For the last four years, the Libyans, who by all reasonable criteria are pleasant, decent and moderate folk, have suffered the deceits and vagaries of its political elite. The plundering of national wealth and the abuse of the huge arsenal of weapons, both legacies of the Gaddafi era, has pushed the country to the verge of failure.
Fratricidal fighting under various guises has spawned scores of war lords and caused insane devastation, of which Benghazi has borne the brunt. It has rendered homeless tens of thousands of citizens and closed down schools, universities, banks, hospitals and other services. Unending revenge and feudal hatred have generated chaos and bewilderment as well as widespread despair. People cannot explain how or why a peaceful and tolerant community has suddenly been possessed by unbridled violence.
There are now two quasi parliaments with their associated incompetent governments, whom the UN envoy Bernardino Leon has been dealing with in his search for a solution. However, real power in Libya today resides not in these political bodies but in the armed groups. An understanding of the dynamics of these groups would make the process more fruitful and constructive.
Reconciliation short-sighted
To his credit, Mr Leon has patiently brought Libyan politicians, party leaders and activists to the negotiation tables in various world capitals. The selection of participants has, however, been unrepresentative.
Mr Leon’s creative ideas have sometimes been merely an expression of wishful thinking. His latest contribution has been a proposal to give the Tripoli-based parliament a dominant role in the suggested power structure. This has incensed the other, i.e. the only internationally recognised parliament and its government. Meanwhile, civilian leaders in Misurata, a powerful city state in its own right, have welcomed the proposal, and seem ambitious to play the arbitrator in Libyan politics.
Furthermore, Mr Leon’s final Draft IV of the Libyan Political Accord is punctuated with contradictions. For example, the proposed High Council of State (Article 19) is described as “... the highest consultative body of state...” but empowered to “... express binding opinion...” on legislative matters.
Despite these difficulties, the momentum of reconciliation remains strong because Libyans as a people have been exhausted by the continued havoc of the conflict, and have realised the futility and insanity of war. Mr Leon has not been able to tap into this fund of goodwill.
At the crossroads
Regardless of legal details, it is nevertheless fair to say that the UN initiative to reconcile Libyan factions is at an impasse. The politicians Mr Leon has engaged are unable to deliver any viable response. The suspicions and squabbles over forming a national unity government remain unresolved. Even if such a government is nominally put together, it will be too feeble to forge a lasting peace or stem the security threat to Europe and the flow of illegal migrants.
Indeed, many observers now doubt the merit of dealing solely with the two Libyan rival administrations in Tobruk and Tripoli, both of which were the outcome of flawed elections anyway. Some analysts feel that Western diplomacy should shift its focus from those “whom we want to have in power” on to those “who actually wield it”. In other words, they advise that the US and Europe should deal directly with the armed militia commanders and their related local Shura (advisory) councils.
The dynamics of the gun
As things stand, every oasis, village, town and region in Libya has one or more (sometimes tens) autonomous armed battalions that are operating under different names, guises and allegiances. Occasionally, they may be drawn into local frictions and skirmishes. The majority assume defensive roles, and act as local police. Some large militias have kept a neutral stance in national politics. They remain potentially very important and could be used strategically.
Taking into consideration that alliances shift over time, we can summarise the current scene as follows:
· At one end of the spectrum is General Hefter’s newly-formed army of professional soldiers and officers opposed to all the various militias. The army, originally drawn from the pre-2011 military has shown efficacy and controls the east of Libya and most of Benghazi, but is probably not sufficiently cohesive in the long term.
· At the other extreme, rejecting any form of negotiation, are IS jihadists in Sirte, Sabrata, and until recently in Derna, but with potential cells in various parts of the country.
· The Fajr (Dawn of) Libya battalions are a broad alliance, Misrata-led and Islamic tinted. It is the most powerful group in the west of Libya, controlling the capital Tripoli, and was initially indicted as a terrorist group by the world community. However, due to its relationship with the Tripoli-based parliament, it is now implicitly suggested as the guarantor of the UN Reconciliation proposal. But the Fajr Libya militia is an intricate alliance which may not remain in unison for long.
· The Muqatila, or the Libyan Fighting Group, was established in the 1990s, by Islamic youth to fight Gaddafi. Many of them spent time in Afghanistan but never joined the Qa’edaa of Bin Laden. Since the fall of Gaddafi, the Muqatila have entrenched themselves in the state structure, quietly securing many influential positions including that of Mayor of the Capital Tripoli as well as controlling the strategic Maitigha air base. The Muqatila fight under the banner of Fajr Libya in the west, and as rebels or Thwwaar in Benghazi in the east.
· Interspersed between these groups are various armed formations. Most take a neutral position and are not fighting at present. They belong to traditional influential communities such as Warfalla in the west, the Amazigs of Jebel Naffousa, the Zintan, the Tuareg, and the Tibus of the southern border region. They should be included in any reconciliation negotiations since they could play a positive role as mediators and underwriters, in resolving the Libyan conflict.
Of note and indicative of the constant state of flux between these groups, the Muqatila in Derna have, over the last fortnight, driven IS from the town into the surrounding hills and ravines. In Tripoli, on 5th June, a new front called the Sumoud (Steadfastness) Front, has been carved out of the Fajr militia “to protect the Capital”.
More splintering and regrouping can be expected. But the more likely course of events will not be easily predictable in the long run, and might be similar to a sports tournament, or rather, more sadly, bloody contests reminiscent of those of feudal knights.
In the light of all this diversity and flux, the UN current approach and proposals are no more than an expression of good intention on paper. It is often the case that paper agreements do not necessarily translate into reality, especially when the latter is being reshaped by other forces, in this case guns.