What is happening in Libya is puzzling even to the Libyans. The country seems to have a logic and a sequence all of its own, possibly due to its geography which allows armies, governments and any form of administration or authority to segment and proliferate? In parallel, perceptions and statements by European politicians are contradictory while declarations of summits are vague and hesitant.
But it now seems that the persistent question – whether or not to intervene – has been finally decided. An attempt to root out IS in Sirte is being made by Misratan militias, with the help of Western logistic and technical support. The CNN’s Nick Walsh, reporting from the war zone, reported recently: “US Special Forces and surveillance flights are operating on the ground and over Libya as the West moves to bolster Libya’s increasingly desperate fight against IS.”
But the situation in Libya remains complex, even unpredictable, since alliances are fluid and rapidly changing. It is easier to think of the current wars in that country as a conflict basically between two rival camps, IS excluded. The dividing line separates the Government of National Alliance or Accord (GNA) headed by Faiz Saraj from the ‘General Hifter Camp’. The alliances on either side are heterogeneous and of varied interests.
The GNA has been enthusiastically supported by world powers, even at the expense of violating the agreed Political Accord worked out by the UN mission. The GNA even lacks democratic legitimacy. It has not even been fully formed, remaining incarcerated in a naval base, protected by a fragile alliance of mostly Islamic militias. The GNA camp, guided by the German UN Envoy Martin Kobler, is increasingly led and financed by Misrata, the wealthy and powerful city 200km east of the capital Tripoli and regionally sustained by Qatar and Turkey.
On the opposite side of the divide, General Hifter has built up a fighting Army, supported by the House of Representatives in Tobrug, although the relationship between the two is more symbiotic. This camp is backed by Egypt, which has its own problems with the Muslim Brotherhood, and supported by Russia for a variety of reasons. The Hifter Army has been arduously fighting a devastating street war in Benghazi, for months, against militias of an Islamic Shura Council, said to be backed by the Islamists of Misrata.
Lately, Hifter’s side received a setback when one of its military leaders, Col. Barghathy, accepted the post of Defence Minister with the GNA. The Oil Installations Guards (dating back to the Gaddafi era) has also changed position and expressed allegiance to the GNA. Two other local militias in Benghazi have dissented and were dissolved by the pro-Hifter Government. These developments may have their positive impact as a step towards decontaminating Benghazi of weapon and as such is welcomed by the city’s population.
On 3 May, General Hifter launched what was said to be an offensive to liberate Sirte, which had been occupied by Islamic State fighters since February 2015. Units were moved to the oases of Marada and Zalla. In response, Misratan Militias swiftly moved and achieved initial successes against IS, but at the price of heavy casualties. Hifter’s initiative has since been gulped into silence. The General may be hoping that the Sirte battle will exhaust the Misratan Militias, and open the road to a march onto Tripoli against depleted forces.
Some speculate that the Hifter’s move was a ploy to drag Misratans to an exhausting war in Sirte. However, even if Misratan militias prevail, they may well be bogged down in a quagmire of traditionally antagonistic social nexus of the local Sirte communities namely Firjan (Hifter’s own tribe), Gaddadfas (the late dictator’s clan), Awlad Slaiman (the powerful chieftains of the Fezzan for the last two centuries) and the pastoral Ma’adaan.
The GNA-Misratan alliance is mainly of moderate Islamists. The adjective “Islamist” here refers to the somewhat moderate Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Muqatila militia, led by Hakim Belhaj, who are politically more malleable and cooperative from Western strategic point of view. It may be surprising to Western readers to hear that their governments are backing Islamist militias. But some observers feel that IS is better handled by such Islamic militia. A corroborating model has been recently provided by the eastern city of Derna, once stigmatized as a nest of terrorism. Some two months ago, the local Islamist Shura fighters there succeeded in evicting the extremist IS militias and have been restoring normal life and administration in the town.
Nevertheless, it must be said that an Islamist-dominated Libya is probably unsustainable in the long run. When it comes to the ballot, Islamists have little chance, as happened in the last parliamentary elections. Libyans may be generally devout Muslim but for historical and cultural reasons recoil from extremism and, indeed, from mixing religion and politics.
Against this background, resolution of the Libyan situation will be fraught with complications and further chaos, as long as Western powers insist on their current political approach. The so-called dialogue that lasted for a year and was expensively organised and hosted by the UN, led to a ‘Political Accord’ – nothing more than an impressive document on paper but so far inapplicable. The reason for this is because, in most instances, the participants represented no one. The Western bureaucrats chose to talk to the wrong people. The Libyan politicians and activists with whom the West has been dealing are often without influence, inept, corrupt or short-sighted – and burning with personal ambitions.
Mr Sarraj and his GNA set-up have so far achieved little apart from words of support from various Western and Arab countries. The GNA, hailed by Western diplomats as the only legitimate government, is virtually crippled and, in fact, has been losing credibility day by day for failing to tackle the more immediate needs of the people, namely water, electricity and cash.
All the players on the Libyan stage have ignored the sufferings incurred by the population. The number of displaced people has reached a staggering half a million – or 15 per cent of the population. Indeed, the priorities must include the lifting of general hardships, a measure that could diffuse much of the tension that is hindering any meaningful dialogue. It will also move large numbers of young people away from the ‘business of war’ to normal living. A ceasefire must also be sought and implemented in eastern Benghazi, the second largest Libyan city and the ‘password’ to the Libyan psyche. A new government has to have“ostpolitik” sensitivity! Leaders with influence in their local communities and commanders of armed formations must also be involved in the political process.
As things are, what prevails in Libya today is a balance of the weak. No single faction is able to defeat their rivals or settle the volatile situation. The state is crumbling and sinking and the economy is prey to criminals. The battle for Sirte may be won by Misrata and Islamic Militias, temporarily on behalf of GNA, but that will only open the gates to a more ferocious conflict between them and the Hifter Camp. Meanwhile the IS threat continues. But then, is the fight against IS a containable ‘side show’ compared with the flood of illegal migration which is really what Europe sees as the main scary aspect of the Libyan crisis? Crises are often exploited for different ends, so there will be those who may find an IS presence in the heart of the Libyan desert useful in destabilising neighbouring countries.
Only a new vision and a fresh approach can salvage Libya from its present chaos, and secure the southern shores of Europe!
M Mufti is a commentator on Libyan issues and author of several books on social and political history of Libya including the ‘Diaries of the February 2011 Revolution’.