The Malta Independent 18 May 2024, Saturday
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‘Collapse occurred suddenly, without advance notice’ – magisterial inquiry

Wednesday, 26 July 2023, 16:51 Last update: about 11 months ago

Perit Alex Torpiano, who was appointed as an expert in the magisterial inquiry into the death of Jean Paul Sofia, said there was no advance warning of the collapse.

“The testimony of workers on site, the films collected from security cameras as well as photos of the site after the incident, provide clues as to the collapse. The collapse was one that occurred suddenly, without any advanced notice and without any noise before the ceiling began caving in.”

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“The near total collapse of the building took a few seconds. The only part of the structure to remain standing was the staircore, which included the stairs, a shaft for a lift, a toilet and a service shaft.” He described it as a core that was characterized by a series of short walls, connected to each other at times, with ceilings of reinforced concrete, “a structure that is known for its lateral stiffness.”

“It is normal that any structure that is not laterally stiff would have at least part of its structure, for example the core as explained above, that would be rigid enough and that you clout tie to, and as such stabilize, the whole structure. In this case, the core didn’t collapse.”

He said that he considered various hypothesis as to what could have caused the collapse, by evaluating different scenarios.

The architect also took note that the majority of material did not fall inside the site, but out of it, particularly on the western side. “This means that the relevant mechanism was one that threw the western wall outwards.”

He said that the evidence showed that the mechanism of collapse began on the long wall.

He found that calculations confirm that “because of the height of the western wall, the length of the same wall between the front and back walls, as well as the number of big openings in the same wall and, not least, the fact that the double walls were not tied, according to the undersigned expert, the western wall was not stable, and could have fallen at any moment.

When this wall began leaning outwards, probably on a horizontal axis between the bottom windows, on the ground floor, and the windows above, probably in the central part of the same wall, there was nothing to stop the wall from continuing to completely fall, he wrote.

At the back, there were some ties with the back wall, and that is why some storey’s remained in place. At the front, where there were two enormous openings, over a height of 5.4 metres, there was nothing that could prop up (jirfed) the wall, and that is why everything fell. In the failure to join the walls, by means of reinforcing the ceiling, between the same wall and the staircore and lift, there was nothing to stop the wall from totally collapsing. And, as the wall fell, all the ceilings fell.”

“This is the only explanation that conforms with all the evidence, that is with the configuration of the front and long-side walls, with the information regarding the construction, the remains following the collapse, with the workers’ testimony, as well as calculations based on the geometry of the building.”

“While the staircore and the lift was a stable structure, compared to the rest, unfortunately, the rest of the building was not tied well with this structure, and that is why everything collapsed except for the core, (and one wall that was demolished by the CPD in the search for Sofia to make the area more safe.)

On the roles of entities assuring control, CEO of the Occupational Health and Safety Authority (OHSA) Dr Mark Gauci said in his testimony that the owners of the building did not inform the authority, as they were supposed to, and the project did not fall under the authority’s radar.

Gauci said that there were no inspections carried out by the authority’s officials, not even to check if the site was safe for workers, if there was the necessary protection, if the workers wore the appropriate protective clothing, etc.

There was also nobody to ensure that the requisites of regulations on the place of work (referring to the minimum needs for health and safety in construction sites) were not satisfied.

Gauci said that one look at all the photos during construction, citing those exhibited by Matthew Schembri, from Architect Adriana Zammit’s files extracted by the police, and in Jean Paul Sofia’s mobile phone, shows clearly that none of the workers had ever worn protective clothing.

Because the site is in an industrial area, there was no need for permits by the Planning Authority, such as in other buildings. Only a notification was required. The proces-verbal said that this is an institutional choice which encourages the perception that there was no need for frequent controls in the construction of factories, where there are many workers.

Due to the fact that the building did not touch with third parties, there was also no need for the owners to apply the requisites of Legal Notice 136 of 2019, which includes a Site Technical Officer, and insurance coverage. 

As a consequence, the building rarely showed up under the Building and Construction Authority’s radar. During the two years and a half of the project, BCA officials never visited the site, and according to BCA representative Sean Mizzi’s testimony, this was also due to a lack of resources.

For the same reason, there was no need for a “Method Statement,” and consequently, for the certifications of cranes or apparatus.

“The hearings of testimonies in this case give a clear picture of amateurism and haphazardness in the construction industry, which does not reflect seriousness, nor the dangers of work at the sites.” 

According to Torpiano, this was the context which led to the building collapse of 3 December 2022.

In his conclusions, Torpiano said that the main reason for the collapse was the structural design of the building, which failed to consider aspects of wall stability, according to applicable standards, as well as resilience or ties of the structure against the catastrophic collapse in the case of an incident. "The configuration of the walls, big apertures, on two sides, resulted in a lack of structural capacity of the long side wall, that carries the weight on it. The failure to tie changed this failure into a total and catastrophic collapse."

The expert's report also found that the designs by the architect did not include instructions about how metal bars between planks had to terminate on the wall, to provide the necessary ties. While metal in the concrete ceilings is specified and in the beams, "nowhere is it indicated how this will be tied, as is required by the standards of design, so that the building will have the necessary resilience."

"The plan of details completely lacks appreciation about how the same building had to be tied together. And, since there were no specific instructions, these ties, between the metal within the plank and the spreader beam, or between the metal in the ceilings and the metal in the beams, was not given."

The expert's report also read that Perit Zammit failed to conduct an inspection of the construction process, to be sure that the workers and those managing them understand the importance of certain construction details, and to ensure that her design was being completely followed.

The expert also said that Matthew Schembri and Kurt Buhagiar failed to appoint a licensed mason, or a person with the technical qualifications, to run work on the site. "This aside from the fact that they did not file the necessary notifications with the Health and Safety Authority on the workplace (but this did not directly contribute to the collapse). It was also Architect Zammit's obligation to ensure that a licensed mason was appointed." Since no supervisor was appointed, the responsibilities for regulations fell on the clients, the expert said.

The expert noted that direction from the contractor, "which according to the testimony of Matthew Schembri and Kurt Buhagiar, was meant to be appointed by MilMar Construction and its director Milomir Jovicevic, "was effectively completely missing, with the role of Milmar practically limited to providing workforce, and this with workers who did not have the necessary training. The effective role of directing the work, seems to have been one of the directors of AllPlus Limited, the report read. "It does not result that Matthew Schembri had the technical requirements to run a construction site. It appears that he did in as a conduit so that the instructions of the architect would reach the site and to order the required materials. But he wasn't even on site continuously, and said that on occasion they would send him photos to update him about works." Jean Paul Sofia was the person doing that from 22 September onwards, the report read, as emerged from video and audio messages between them.

Sofia, the report reads, was an employee of Whitefrost, not of AllPlus or MilMar. The role of WhiteFrost remained unclear, "but it certainly had a significant role, even though from testimony and documents it wasn't mentioned as having a role as contractor on the project. It is certain that some material was ordered by this company, but it is not clear what the relationship between the clients of the project, AllPlus, and Whitefrost is, except that Matthew Schembri is a director and shareholder of both.

The report read that on the day of the collapse, Sofia went to the construction site twice. The first time it seemed that he was driving a WhiteFrost can to carry material to and from the site. The second time it appears he went on the roof to see and take photos of the works, it read. "If Jean Paul Sofia wasn't one of the workers working on the site, how was he able to enter and exit from an intrinsically dangerous site without any control or authorization, and no personal protective gear? The lack of experience of employees in this line of work is a shortcoming of both the contractor who hired them, as well as the system, which while placing lots of control on many things, makes no control over who works on construction sites."

It also read that Milomir Jovicevic, as Milmar's director, "who according to Matthew Schembri and Kurt Buhagiar was the contractor, failed to take effective control of the construction project and provide trained workers."


 

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