The government insists that there is no cause for concern with having a floating storage unit in the middle of Marsaxlokk, what do you think?

Well if I were a Mepa board member, because it is the Mepa board members who will ultimately decide whether this project goes ahead as planned or otherwise not the government, I would not be particularly happy. Both OHSA and Mepa cannot and certainly should not take a decision without first carrying out a maritime impact assessment. As I have stated elsewhere, a maritime impact assessment will assess whether an FSU carrying 126,000 cubic metres, either alone or together with its monthly supply vessel of equal proportions, will affect the thousands of manoeuvres inside this very busy primary commercial harbour; whether the FSU with or without an adjacent supply ship will impact  the turning circle for the larger vessels to get into Freeport or oil tanking; what  the effect of strong south easterly winds and seas will have on the FSU and on its supply ship; whether the harbour will be closed to traffic during ship to ship transfers which we are informed will take 24 hours;  what are the risks of a collision between any traffic in this geographically restricted busy waterway with the FSU or the supply ship; what the effects of such a collision would be. At the public consultation meeting, we were promised that this would be done. To my knowledge, it has not yet been done.

Last week, the Papadakis report was published and the report is being used to prove that the risks are minimal. What are your views?

First of all, what was published is a “summary” of a “preliminary report”. It concludes that the risks are minimal. However, the report contains an extremely important “assumption” which is like a disclaimer. It actually states on pages 22 and 24 that the immediate ignition of gas releases is a “remote possibility” because it is assumed that the areas within the regasification unit and the FSU location are ignition free! This is only part of the picture. What people want to know is what would be the effect of an ignition source right next to the release of gas, such as in the case of a collision between one of the vessels entering or leaving the harbour with the FSU or its supply ship? Last Sunday, Din l-Art Helwa’s expert, Prof. Passman, indicated that in such an eventuality the effect would be “devastating”. If I were a Mepa board member, under no circumstance would I approve such a project without having this question answered black on white by Dr Papadakis. Mepa board members have a huge responsibility which the government has so conveniently placed squarely on their shoulders.

Last Monday, the Prime Minister stated that he was advised that if they had to place the FSU outside the port, they would have problems with regard to maritime navigation and sea currents, which pose riskier problems and that they chose the safest option. Do you agree?

I would love to have a discussion with the person who gave him that advice because I have a number of reservations and several questions. First of all, for whom is this option of having the FSU inside, rather than outside, safer? In certain weather conditions, it might be safer for the FSU to be inside but in any weather conditions and under all circumstances, it is certainly not safer for the harbour, the residents of the harbour area, for the substantial maritime activities which line the harbour, for the very power station itself. Having the FSU inside is certainly not safer for them! Furthermore, in severe south easterly sea conditions, it would not be safer for the FSU either to be tied to a jetty inside Marsaxlokk harbour; in such conditions the FSU would most certainly be better off out of the harbour. This is because, as every seaman and captain can attest, the worst position for a ship to be in when facing direct, ferocious and unprotected weather conditions is anywhere near the coast because of the effect that the surge and swell will have in relatively shallow waters close to shore and because of the strength of the wind and waves against vessels moored alongside in such weather. Anyone who observes the activities at Freeport and Oiltanking can vouch for the fact that in these prevailing severe weather conditions, vessels tied alongside need tugs to stop the vessels from breaking their moorings for the entire duration of the bad weather. How many tugs will be required to hold the Gemini in place? What are the risks of the Gemini breaking her moorings in such conditions? What would be the effect of the Gemini breaking her moorings? No wonder the Captain of the Gemini insisted that he needs a breakwater to protect the FSU, which I believe will be a dead ship with no engine power against the notorious south easterly seas. 

As for the risks associated with other maritime traffic outside the harbour, there are similar semi-permanent installations out at sea all the time, such as oil rigs and similar installations. These are appropriately marked on nautical charts through appropriate notices to mariners, they are well lit, they are surrounded by special marker buoys and cardinal buoys and there would typically be patrolled exclusion zones excluding traffic for a given radius around the installation. The FSRU in Livorno has an exclusion zone of two kilometres. It stands to reason that the risks of a collision between a vessel and an FSRU (floating storage regasification unit) out at sea is much more remote than a collision between one of the thousands of moves in and out of the harbour and the FSU or its supply ship moored in the middle of Marsaxlokk. The reason why I mention an FSRU out at sea is because, in that case, it would make sense for the regasification unit to be on board. In any event, the effect of a collision outside harbour and inside harbour are incomparable! No prizes for guessing which poses the greater security and safety threat and risk!