On 18 July, Malta recorded its hottest July day ever: 43.3°C. Three days later, demand on the electricity system reached 741MW, against a previous record of 663MW set only three years earlier. Cables failed across the island. Localities went dark, some for hours, some night after night. Within days, the two parties did what they always do. The Opposition demanded ministerial accountability. The government pointed at the failures of its predecessors. Both are right. Both are wrong. And both are arguing about the wrong decade.

There are two rules behind this series. The first is about time. I also worked in ICT. ICT moves like a Spitfire. Technology changes in months and decisions have to follow. Energy is different. Energy moves like an aircraft carrier. A decision taken today on a power station, an interconnector or the distribution network may take five, ten or 15 years to show its full effect. The same applies when a decision is delayed. You may save the money today. The consequences arrive years later. That is the central argument of this series. The blackout you suffered last July was not decided last July. It was decided - or, more often, not decided - years ago. That is why I call energy infrastructure the Aircraft Carrier.

The physics of energy does not read manifestos. It reads investment decisions, procurement dates, commissioning dates and maintenance regimes. Those dates rarely fit neatly within one legislature.

The second rule is about cost. An hour without electricity is never free. During one week of the July heatwave, the health authorities confirmed 20 deaths linked directly or indirectly to the heat, most involving older people with existing conditions. Around 179 people sought emergency treatment at Mater Dei during July for heat-related problems; 89 required admission or further specialist care. A power cut during extreme heat adds another layer of risk: older people in homes without cooling; oxygen concentrators and other medical equipment without power; medicines that need refrigeration; lifts that stop working. This is not theoretical. During the 2023 heatwave, Mater Dei itself lost electricity in the early hours, and the standby generators did not take over as they should have.

Then comes the economic cost: businesses unable to operate, production stopped, stock spoiled, employees unable to work, services interrupted and Malta's reputation as a place in which to invest damaged. Most of that cost never appears in the electricity utility's accounts or, for that matter, in the government's accounts. That is why underinvestment can look cheap. The utility saves the euro. The country pays the real cost. A serious energy policy must therefore ask what an hour without electricity costs the country, not simply what another kilometre of cable costs the utility.

I worked inside this system as Chief Executive of Enemalta in 2007 and 2008. At the time, the Corporation was embarking on major investment in energy infrastructure: new generation at Delimara, the groundwork for the first interconnector to Sicily, a new 132kV backbone, the 33kV programme, new distribution centres, SCADA and the undergrounding of overhead lines. In parallel, we were transforming billing through what became the smart meter programme and ARMS. We also closed a collective agreement that had been open for five years and addressed management rights that had gradually shifted to the unions.

I resigned in 2008. My reasons are on the public record, including before the Public Accounts Committee and in the press. I will not repeat them here. At the invitation of the responsible minister, I then continued as executive consultant, working on the major changes already underway until responsibility for Enemalta changed hands in 2010, when I left.

I am writing this series because I worked on these issues then, have continued to follow Malta's energy sector closely since, and can now place what happened at the time beside what followed. Successive National Audit Office reports provide another part of that record.

That matters because explaining a decision afterwards is easy. Taking it at the time is not. Decisions had to be taken against deadlines, with difficult industrial relations, a regulatory framework that was not equipped for what was required, severe financial constraints and governments conscious of the electoral consequences of what they did. None of that excuses a bad decision. But it is part of understanding why decisions that appeared necessary were delayed, changed or abandoned.

In many cases, what needed to be done was already known. Why was it not done? What did postponement eventually cost? And are we making the same mistake again?

As with my other articles, this is a policy series. Looking backwards has little value unless it helps us decide what to do next. Each article will therefore look at the impact of the issue, the choices Malta has, their cost, the cost of doing nothing, and what I believe should be done. I will use the same approach I used in my series on demography: place the earlier record beside where Malta stands today.

For energy, that means going back to Enemalta as it stood in 2007 and 2008 and following the major issues forward: its finances, generation, the interconnector, the distribution network, industrial relations and the billing transformation. Many of the problems will sound remarkably familiar. Once an energy decision has been made - or avoided - its consequences can keep travelling towards us for years.

David Spiteri Gingell is a Governance, Institutional, and Digital Transformation Consultant