public trust.
The relevance of Parliament
Vassallo said a regular PM Question Time could potentially make Parliament more relevant and visible, shifting public and media attention from the executive to the legislature at regular intervals and reinforcing Parliament's scrutiny role, though they noted it is not the only reform capable of achieving that outcome. Pace was more cautious, saying he presumed the format had the potential to somewhat raise the profile of televised parliamentary debates, but that the real test would come later. The public, he said, would switch off as soon as the event ceased to be important or failed to produce substantive information or decisions.
On the technical changes required to make the format work, the analysts broadly agreed that Standing Orders' reform would need to address frequency, notice periods, question allocation and time limits, while stressing that rules alone would not guarantee success. Cachia called for a fixed, non-negotiable monthly or fortnightly slot that could not be cancelled or adjourned by the government majority without cross-party agreement, an open-question format allowing unscripted supplementary questions with zero notice, follow-up slots ring-fenced mainly for the Leader of the Opposition and committee chairs to prevent government backbenchers dominating with safe questions, and strict one- to two-minute limits for questions and answers, with explicit authority for the Speaker to intervene against filibustering or evasion. Vassallo called for similarly regular scheduling, minimal or zero notice requirements, specified time allocations, and strict enforceable limits, suggesting two minutes for questions and eight minutes for answers. Pace, by contrast, said he had stressed throughout that such procedural details matter, but not on their own.