Ombudsman Joseph Zammit McKeon has long been lamenting the frustrating deadlock in parliament that has been leading to his office's reports of improper government practices being consistently ignored and not acted upon.
This is a real pity as the incumbent Ombudsman embodies the art of an effective Ombudsman by improving access to justice, insisting on accountability and endeavouring to improve public services.
To date, he has amply shown how he has a clear and doable three-fold vision for his office. He is continually striving to make his office more user-led and responsive to citizens, holding the government to account and supporting improvements to public services while insisting on having more powers to provide the most effective Ombudsman service.
The government must lend a helping hand in reaching such welcome and much-needed objectives.
The government and the Ombudsman need to talk constructively about how they can align their roles and their goals and collectively improve life for those who've been let down and need their help.
It is time to revive the parliamentary dimension of the Ombudsman's role. The original intention of the role was to provide parliament with an independent and impartial service to handle complaints about public administration. Yet, without coercive powers to hold public bodies to account, the current remit, while undoubtedly useful, appears outdated and flawed.
When the Ombudsman's Office finds something has gone wrong and there's no evidence of learning, it lays its reports in Parliament to ensure that the public body is held to account. This is its role. It's not a popular one. It's a heavy responsibility, and the office takes it seriously.
Apart from that, the incumbent Ombudsman seems to have adopted a somewhat new strategy as he commits to identifying and calling out flagrant breaches of fundamental and human rights where he sees them. Protecting and promoting fundamental rights is a key role of public ombudsman services, as set out by the Venice Commission in their Venice Principles on the protection of ombudsman institutions.
With a strong reputation for impartiality and neutrality, it is unacceptable how the government and public officials too often fail to recognise the importance of the ombudsman's recommendations regarding administrative practices.
We have never had a single instance when government agencies proactively sought the guidance of the ombudsman office to ensure fairness in the development and implementation of administrative policies.
As things stand, the ombudsman's office has few express powers to impose or enforce binding decisions. Rather, the office's effectiveness originates from its status or influence as an impartial investigator, by which it is perceived as non-threatening and helpful to both parties. The role of the ombudsman office is, in effect, that of an extrajudicial body.
Unfortunately, there is a very low rate of governmental voluntary compliance and acceptance of ombudsman office findings, with many recommendations not acted upon or acted upon in an unsatisfactory manner.
The Ombudsman's Office is a state entity, meaning it relies on public funds and must maintain political support for continued funding. Thus, it is in an awkward position to investigate the government while relying on funds from the government.
That notwithstanding, the Ombudsman Office seeks to settle complaints in a manner that can enhance public understanding of the government and improve agency administration. Its effectiveness is largely measured by its ability to influence broader administrative reforms. Office effectiveness and efficiency are often influenced by the legal authority granted to the ombudsman and the realities of operating such an office.
The Ombudsman's up to now generally soft law powers can hardly ever hope to impact our country in a way that can hold back anti-democratic impulses, the undermining of the rule of law, the environmental depletion, let alone the rampant institutional corruption.
When we see the Ombudsman's role as being able to lend its power to the powerless citizens to enable them to deal with a powerful administration as equals, then we can confidently conclude that his office is truly serving its purpose.
Ironically, the Ombudsman's role is also one that protects the administration from itself. The institutional urge to serve its own interests can be a strong one; the desire to defend itself from criticism is equally strong. Groupthink can set in and with it the failure to see risk, to see the bigger picture.
An administration may focus on legal or political risk without fully considering the wider public interest. It is the Ombudsman's job to coax it away from the security of black-and-white decision-making and into a greyer, messier reality.
We have had more than one administrative failure to deal with certain problems when they were still small, allowing them to build to a point where they became overwhelming.
The transformation of the Ombudsman's role arises more squarely if the Ombudsman is called on to exercise a determinative function, with one feature being a statutory power to make a binding determination in certain situations.
Beyond our shores, for example, some ombudsman offices, especially those with an active human rights or anti-corruption mandate, may initiate court proceedings to enforce their recommendations.
Above all, however, our parliament must first start showing due respect to the Ombudsman's Office and constitutional role by setting up a dedicated parliamentary committee to act upon all recommendations submitted by the Office together with any proposed legislative ideas and suggested practice modifications.
The Ombudsman's Office can become a unique tool for ordinary citizens.