The safety record of Malta’s fireworks factories is “shocking”, a report commissioned after a deadly blast in 2010 notes. But the increasing workload pyrotechnicians face may be pressuring them into being less cautious.

If Maltese fireworks factories shared the safety record of their British counterparts, accidents in Malta would only happen roughly once every 250 years, the government-commissioned report reveals.

Furthermore, the number of accidents and deaths at fireworks factories was on an upward trend, and this trend was likely to continue if certain issues are not addressed. This includes factories’ increasing workload, which put pyrotechnicians – who are practically all volunteers – under increasing pressure.

A board of inquiry – made up of university professors Alfred Vella and Victor Axiak, chemistry teacher Servolo Delicata and Malta Pyrotechnic Association secretary Joseph Theuma – was appointed on 6 September, 2010, a day after an explosion at a fireworks factory in Għarb which claimed six lives. It was tasked with identifying factors which could have caused these accidents and to issue recommendations aimed at increasing safety.

Nine people had been killed in accidents related to the manufacture of fireworks that year, making it the deadliest on record. The next two deadliest years were 2007 and 2005. The report notes that an increase in accidents, injuries and deaths which has taken place since 1981 is statistically significant.

The report’s authors also observe that a year characterised by a high number of accidents is typically followed by a year when incidents are far less frequent. In fact, no deaths were registered in 2006, 2008 and last year.

The board concludes that the trend effectively rules out any issue caused by the quality of chemicals used, as this would not vary so dramatically with such regularity. On the other hand, it suggested that those involved in the production of fireworks became more cautious following serious accidents, only for things to return to normal after a year or two.

“It appears that experience has not been a teacher,” the board writes in its report.

The main cause of accidents was the milling and granulation of gunpowder. But the report indicates that pyrotechnicians were well aware of the risks and took more precautions during the process, and just one person died in the 16 accidents which ensued.

The most deadly processes were mixing chemicals for colour fireworks displays, fuelling lance fireworks and charging colour fountain fireworks with gunpowder, the board discovered.

The inquiry also involved interviewing people involved in fireworks manufacture in a bid to determine their concerns.

The main problem identified appeared to be the increasing workload that pyrotechnicians faced. The number of factories in Malta is actually declining slowly, as some factories are not being rebuilt after an explosion, but the demand for their work is increasing, particularly from Gozo.

The report stresses the need to ensure that the number of fireworks factories is enough to meet demand, although it stops short of directly calling for the construction of more.

The board also noted that pique between fireworks factories – and at times, even within them – was adding to the pressure, a situation not helped by fireworks competitions. Rivalry could also be pushing fireworks factories to experiment with new mixtures which would lead to impressive displays, further adding to the danger.

Several pyrotechnicians lamented that the distribution of potassium nitrate by the Armed Forces of Malta was taking place too late, thus adding to time constraints. The AFM stores potassium nitrate and potassium chlorate – two volatile compounds used in firework manufacture – itself, and distributes it to factories on a quota basis.

As for potassium chlorate itself, the board believes that it should be phased out, replaced with the safer potassium perchlorate after pyrotechnicians receive the necessary training. The report notes that certain uses of the chemical – including mixing it with aluminium and other metals – have already been banned in other EU countries, and recommends immediately banning such practices.

To some extent, potassium perchlorate is already being used locally, although potassium chlorate is generally preferred because it is roughly a third cheaper. The board is adamant that the added expense is justifiable, in light of the safety concerns.

However, it also points out that the introduction of potassium perchlorate on its own may have actually added to the danger, rather than decreased it, as it is not yet limited by quota as the other substances are. This should also be addressed, the board believes.

Most pyrotechnicians have no scientific background, and the board suggests that they should be forced – and helped – to test the sensitivity of the chemical reactions they would use, to avoid the use of mixtures which are too volatile.

It also recommends setting up a well-equipped specialised centre to carry out these tests, as well as to advice manufacturers, possibly through a joint venture involving the government, insurance companies and the pyrotechnics association.

The centre would take over the Fireworks Inspectorate’s educational role, thus allowing it to focus solely on enforcement. The inspectorate should be given sufficient resources to do so, and should be staffed with people who have no potential conflict of interest, the report suggests.

The board also suggests leadership training for fireworks factory licensees, to enable them to keep a tighter rein on the factory. Their inquiry revealed that on a number of occasions, the police had to be called as people within the factory would not obey their orders.