Theoretically, our democratic system is dependent on regular elections and citizens' legitimacy beliefs. A voter's reaction to an electoral outcome is crucial for the functioning, stability, and very existence of electoral democracy.

In fact, democratic systems depend on the premise that voters accept an election's outcome and recognise the legitimacy of the electoral process and the political system, regardless of whether they win or lose. In this respect, electoral losers who are unsatisfied with the result demonstrate a normal democratic reaction, but losers who lose faith in the system and start questioning its evenhandedness can pose a real threat to the system.

Having said that, what has been happening these last few years in our beloved Malta? We already know that winners and losers of the electoral competition differ significantly in terms of important political legitimacy beliefs, such as their level of satisfaction with democracy, trust in institutions and political trust more generally. How have these different indicators of legitimacy beliefs been affected by repeated electoral defeats for the nationalist party?

Being continually denied access to power has gradually eroded the general support of the entire political system among the PN's share of the electorate. Building on these insights, I contend that repeatedly losing resembles a form of long-term exclusion from the benefits of political power because repeated losers do not see their preferred party in power over several electoral cycles.

I further argue that repeatedly losing, compared to losing once, has additional negative effects on legitimacy beliefs because people lose faith in the system and start questioning its evenhandedness on a fundamental level.

Focusing on democratic losers rather than winners is important because of the central role of losers' consent in the peaceful transition of power, their subsequent acceptance of decision-making, and the connected longevity of our democratic setup. Accepting the outcome of an election and perceiving the system as legitimate does not seem problematic for those who won the electoral competition, as they are presumably very satisfied with the process that led to the victory of 'their' party or candidate. Losers' support, however, is less evident.

Losers' support requires that they recognise the legitimacy of a system and a procedure that have led to an unfavourable outcome. Nevertheless, it is this consent that is vital for electoral democracy. If losers deny the system's legitimacy, they might not voluntarily turn over power or adhere to the decisions and laws of the new government. This objective or subjective exclusion from political power over several electoral cycles could be expected to depress the legitimacy beliefs of uninterrupted losers.

Exclusion from the benefits of electoral victory dampens citizens' belief in the righteousness of political institutions and the prospective delivery of favourable outcomes-at least in the short term. It appears as if a repeated defeat spurs scepticism about the regime's institutions and their setup rather than the system's performance. Obtaining losers' consent is therefore one of the central, if not the central, requirements of the democratic process.

It is an indispensable requirement, as our democracy is unique in the extent to which its stability depends on legitimacy-a belief on the part of the public that the system of government in this country has a moral title to rule. Moral assessments of political authority are always, to some extent, relative. People may not love their system of government, but it is important that they at least see it as better than any alternative they can imagine. As Churchill aptly put it, no one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.

Yet there is a difference between popular acceptance of a regime in the absence of any immediate alternative and a deep popular commitment to its moral worth. We must also distinguish between "performance legitimacy" and "intrinsic legitimacy." The former is more superficial: people support a political system because it works for the moment to maintain order, generate economic growth and produce other public goods. But the danger with legitimacy that is based purely on performance is that it can evaporate when the performance goes bad.

The performance yardstick can be quite vulnerable to vicissitudes, especially if difficult times last a very long time, as our country experienced some time ago. Political legitimacy has many possible sources. People might see authority as morally right if forged by the personal charisma of a transformative leader, whether democratic or autocratic. But to be sustained, legitimacy must be institutionalised through rules and procedures, the rational-legal bases of authority.

People will obey rules when they are perceived to work fairly and well over the long run-or in the absence of any alternative. But in the face of an extended crisis of performance, for example, a protracted increase in economic inequality, two or more decades of stagnant or declining incomes for a large swath of the population, or a broader sense of general malaise, much of the population may lose faith in the political system. And when that happens, a systemic alternative is bound to present itself.

The real danger that our established democracy faces is the creeping path to autocracy, in which a "strong" elected leader would seek to sideline or undermine established institutions and constraints.

When that happens, such a leader would not need to bother with constitutional constraints and could simply "get things done."

Dr Mark Said is a lawyer