'BBB+/A-2' ratings affirmed
Overview
- In our view, Malta's economic growth prospects remain strong relative to
- its EU and 'BBB' rating category peers.
- We expect budgetary consolidation to continue, leading net general
- government debt to decline to 55% of GDP in 2018, from 59% in 2014.
- We are therefore revising our outlook on Malta to positive from stable and
- affirming our 'BBB+/A-2' ratings.
- We do not believe events in Greece will have a material bearing on Malta's
- credit profile.
- The positive outlook reflects a one-in-three likelihood of an upgrade
- within the next 24 months if medium-term economic growth prospects are
- maintained and fiscal consolidation continues, while no bank- or
- nonfinancial public enterprise-related contingent liabilities or external
- risks materialize.
Rating Action
On July 10, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Malta to positive from stable. At the same time, we affirmed our 'BBB+/A-2' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings.
Rationale
Malta's real GDP grew by 3.5% in 2014, and we project that it will expand by close to 3% annually on average in 2015 2018.
We believe Malta's economy will continue to outpace the eurozone as a whole, notably because of investments in the energy sector.
Investments include the laying of an interconnector cable to Sicily (currently in a testing phase), as well as the building of a liquefied natural gas terminal, a natural gas plant, and the conversion of an oil-fired plant to gas, all expected to be finalized in 2016.
Beyond 2016, further diversification of the economy--particularly into information and communication technology and medical tourism--could boost investment.
Moreover, we expect domestic demand to be backed by stronger private consumption, resulting from government-mandated cuts to utility tariffs that have reduced electricity prices by 25%.
Lastly, consumption trends are being supported by rising real wages and, more importantly, broader female participation in the labor market.
On the external side, we view Malta as an open, services-oriented economy.
We expect the tourism sector will continue to perform well on the back of a favorable euro/pounds sterling exchange rate, the increased perception of terrorism-related risks in some other Southern Mediterranean countries, and the current turmoil in Greece.
The low corporate tax rate has attracted significant foreign investment into Malta's banking, insurance, and gaming industries, implying that the economy would be sensitive to potential pressure for a eurozone-wide standardization of corporate tax regimes.
We expect that Malta will run a small current account surplus over our 2015-2018 forecast horizon, and remain in a narrow net external asset position of about 16% of current account receipts (CARs) on average during 2015-2018.
Nevertheless, we note that gross external financing needs are high, at about 255% of CARs plus usable reserves on average during 2015-2018, mainly reflecting the large financial sector.
Indeed, offshore banks dominate Malta's international investment position. We understand that foreign banks use Malta as a booking center for their own financing needs.
We believe that Malta's favourable economic growth prospects support further budgetary consolidation.
We forecast general government consolidation to progress gradually through 2018, primarily owing to increased tax receipts from strengthening domestic demand and the expected decline in current expenditure from 2016 onward.
We expect net general government debt to decrease to 55% of GDP by 2018, from 59% in 2014.
We forecast general government gross debt to be 68% of GDP in 2015, excluding the guarantees related to the European Financial Stability Facility.
We forecast general government interest payments will average 7.1% of general government revenues per year over 2015-2018.
Malta's contingent fiscal liabilities stemming from NFPEs derive mostly from Enemalta's government guaranteed debt (9.7% of GDP as of end-March 2015).
Enemalta will likely not generate profits until 2017. We note that the current drop in international oil prices is helping Enemalta's expected return on investments.
Nevertheless, other state-owned enterprises also represent fiscal risks, as exemplified by this year's government financial support to Air Malta, estimated at 0.5% of GDP.
Government guarantees of NFPE debt totaled 16% of GDP at year-end 2014.
Moreover, we note that without further reforms in the pension and health care
systems, public finances will become strained in the medium term.
Under our criteria, we see contingent fiscal risks to public finances coming from the banking sector.
Malta's domestic banking sector operates alongside a large offshore sector which, we believe, the government would not support in case of financial distress. However, dislocations in their funding could affect the island's reputation as a financial center.
Assets of the total banking sector are nearly 7x GDP while assets of core domestic banks amounted to about 2x GDP.
As of end March 2015, domestic systemically important banks include 25% state-owned Bank of Valleta (total assets €9.3 billion) and HSBC Malta Bank (total assets €5.9 billion). To this list, we would add fast-growing Mediterranean Bank (total assets €2.9 billion), which we expect to join the other two under ECB supervision soon.
Among core domestic banks, the increase in nonperforming loans (NPLs) to 9.1% of total loans as of March 2015 remains a challenge for the economy, with almost half of NPLs in the construction and commercial real estate sectors.
Banks' aggregate loan loss provisioning rose to 43.9% as of March 2015, which we still consider low.
Indeed, banks take a while to realize collateral in Malta, a characteristic that we regard as common to small jurisdictions.
Membership in the eurozone anchors Malta's monetary policy and provides its banks access to funding at low nominal interest rates.
Nevertheless, we believe that membership in a monetary union increases the onus on member governments to support competitiveness through fluid labor, product, and services markets, and to build up fiscal buffers against future shocks.
This is more the case now than a year ago, given that the ECB is undershooting its medium-term price stability target of close to, but lower than, 2% for the eurozone as a whole.
We note that nominal unit labor costs have been increasing at one of the fastest rates in the euro area, posing risks for competitiveness when many euro area neighbors are undertaking structural reforms and internal devaluations.
We do not believe events in Greece will have a material bearing on Malta's credit profile. Like all Eurozone members, Malta is exposed through common monetary, fiscal, and development institutions such as the European Central
Bank, the European Financial Stability Facility, and the European Investment Bank.
Apart from contingent liabilities associated with those institutions, Malta's exposure to Greece is limited. Malta's trade with Greece is small and direct financial links are few.
We assess the external debt of Malta's domestic banks as sufficiently contained such that Malta would cope with a permanent real increase in external funding costs spilling over to eurozone markets from Greece.
Overall, the ratings on Malta are supported by our assessment of Malta's economic growth prospects, solid external position although with data discrepancies, and gradual budgetary consolidation, which we expect will place the government's debt-to-GDP trajectory on a steady downward course.
Sizable government debt and contingent liabilities continue to constrain the ratings, however.
Outlook
The positive outlook reflects our opinion of at least a one-in-three likelihood that we could upgrade Malta within the next 24 months if medium-term growth continues without a return to significant current account deficits.
We could also raise the ratings if fiscal consolidation advances faster than we currently expect while no contingent liabilities or external risks materialize for the government.
We could revise the outlook to stable if, all else being equal, we observe that economic growth prospects are weakening, the government's budgetary position fails to improve as expected, or risks to the economy's external position increase.