The Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) was set up under new legislation and met for the first time in September 200l. It could not be claimed that it has lived up to expectations.

It has been side-stepped practically on all major issues of development, and was deprived of the human and financial resources necessary for the fulfilment of its mandate. It was expected to be a catalyst and a watchdog, capable of taking its own initiatives and to forewarn the government in anticipation of dangerous turns.

More than anything else, it seems to have lacked the opportunity of sharing with the government a clear concept of consultation, with rules equally binding to both sides.

Institutionalised consultation by the government cannot be a purely one-sided affair. It entails involvement by the “consultee”. If a consultee recommends or consents to a certain policy or course of action, he cannot then contract out of the consequences. Those who call for participation in decision-making become parties to the decisions they accept.

Concept of partnership

The concept of partnership entails negotiation of the terms, and there must thus be some room for concession or compromise on both sides.

There is plenty to grumble on the manner, extent and timing of the government’s formal consultation with representative organisations.

A school of thought holds that constituted bodies should say nothing until the government discloses its intentions. While it may be necessary for a constituted body to keep its powder dry in certain circumstances, and to oppose rather than propose, it would very often be far too late to tackle important problems. Representative organisations would be well advised to be positive and to advocate acceptable solutions to problems.

Governments tend to be willing to consult only when they feel a need to do so, even though need requires a definition.

Advisory committees are there to give advice when there is advice to be offered. Consultative committees tend to be consulted at the whims of the consulter.

Neither suits a representative constituted body which seeks to achieve a standing liaison relationship with those concerned in government, so that there could be a viable process of dialogue on relevant subjects put forward by either side, especially in the formative stages of policy-making.

Informal consultation

Informal consultation is the private and confidential sounding of the opinion of trusted individuals. If such individuals hold office in representative institutions, there is then the probability that their views will coincide with those of the institution concerned.

Nevertheless, informal consultation is understood not to involve any guarantee that the organisation, if and when it is formally consulted, will agree with the private views its representative may have given.

Formal consultation is a full-dress affair at which the representatives speak with the authority of those they represent, to whom they will be expected to report.

Ministers and senior civil servants may like to choose those whom they will consult. Equally, interest groups prefer to appoint their own spokesmen, and to be satisfied that opinions given on their behalf are neither way out nor those of backwoodsmen. In fact, they are expected to be representative.

There is no doubt that this aspect of consultation gives rise to difficulties on certain occasions. After all, consultation is pervasive and hard to anatomise. While people and organisations aspire to the right of consultation, minister and officials, and others in power, approach the subject with caution, sometimes even suspicion. Informal consultation seems to be preferred.

The public interest

Sometimes, ministers appoint their own preferred advisers – perhaps out of human preference for consulting congenial sympathisers rather than awkward busybodies.

From the point of view of representative organisations, it is not good enough to be brushed aside in favour of informal consultation.

Quite apart from the basic need of meaningful consultation, the public is concerned to know what is going on, and is averse to decisions being taken behind closed doors by remote and untrusted figures.

Public ignorance of the real issues feeds the tendency of policy makers in government to prefer private discussions.

About this, one has to be realistic. It would be absurd to expect a company chairman to discuss outside his boardroom his thoughts about his company’s expansion and development plans, for this would be the quickest way to harm his company and help his competition.

Equally, it would be naive to expect a minister or the government to disclose prematurely the way the official mind is working. One would expect those in political authority to discuss confidentially with their civil servants all the options open to them.

This is not the sort of disclosure sought by constituted bodies.

Their objective is to inject their views on any subject under consideration at the formative stage, before policy decisions are reached.

All the above – and more – ought to have been incorporated, in practice, in the modus operandi of the MCESD.

Things have not turned out this way.

Without this, there could be no fruitful meeting of minds.

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