This case concerned a claim for damages in relation to injuries incurred at the workplace. The main dispute, however, became one of prescription of an action for damages.

The plaintiff was employed with the defendant company when he allegedly had an accident at his place of work. The plaintiff claimed that his injuries were caused by the defendant company’s negligence, imprudence, want of attention and failure to provide a safe place of work or a safe system of work. The plaintiff alleged that as a result of the accident, he suffered damages, also of a personal and permanent nature. The plaintiff allegedly called upon the defendant company to make good the damages suffered however, the latter party allegedly remained in default. The plaintiff therefore requested the court to:

1. Declare that the plaintiff’s injuries were imputable to the defendant company’s negligence, imprudence, want of attention and failure to provide a safe place of work or a safe system of work as is required by Law.

2. Liquidate the damages due to him

3. Condemn the defendant company to pay such liquidated damages

The defendant company inter alia claimed that:

1. The circumstances, the date and the place of the disputed accident were not indicated by the plaintiff

2. Should the plaintiff be indeed referring to the accident of the 28 March 2006, the plaintiff’s action was prescribed in terms of Article 2153 of the Civil Code (Chapter 16-Laws of Malta).

3. In any case, should the plaintiff be referring to the accident of the 28 March 2008, the accident should not be attributable to its alleged negligence, imprudence, want of attention and failure provide a safe place of work or a safe system of work as is required by Law. Indeed, the plaintiff’s injuries occurred through fault of his own.

4. The allegation that the defendant company failed to provide a safe place of work or a safe system of work did not render the latter company responsible unless it was proved that the alleged failure was indeed the cause of the accident.

5. It does in fact provide a safe place of work.

6. Regarding the plaintiff’s allegation, he had, from the beginning of his employment with the defendant company, complained of pain in his right hand due to an accident which occurred when he was young.

The court considered the facts of the case including how, upon the accident taking place, the plaintiff had gone to hospital and spent three months in a cast and undergoing therapy. He claimed to have found out about the nature of his injuries two years after the accident had taken place.

The court made reference to Article 2153 of the Civil Code which states: “Actions for damages not arising from a criminal offence are barred by the lapse of two years.”

The Court referred to a series of judgements delivered by our local courts which considered the issue of prescription. The Court, inter alia noted that according to such judgements as well as legal doctrine, prescription starts to run from the day that the illicit fact giving rise to the damages occurs and not from the date that the aggrieved party becomes aware of such fact.

The court noted that the disputed damages did not arise from a criminal offence and therefore, in the event that the conditions established by law are indeed satisfied, Article 2153 would be applicable. The court therefore held that as of the date of the accident, the plaintiff could have instituted proceedings accordingly. The court in fact referred to Article 2137 of the Civil Code which states that “Subject to any other provisions of the law, the prescription of an action commences to run from the day on which such action can be exercised, irrespective of the state or condition of the person to whom the action is competent.”

Article 2138 further states that “(1) Prescription is reckoned by whole days, and not by hours. (2) The days are running days: The months are reckoned according to the calendar."

Furthermore, Article 2128 holds “Prescription is also interrupted by any judicial act filed in the name of the owner or of the creditor, served on the party against whom it is sought to prevent the running of prescription, showing clearly that the owner or creditor intends to preserve his right.”

The court noted that no such judicial letter that could interrupt prescription was served by the plaintiff.

The court also considered the plaintiff’s contention that proceedings could only be instituted once it is established that the damages suffered are of a permanent nature. The plaintiff made reference to a series of cases, in particular a judgement delivered in 2005 by the Court of Appeal in its Inferior Jurisdiction wherein it was held that in the case of actions for damages, prescription starts to run the moment the damage manifests itself externally and becomes objectively perceivable and known. The plaintiff reiterated that such moment in his case was when he was provided with a medical certificate by his consultant in April 2008. The court however noted that the facts of the case referred to were very different to this one and that in this case, the moment the damage manifested itself externally and became objectively perceivable and known was the same moment the damage was suffered.

On the basis of the above and further considerations, the court upheld the defendant company’s prescription claim and therefore rejected the plaintiff’s requests in their entirety.