Trial by jury is one of the clearest expressions of public participation in the administration of justice. Instead of leaving the question of guilt entirely in the hands of professional judges, it places ordinary citizens at the heart of some of the most serious criminal cases before the courts.

That principle should not be dismissed. Nor should the jury system be attacked simply because individual trials can become long or complicated. But a system that places such a heavy burden on citizens must also ask whether it is still operating in a way that is fair to those citizens.

This is why the proposal made in The Malta Independent on Sunday two weeks ago by law professor Kevin Aquilina for a commission to examine the jury system deserves serious consideration.

The issue has acquired particular relevance as Malta watches another lengthy trial by jury unfold, now approaching two months. The trial itself is not the subject of this discussion. Its existence, however, is a reminder of the demands that a modern jury trial can place on the people selected to serve on it.

In Malta, jurors do not simply turn up at court during working hours and return to their normal lives at the end of the day. They are sequestered for the entire duration of a trial, housed in a hotel, cut off from their families and prevented from following the news and communicating freely with the outside world.

Aquilina uses deliberately strong language to describe this situation, referring to jurors as being "kidnapped by the State". The wording is provocative, but it points to a genuine question: how much can the State demand from an ordinary citizen in the name of administering justice?

There is an obvious reason for restricting jurors' contact with the outside world. A jury must be protected from outside influence. Jurors cannot be allowed to read reports about the case, discuss proceedings with others, or follow public debate while they are deciding the fate of an accused person.

But the fact that restrictions may be necessary does not mean that the burden imposed on jurors should simply be accepted without question.

The first and easiest reform is remuneration, something with which the Chamber of Advocates has said it is in agreement with.

The sums paid to jurors are plainly inadequate. Under the present regulations, the payment can be as little as €10 a day for those receiving a salary, while jurors not receiving salary or wages receive €30 a day for the first 15 working days and €40 thereafter.

These amounts are difficult to justify.

Consider a self-employed person. If that person does not work, there may be no income. There may still be employees to pay, rent to meet, bills to settle and a business to keep functioning. Jury service does not make those obligations disappear.

The same principle applies to employees, although their circumstances may be different. Being paid a token amount for performing a public duty does not adequately recognise the disruption that jury service can cause.

Serving on a jury is a civic responsibility. It should not become a financial punishment.

The second issue is preparation.

Professional judges spend years studying law and continue receiving training after their appointment. Jurors, by contrast, are ordinary citizens who are expected to absorb large quantities of evidence and reach a decision without having undergone comparable preparation.

This does not mean that jurors are incapable of making sound decisions. Ordinary citizens can bring something important to the justice system: common sense, independence, and a perspective that is not shaped by a professional legal career.

But modern criminal trials are not always simple exercises in judging credibility.

Cases can involve complicated financial transactions, forensic accounting, digital evidence, corporate structures, money laundering allegations, technical reports and vast quantities of documentation. Expecting someone who has never encountered a balance sheet or audited accounts to understand complex financial evidence after only limited explanation is not necessarily a criticism of that person. It is a question about whether the system gives that person the tools required to perform the task.

This is precisely why the idea of a commission is worth pursuing.

Rather than beginning with the assumption that the jury system must be abolished, or with the opposite assumption that nothing should change, an independent commission could examine how the system actually works and what reforms are needed.

It could look at remuneration, the length of trials, sequestration, juror welfare, preparation and training, the types of offences that should go before juries, and the growing backlog of jury trials.

If the jury system is to remain, it should be made sustainable. If some aspects need to change, they should change.

There is also an important safeguard in Professor Aquilina's proposal: if the jury system were ever replaced or substantially reduced, the answer cannot simply be to transfer all power to judges without strengthening accountability and transparency.

The debate, therefore, should not be "juries versus judges". It should be about how Malta can provide a criminal justice system that is fair to defendants, credible to the public, and respectful of the citizens who are asked to administer it.

A commission would provide a sensible starting point.

The State has the right to ask citizens to serve on juries. It also has a responsibility to ensure that those citizens are properly supported, properly compensated and properly prepared.

The people who serve justice on behalf of the State deserve better than being treated as an afterthought. Reviewing the system would not weaken trial by jury. It could be the best way of ensuring that it remains worthy of public confidence.