Malta was deeply shocked and extremely concerned about the tragedy that befell the fishing vessel Simshar last month, which left three people dead, an 11-year-old child still missing, and a badly injured sole survivor.

Many are those who speculated about the cause of what could have happened and many theories have been discussed and debated, some of which, although feasible, were absurd and others downright fictional.

Some have also gone to the extent of blaming the AFM for not co-ordinating the Search and Rescue mission in an adequate manner. It is easy to put the blame on others in moments of stress, but facts and circumstances have to be minutiaed and assessed before fingers are pointed. I am sure that all AFM personnel involved in this department are not only competent in the roles they play but also conscientious enough to risk their lives in certain arduous and dangerous situations to save others.

Others have also blamed the Fisheries Department for not monitoring the VMS (vessels monitoring system) on a 24-hour basis and thus was unaware of the fact that the Simshar had stopped transmitting its position in line with fishing regulations.

Everyone is very wise and knowledgeable after an accident happens and a lot is said and written for the consumption of the non-informed public. Technical experts look at things from a different perspective and in most cases come out with the real answers as to the cause of a problem that may be completely different to peoples’ perceptions.

Let us examine some facts. It was reported that the Captain of the Simshar told his rescuers that:

1.There was an explosion on board.

2.That there was a fire in the engine room.

3.That the CO2 fire extinguisher did not work.

4.That the life raft did not operate when he tried to open it.

5.That he rigged a makeshift raft out of empty plastic bottles and polystyrene slabs.

6.That he and all the other people on board abandoned the fishing vessel.

7.That they watched the vessel burning for around six hours until it sank.

8.That the communication systems on board did not work when needed in such an emergency, viz: the satellite phone did not work; the VMS stopped transmitting abruptly; no mention was made of VHF and so on.

9.That none of the persons found, dead or alive, was wearing a life jacket or had a lifeline attached to him.

From a technical viewpoint, I do not believe that there was an explosion of any kind on board. What could in reality have happened was that there was a fire in the engine room and when the Captain went to investigate and opened the machinery spaces hatchway or door, an amount of oxygen was fed into the compartment which was on fire, causing a sudden back draught of the fire, which at that time looked like an explosion to him, and which could also have caused some burns to his body.

If an explosion had occurred, one or more of the crew would have been injured, burned, and/or thrown overboard at the point of occurrence, and the boat would have been torn open and sunk in minutes. This did not happen as they had time to fashion a raft out of material found on board, and all persons found, dead or alive, did not carry signs of burns or injuries that could have been caused by an explosion. Post-mortem examinations on the bodies found confirmed that all three men died by drowning. Only one person was reported to have suffered burns.

The CO2 fire extinguisher, which should open when the machinery spaces are closed so that the fire will be suffocated, did not work. Why? When was the CO2 fire extinguishing system last surveyed, tested and certified that it was operational?

Was the machinery space fitted with a fire indication alarm?

The life raft did not open. Why? When was it last serviced and certified that it was in good condition? Have any drills ever been carried out on this vessel with any of the crew, or was everything taken for granted? Are any safety drills and training of crews carried out on any fishing vessel in Malta for that matter?

The satellite communication phone system did not operate. Why? Did they really have one on board?

It was alleged that the vessel’s VMS (vessels monitoring system) signals were terminated abruptly on Thursday evening but this was not picked up by the Fisheries Department. This is not a true statement because it is recorded that only two messages were transmitted through the Simshar’s VMS. One was sent when the vessel was still at Marsaxlokk and the other when it was actually ping-pinged by the Fisheries Department.

Let us explain one thing about Vessel Monitoring Systems. VMS are used in commercial fishing to allow environmental and fisheries regulatory organisations to monitor, minimally, the position, time, course and speed of fishing vessels vis-à-vis restricted areas and time in restricted areas, possibly separating fishing and transit time by speed.

Malta monitors approximately some 60 fishing vessels with this system in accordance with EU rules to control the fishing for tuna and other migratory species that are governed by seasonal fishing rules as well as quotas. VMS systems are neither vessel identification systems, vessel traffic service systems nor emergency transmitting systems. They are principally a monitoring system to regulate illegal fishing and are used primarily for fisheries management.

As a bonus use, a VMS system can help in search and rescue operations as the department monitoring the signals can get a last reported location of the vessel and perhaps its course if an accident occurs. Emergency signals should be sent by the vessel in case of emergency so that the search and rescue agencies such as the AFM in Malta would be able to act immediately. Abruptly stopping VMS signals do not by themselves indicate an emergency that would warrant a nationwide search and rescue mission. An SOS signal has to be sent by the vessel immediately, or the alarm raised by family or base when a vessel is overdue. This latter option proved to be far too late for the Simshar five because it came two days after the casualty occurred. Sound and efficient shipboard communication systems are paramount for the safety of seamen.

With reference to the satellite phone, there are various makes and quality of such phones on the market, most of which have very long ranges and can be used in most weather and environmental conditions. They are operated by a chargeable battery that has to be topped up regularly. When was the last message on the vessel’s satellite phone sent? And to whom? Was this phone tested daily by transmitting a check-up call to the vessel’s base? Why did it not transmit when it was needed most?

Is it not time that all commercial fishermen in Malta who operate offshore fishing vessels and employ crews to have a Base Office with a person on call 24 hours a day to monitor check-up calls from fishermen at sea? Why do we always have to rely on the authorities when it is always far too late to take remedial and effective action?

The crew had time to fashion a raft but they did not wear any lifejackets when they abandoned the boat, in fact it was stated that some had polystyrene slabs tied to their hands by the Captain to keep them afloat. Where were the lifejackets? Where were the lifelines? Were any flares fired during the night of the incident?

When was the last safety equipment inspection carried out on this vessel by the authorities?

Research conducted by the commission of the European Community in recent years has demonstrated that of all the occupational activities in the countries of the European Community, offshore fishing has the highest accident rate. The annual mortality for the entire Community is an average of 2 (two) per 1000 (one thousand) as opposed to 0.3 per 1000 for other “dangerous activities” such as construction, mining and agriculture. According to the ILO, fishing is one of the most dangerous of all professions. As many as 24,000 people working in the fisheries sector are killed each year worldwide.

Statistics compiled by the Industrial Accident Foundation on the number of industrial accidents on board fishing boats have shown that working on board a fishing boat is especially dangerous, and that many accidents, some of which fatal, have been caused by:

• Unsafe work with equipment on board.

• Failure to respect a number of elementary basic rules on board.

• Inadequate equipment.

• Unsafe work with dangerous technical material.

• Boats inadequately equipped with the necessary safety enhancing equipment.

• Lack of basic training regarding the use of safety equipment.

• Inadequate communication systems on board and ability to use them effectively.

There is no doubt that these statistics answer most of the questions I have raised above. We as a nation are not yet aware of all the needs and requirements of safety at the work place in all aspects. Fishing boats are dangerous work places operating in an unfriendly environment; their safety should be governed and controlled by legislation and enforced by qualified inspectors.

The European Agency for the Safety and Health at Work, through FONDS, the organisation that represents the interests of those involved in the fishing sector, decided to launch campaigns to improve working conditions and to reduce the number of accidents over time. The objective of the project was to encourage all ship owners and crew to pay more attention to safety in all its aspects. The intention was also to organise the project in consultation with the supervisory authorities and the social partners to achieve broad dissemination of information and communication about the project.

The FONDS campaign was carried out between 1999 and 2001, and covered about 125 fishing boats belonging to various companies in Europe. This involved around 600 fishermen employed by fishing companies that employed fewer than 20 crew. Most of these companies only employed six or seven, the same as typical Maltese fishing companies.

The campaign was aimed at raising awareness in the sector of the dangers and risks on board and reducing the number of accidents on board by motivating people to engage in safe behaviour and to encourage owners to invest in safe equipment and techniques and the crews to deal with unsafe situations and acts.

Naturally, this campaign faced various problems and challenges, some by the fishermen themselves. One of the arguments was that the specific character of the fishing sector does not lend itself easily to the development of a good safety culture. The sector has the reputation of being hard and that accidents are simply a normal occurrence. Expressions such as “a fishing boat is no place for weaklings” and “one has to be able to take it” are still common in most EU fishing communities. In this sense, the raising of “reluctant consciousness” had to be taken into account from the outset when introducing safety measures. This, as one can see from recent fatal accidents, is still a battle that has yet to be won. One cannot adopt a reluctant consciousness in matters of safety especially if one is responsible for the safety of others.

Under European directives, employers have responsibilities for the safety and health of their workers. Health and safety requirements for fishing vessels are laid down in European and international legislation and are supposed to be enforced at national level. European legislation includes:

Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work;

Council Directive 93/103/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning the minimum safety and health requirements for work on board fishing vessels. This is aimed at fishing vessels that have a length of 15m or more.

The fishing industry in Malta tends to circumnavigate these directives by building vessels under this length requirement so that it will not be obliged by law to conform to all aspects of the safety regulations. As seen, there is a very hefty price one pays for such an intransigent attitude.

Employers are required to assess risks and take practical measures to protect the safety and health of their workers, keep accident records, provide information and training, consult employees and co-operate with the authorities.

The authorities on their part are to provide the necessary enforcement of legislation and appoint professionally qualified, trained and experienced inspectors to carry out surveys, tests and inspections and to issue relevant safety certificates on an annual basis to fishing boats. It is very doubtful if this is done in Malta and I am sure it does not exist. Hence the term “raising of reluctant consciousness” of safety factors and requirements. We are all conscious of the requirements and needs but we are reluctant to adopt them or enforce them.

The following, in my opinion, contributed in no small measure to the Simshar fatality and to others:

Factors that increase the risk of accidents on board fishing boats

• Long and irregular working hours leading to fatigue;

• Lack of adequate rest, which may rise from factors other than long working hours, such as bad weather conditions;

• Old, or inadequately maintained boats;

• Presence of dangerous machinery;

• Cramped, small workplaces;

• Inherent hazards (the sea, the weather);

• Lack of training or expertise;

• Lack of monitoring of safety performance;

• Hazardous product (poisonous fish);

• Lack of identification of hazards (leaking fuel into bilges; leaking gas; sparking electrical motors, switches, and so on);

• Failure to provide or use safety measures or protective equipment and clothing.

Measures that can be taken to reduce accidents:

• A risk assessment should be conducted before the voyage to identify potential causes of harm and hazards and appropriate measures taken to reduce accident risks on the basis of the assessment.

• All tools and all equipment on board, including life rafts, fire extinguishers, flares and fire-fighting equipment, should be regularly checked and kept in good working order;

• Everyone on board should be suitably trained and qualified;

• Regular safety drills and daily safety instructions are necessary to ensure that skipper and crew know what to do in an emergency, especially in man overboard, fire on board or bad water leakage situations;

• Safety equipment and personal protective equipment for the crew should be provided and used at all times;

• Lifejackets and safety lines should be worn.

It is to be noted here, that the crew of the Simshar were hanging on to dear life, with their hands, to a makeshift raft, without lifejackets and/or safety lines with which they should have been attached to the raft.

Need-to-know aspects for fishermen in order to work safely on board:

• All crew members on board a fishing vessel should be trained and competent, with everyone involved having clear roles and responsibilities relating to health and safety, whether boat owner, captain/skipper, or worker.

• Every person on board should know what to do in case of emergency.

• Fishermen should be sufficiently trained in the following areas:

* personal survival techniques;

* Hi Line transfer (helicopter rescue);

* fire prevention and fire fighting;

* emergency procedures;

* First aid;

* prevention of marine pollution;

* prevention of fishing accidents.

Under the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, if any crew member is not properly trained or aware of emergency procedures, they should request the Owner/ Captain or Skipper to provide the necessary training.

Fishing boats are considered “work places” by the EU and the ILO and prior to the issue of an operational licence, a fishing boat has to be insured. Likewise, the crew being the employees of the owners of a fishing boat have to be registered as such, be in possession of a work book and pay national insurance contributions either as employed or self-employed; every crew member setting out on a fishing trip should be insured against accidents. There have been various incidents on local fishing boats where the victims were not insured. This should be a compulsory requirement for any fishing boat prior to any operational licence being issued.

Finally, as a member State of the European Union, the Maltese government should ensure that all safety legislation is strictly adhered to and enforced and not simply and solely by ratifying conventions, but by having suitably qualified, trained and experienced personnel in risky work environments such as the fishing industry to inspect, train and certify fishing boats and personnel at periodic intervals as required by law.

Inquiries are useful to determine cause and tort, but they in themselves are normally token actions taken by respective governments after an accident occurs to have the circumstances on record and to conform with legislation requirements. They do not in themselves prevent accidents or further future fatalities. Accidents and fatalities can only be averted by the adoption and enforcement of prevention legislation overseen by qualified, trained and experienced persons in the respective fields. There is definitely no room for dilettantes in the marine field, especially in sectors such as the fishing industry where “reluctant consciousness” is rife among most operators and enforcers.

Mr Spiteri is a certificated First Class Marine Engineer (UK). He is a Consultant Marine Surveyor and has carried out numerous Risk Assessments, Casualty Investigations and damage surveys on board ships of all sizes since 1976.