The Malta Independent 15 July 2026, Wednesday
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Malta's place in China’s foreign policy strategy

Tarcisio Zammit Friday, 4 October 2013, 07:51 Last update: about 13 years ago

The recent visit to China by Prime Minister Joseph Muscat to participate in the Annual Meeting of the “Summer Davos” organized by the World Economic Forum on 11 – 13 September in the Chinese city of Dalian, caused ripples in the local media and ruffled many feathers among the Nationalist Opposition.  The controversial Memorandum of Understanding signed by Malta with China Power Investment Corporation on this occasion, once finalized in six months’ time, will make the Chinese state-owned company a minority shareholder of Enemalta to the tune of 35%, and will lead to the setting up of a joint company in Malta for the manufacture of photovoltaic panels to tap the European market.

This involvement with the China Power Investment Corporation overshadowed other elements of the Prime Minister’s visit, among them the medium term cooperation plan covering a number of sectors including education, the services sector and the infrastructure, which was discussed by the Prime Minister with his Chinese counterpart, Mr Li Keqiang.  One should indeed consider this visit as one step further in a long series of high level contacts between Malta and China dating back to 1972, and which all constitute building blocks for a sound mutually beneficial relationship.

This aspect of the visit, together with the Prime Minister’s expectation for more investment by Chinese companies, which may mean more encroachment by China on the Maltese economy, calls for a reflection on the foreign policy strategy of China, and how its readiness “not to do anything with Malta that only benefits China”, (to quote H.E. Ambassador Cai Jinbiao) fits into this strategy.

A discussion on China’s foreign policy strategy should avoid hastily constructed simplistic stereotypes resulting from the excuse that the Chinese system lacks transparency. These will only provide a distorted picture and will not help in understanding where Malta stands with China. Contemporary China is a country of ancient traditions and deeply ingrained cultural philosophies which still exert great influence on the Chinese way of doing things. It is also a country in the process of rapid transformation, modernization and economic development, and which only recently began to overcome its long history of mistrust of foreign powers.

Any sensible and responsible government will conduct its foreign policy on the basis of an assessment relating to: (1) the overall configuration of power in the international system and the direction of change in the system; (2) the country’s own national identity with its specific characteristics and resources as well as its limitations and needs, and (3) diplomatic strategy, that is, the art of using various legitimate and acceptable means to achieve one’s own national interests and objectives. It seems to me that the best way to approach China’s foreign policy strategy is to examine China’s moves as an international actor, including its cooperation with Malta, from the various aspects of these three concepts.

China's perception of the international system has greatly influenced the basic orientation and thrust of its foreign policy. Mao Zedong, having experienced the blockage policies of the United States against the newly founded People’s Republic of China, believed that the international system was predominantly pro-capitalist and hostile. His conclusion was that China had to prepare for war and seek to replace the existing international system. Towards the end of the 1970s, under the influence of Den Xiaoping, and building on the results of a hesitant rapprochement with the United States and other Western countries, China began to recognize that it could pursue its “peaceful rise” policy within the existing international system.  This ushered in a policy of reform and opening-up, which gradually transformed China’s profile within the international community, in spite of some serious set-backs such as the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989. Today’s China is fully integrated into the international system, and is seeking to achieve common development and assume more responsibility in peace-building and solving global issues.

As a rising power, China is much concerned by the international distribution of power - economic, political and military, hard as well as soft power. Chinese foreign policy makers tend to focus on American hegemony, multi-polarity and the emergence of other major rising powers.

It is hard to decipher China’s attitude towards American hegemony.  It recognises the central role that the United States has played in world government through its military and economic might. However, the world leadership of the United States is now being questioned, following the disastrous invasion of Iraq, the prolonged engagement in Afghanistan, and the impact of the financial crisis of 2008

China’s preferred option has long been for a multi-polar international system, in which big powers are mutually checked and constrained, and which serves as a safeguard against unilateralism.

However, there is a growing view among Chinese analysts of international relations that the current multi-polar international system, with the United States in a demi-hegemonic position, is evolving into a more egalitarian system of international relations in which the several poles are gradually flattened.  This explains China’s declared policy of seeking cooperation with all countries on an equal footing.

In Chinese thinking the European Union is a model of a flattened international structure, which has developed a decision-making mechanism based on equality among the member states. Similarly, China considers the emergence of the G-20, which in its view will soon replace the G-8 as the principle policy coordinator of the world economy, as an indication that the transition towards a new wider-based international leadership has started.

 

China clearly believes in soft power.  It commits substantial financial and human resources to development projects in Africa, Latin America and Asia, and is rapidly becoming the leading provider of development finance, surpassing even the World Bank and the IMF. This charm offensive and exercise of soft power is linked to China's insatiable need for natural resources and to its trade agenda. It also serves China's strategic objective of dissuading other states from recognising Taiwan

Where is Malta's place within this all-encompassing Chinese foreign policy strategy? The answer is given by China's Ambassador to Malta, H.E. Mr Cai Jinbiao, in an interview he gave to the Malta Independent published on 26 September 2013.  “China,” he said, “sees Malta as a valuable friend in the Mediterranean and the EU.”

Throughout the interview the Ambassador made China’s agenda on Malta crystal clear.  In recent years there has been a charm offensive highlighted by his Excellency when he  mentioned China's unilateral assistance to Malta – the Grand Harbour Drydock,  Santa Lucija Serenity Garden  and the Chinese Medicine Clinic in Paola.  Now it is time to move to the business of bilateral cooperation “on the basis of equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit”. The Memorandum of Understanding signed with the China Power Investment Corporation in Dalian is a step in this direction, providing finance and job opportunities for Malta and access to the EU market for China. 

It is up to the Maltese government to ensure that this relationship will continue to work to Malta’s advantage.

 

Tarcisio Zammit is a former Ambassador to Belgium and Malta's representative to the EU's Political and Security Committee

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