A question which is often raised with regard to genetics is that when we identify certain genes with behaviour, then we are more inclined to that kind of behaviour. There is no denying that if one is pre-disposed to a certain condition, then the right environment will make it more likely that that condition manifests itself.
Of course when it comes to certain behaviours we may justify that behaviour because of our genes. The question is whether lawyers will use this ‘genetic determinism’ in defence of people accused of crime, and indeed whether the court will take this into consideration.
Genetic determinism is not ‘genetic essentialism’ – which basically says that we are our genes. We are not in fact solely what our genes say. A lot of what genes manifest in the person is due to the environment – which is now referred to as the epigenetic environment. Of course, courts of law have been known to take into consideration the conditions of people. Although committing a crime when you are under the influence of drugs is not an excuse – for you were quite autonomous in choosing to take that drug – one considers the fact of addiction and its detrimental effect on behaviour, making one commit certain crimes in order to buy that drug on which one depends. Courts, rather than lowering sentences however make these individuals go on a programme. But if we know that some have a ‘crime gene’, is this not a determining factor?
We will come to the epigenetic environment in a moment – first we have to settle the issue of free will. For if I am not free to determine my behaviour then it may well be the case that I could not have prevented the crime I committed. Free will has been under discussion for a long time and certainly I will not propose a solution. What I can say is that I do not find what the whole ado is about. Students who study sciences (not all of those who come from the arts) will easily acknowledge that in reality colours do not exist.
There are only wavelengths which the brain has learned to discriminate. Although we all call a certain shade red or blue, we are not certain that we are in fact seeing the same shade. But does this means that the phenomenon of colour does not exist. Of course not! Even if it exists in the mind (a figment of neural networks – so as not to insult the reader by saying ‘imagination’), it is a reality which has served for man’s survival. There are colours which we don’t see and others which only we see but other animals do not. It is a matter of evolutionary discretion. But tell a black man that his skin colour has not had an effect on his life!
Therefore as the phenomenon of colour exists whilst the theory of knowledge (epistemology) tells us it does not in reality exist other than in our neurological function heads, it is the same for free will. It is quite obvious that everything has a cause; and this will not exempt our thoughts. It is also obvious that we perceive free will and life – including court sentences handed down – have worked on this assumption. In fact my decision depends on thoughts (unless it came out of no-where and in which case there was no rationality anyway) and other experiences – some conscious and some unconscious. What true mystery we cannot explain is not free will but the phenomenon of consciousness. If a man-made replica of a human had to be technically photocopied, will it have consciousness? (I think it would if it is exactly the same). But the point is that the conscious thoughts are the causal factors. The fact they are conscious determines us to ‘be’ free.
If this is the case, then reducing a sentence based on genetic determinism will remove the deterrent – the only causal factor which is determining the epigenetic environment in this case. If we remove all deterrents, then that gene will manifest itself all the more – and this would be through a conscious logic – if I am not going to be held liable then I might as well commit the crime. If I know I will still be handed a guilty verdict, even if the courts had to take genes into consideration, then I will have a determining force causing me to reason that I ought not to commit the crime.
The morale is that we cannot separate genes from the epigenetic environment. Using genes as an excuse (or, for that matter, because other animals do it) has been used in the past to justify behaviour. The quicker we move away from this idea, the better.
Pierre Mallia is Associate Professor in Family Medicine, Patients’ Rights and Bioethics at the University of Malta; he is also Ethics Advisor to the Medical Council of Malta. He is also former president of the Malta College of Family Doctors